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SWEDISH NEUTRALITY AND THE COLD WAR, 1945 -1949. 
Introduction. 
Why did Sweden stay neutral at the height of the Cold War? Other countries, 
with a comparable tradition of neutrality, abandoned their old foreign policy 
because they felt they could secure their national independence only in a pact 
with Western democracies. Sweden was culturally, politically and economically 
as much a part of the West as those countries that gave up their neutral 
status. At certain times there had been vague indications of a slow drifting 
away from pure neutrality such as the membership of the United Nations, the 
acceptance of Marshall Aid and last but not least the talks about a Scandina-
vian Defence Union. 
With respect to pure neutrality there were some other questions which 
aroused the curiosity of the observer: How had Sweden handled the American 
demands to take part in the US embargo policy against the Soviet Union? 
And had Finland played a role in the Swedish decisionmaking? Or the 
Soviet Union? And how did the Credit and Trade Agreement with the Soviet 
Union (1946) fit into the picture? Also the atomic bomb (USA:1945; Soviet 
Union: 1949) had changed the nature of neutrality. A nation might escape 
direct involvement in a war but is it also able to survive a nuclear war, even 
if it is not waged within its own borders? 
Asking questions is not answering them but the basic condition for finding 
answers to questions, curiosity, was there. I have, of course, not the slightest 
illusion that I, after years of research, have found the definitive answers. 
They simply don't exist. The historical facts do not change but our 
interpretations certainly do. 
At the congress The Cold War and the Northern Countries in Odense, 
Denmark (1984), the Swedish contributor Wilhelm Agrell held a speech with 
the significant title Sweden and the cold war. The structure of a neglected 
field of research} 
Agrell complained that Swedish historians and political scientists seem to 
have accepted 1945 as a kind of generally adopted limit for their research. 
Remarkably enough there are several studies about the foreign policy of 
Sweden in the 1960's and 1970's but about the previous two decades hardly 
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anything can be found. Not even an actual global review of the pertinent 
period is available, the last one dating from 1965. Studies dealing with the 
subjects, taken up in the various chapters of this dissertation, are still very 
limited. Moreover the few existing studies all have one thing in common: they 
hardly make use of official Swedish sources and are mainly based on 
Norwegian , English and US literature as well as on archival material from 
those countries. The main reason for that situation was due to the inacces-
sibility of the Swedish archives. Practically all requests for admission were 
turned down by the Swedish government and researchers seem to have 
accepted those refusals without much protests. 
However, for this dissertation, authorization has been granted to make use 
of Swedish Foreign Office documents for the first time. Furthermore the 
private archives of the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander and the then 
Foreign Minister Östen Undén were opened up for me. The diaries of both 
statesmen proved to be a rich source of information. Also the archives of all 
the political parties were made available for my research. I have also been 
able to do some interviews with contemporaries of which especially those with 
Tage Erlander have been most illuminating. For a complete review of the 
consulted archives and interviews is referred to "Sources". 
Newspapers and periodicals from the years in question have provided me 
with information from contemporaries and furnished moreover much back-
ground material. 
a. Neutrality and Swedish neutrality. 
There is, legally at least, little confusion about the rights and duties of 
neutral states in wartime: They were laid down at the Hague Convention on 
Land and Sea Warfare in 1907 and have never been fundamentally changed. 
We do not deal here with the question if those laws are nowadays out of 
date. 
Neutrals have the right to have their sovereignty and independence 
respected by the belligerent nations and they have the duty to abstain from 
participation in conflicts and to exercise impartiality, in treatment, towards 
the parties of war. The basic rules of the international customary law of 
neutrality are, summarized, the following: 
"(1) A neutral State must abstain from taking sides in the war and 
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assisting either belligerent and, in matters of discretion, deal impartial-
ly with all belligerents. 
(2) A neutral State must prevent its territory from being used as base 
of hostile operations by any belligerent. 
(3) A State not participating in a war is entitled to respect by the 
belligerents of its rights as a neutral Power. It must, however, 
acquiesce in restrictions which, under the laws of war and neutrality, 
belligerents are entitled to impose on the relations between their 
enemies and neutral nationals. 
(4) A neutral State, as distinct from a neutralised State, may change its 
status to one of belligerency. Otherwise the state of neutrality is co-
extensive with that of war. 
(5) Any violation of the legal duties owned by belligerents and neutral 
States to one another is a breach of international law and entails the 
consequences of an international tort." 
But neutral states need not prevent their subjects from supplying war 
materials to the belligerents. "Neutral States are responsible to belligerent 
States only for their own acts and omissions.' Private companies and persons 
may, at their own risk, associate themselves with the belligerents. State 
owned companies have not that right. The consequences of that legislation are 
quite considerable for societies where most companies are privately owned. 
They are free to trade with the belligerents without violating their own 
national laws, provided of course that the national law does not explicitly 
forbid such associations. But the position of a trading neutral citizen with 
regard to the laws of the distinct warfaring parties is quite a different one. 
The Anglo Americans attached enemy character during the Second World War 
as much to their own subjects in enemy territory or enemy-occupied territory 
as to foreigners, no matter if they were neutral or enemy nationals. 
So it could happen that private Swedish companies and persons were 
brought to trial in the USA for having traded with Nazi-Germany whereas 
they were not prosecuted in Sweden. 
There are, on the other hand, no rules of international law governing how 
a neutral country must act in times of peace. 
A lot of different terms are used to describe neutrality: no-alignment, non-
alignment, non-participation, policy of independence, neutralism, while a Dutch 
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diplomat called it once, with regard to Sweden a "wait and see policy". No 
special preference for any of those term is used here. 
The historian Bames has pointed out that with the rise of the Cold War 
a new situation came into existence and that neutrality therefore is no proper 
term anymore: it would be preferable to speak of non-alignment which 
manifests itself in two forms: negative and positive non-alignment. The former 
term means anti alliance and non-commitment, the latter implies non-
alignment as well but gives the right to exercise and maintain relations with 
other states, regardless of their position in the Cold War. The relations may 
not entail entanglement, direct or indirect, in the Cold War associations of 
those countries. Total non-alignment is in both forms impossible because there 
is always an ideological, cultural and economical alignment. With regard to 
Sweden, Bames rightly remarks: 
"Sweden aims at classical neutrality in war and does not pursue a 
system of 'permanent' or 'total' neutrality in times of peace. Sweden is 
not a member of any alliance system and in this sense she follows one 
of the strands contained within negative nonalignment, but Sweden is 
certainly not uncommitted and identify 
herself with one of the Great Powers if only in an economic and 
cultural sense. Sweden is Westward-oriented and her economic system is 
decidedly capitalistic but this has not deterred the Swedes from 
conducting a decisively alliance free policy. Since Sweden is obviously 
not a member of a Western bloc but is linked to one in so many other 
fields, it has been mandatory for her foreign policy to be administered 
in such a manner that her aim of classical neutrality in times of war 
should appear credible. Credibility of the continuity of Sweden's aims is 
essential for maintaining its status as a sovereign unit withdrawn from 
Great Power conflicts. Consequently, a cardinal point of Swedish policy 
has been to remind the rival power blocs in her international environ-
ment that credibility of her policy needs to find its counterpart in the 
credibility of the rival Power's respect for Sweden's peace-time foreign 
policy posture." 
Has Sweden a serious chance to stay neutral when it is, or is threatened to 
be, cut off from oil, vital spare components for its defence system, indispen-
sible raw materials and technology for its industry? Most of it coming from 
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the part of the world where its sympathy goes to: the West. Sweden tries to 
keep the level of her stocks of strategic materials and foreign spare parts as 
high as possible but running out of stocks is in a situation of war only a 
matter a time. The question is what choice Sweden will make in the event 
that she faces such a situation. 
The Swedish policy of "non-participation in alliances in peacetime aiming at 
neutrality in the event of war", as it is officially described, has neither a 
theoretical nor an ideological base. The guiding principal is pragmatism, 
dictated by national interest. That is of course nothing new: Already the 
Athenian historian Thycidides (c.460-c.399 B.C) observed that fact in ancient 
Greece and the first president of the United States, George Washington, 
confirmed it two thousand years later when he said that "a small knowledge 
of human nature will convince us, that, (..) interest is the governing principle 
(..)." and it has been affirmed by Max Weber in our century when he wrote 
that interests and not ideas dominate the actions of mankind. In his last 
speech as Foreign Minister (1962) Undén echoed that opinion: Sweden's 
foreign policy was in the first and last resort dominated by her own 
interests. Only they were decisive; its motives were laying - Undén borrowed 
his words from Nietzsche - beyond Good and Bad (jenseits von Gut und Böse.) 
All the political parties represented in the Riksdag, the Swedish Parliament, 
support the policy of non participation in peacetime and neutrality in case of 
war. Swedish neutrality however is not laid down in the Constitution as for 
example is the case in Switzerland. 
Another characteristic of Sweden's neutrality policy is that it is, contrary 
to Swiss neutrality, neither guaranteed nor confirmed by any international 
agreement. Sweden has argued that if neutrality is incorporated in an 
international agreement and guaranteed by the Great Powers it might create a 
certain measure of dependence on those powers. The fact that its neutrality 
is neither laid down in the Constitution nor in an international agreement 
means, in theory, that the neutral policy can be amended by the government 
whenever it wishes to do so. But practically such a change is not soon to be 
expected because this policy has served the country well ever since 1814. 
Only once since the days of Napoleon did Sweden adhere itself to foreign 
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powers: an alliance with France and England during the Crimean War (1854-
1856). 
But Sweden was careful not to join the French-English armies on the bat-
tlefields in Russia. The Crimean War had a fortunate implication for the 
Swedes: A British-France expedition destroyed the Russian fortifications on 
Aland, "a pistol pointed at the heart of Sweden", and at the Peace Treaty of 
Paris (1856) the Russians were forbidden to remilitarize the island of Aland. 
Sweden escaped being dragged into the both World Wars of this century and 
that historical experience has become the main force behind the continuation 
of its policy of neutrality until today. Prime minister Per Albin Hansson got 
an ovation for his war time foreign policy that, according to his party 
members, had kept Sweden out of World War II. 
It is of course quite disputable that Sweden owes her staying out of those 
World Wars to her policy of neutrality. 
World War II has left far more and deeper traces in the Swedish neutrality 
consciousness than the first World War, also because of the fact that the war 
this time had come very close to its own borders. Finland became involved in 
the war, Norway and Denmark were occupied. 
During the war Sweden was governed by a Grand Coalition Government in 
which all parliamentary parties, except the communist, were represented. 
Christian Günther was foreign minister. Günther was a civil servant and a 
diplomat. He was no politician and neither was he a member of a political 
party. 
The protection of the Swedish neutrality demands a strong defence and it is 
precisely that defence that ties Sweden more and more to the West. The air 
force, navy and army are for their high tech weapon systems, radar and 
warning systems for a great part dependent on the West. But also Swedish 
industry cannot exist without making use of Western technologies and raw 
materials. This still growing dependence on the Western world may in the 
long run reduce Swedish neutrality to not much more than a formal state-
ment. 
Sweden got, after all, involved in the US embargo policy against the East 
(see chapter 7). Where Sweden stands ideologically has never been a secret. 
She has her roots in the culture and tradition of the West. The motives for 
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her neutrality are no secret either and they are very similar to those of 
other states: national interests. It has absolutely nothing to do with moral or 
so called "higher principles". If there is any moral guideline it is the kind 
which was once described by the English philosopher Ken Booth as "the idea 
of the lesser evil." 
b. Neutrality and World War Π 1 4 
The overriding concern for Prime Minister Hansson and his foreign minister 
was to keep Sweden out of the war. To reach that purpose, Hansson was, if 
the circumstances demanded so, willing to bend in the wind. Per Albin, as the 
social democratic cabinet leader generally was called in Sweden, knew that he 
had the almost unanimous support of the public. He became the fatherfigure 
who led the country through the dark years. 
May 1940 was the most dangerous time for the Swedish independence when 
English and French troops captured Narvik in Norway and threatened to 
occupy the iron ore mines in Northern Sweden in order to prevent the export 
of iron ore to Germany. 
External factors, not its policy of neutrality, saved Sweden from direct 
involvement in the war. Things would probably have run another course if 
there had not been 4000 German soldiers in Northern Norway to prevent the 
English and French to enter Swedish territory and if the defeat of the 
Western Powers in May 1940 at the theatre of war in Europe, with that 
giving the Germans a free hand in Europe, had not taken place. The Balance 
of Power in Europe, although seriously upset, did not make it a military 
necessity for the Nazi's to occupy Sweden. 
Sweden was much more important to Germany, because of its export of 
critical raw materials to the Third Reich, than it was to the Western Allies 
and the Soviet Union, the latter mainly being engaged in improving its 
defensive positions and restoring for that reason former Russian territory. 
The Allies were not really interested in Sweden, or Scandinavia on the 
whole, in the post May 1940 period, because their main interests lay 
elsewhere. 
Swedish trade with the West declined dramatically after April 9, 1940 when 
the Nazi's launched their attack on Norway and Denmark. By autumn the 
Skagerrak, Seagate to the West, was closed by a German minefield from 
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Denmark's most Northern tip to Lindesnes in South Norway. That was about 
the end of the Swedish trade with the West, only the so called "Gothenburg 
traffic", which was dependent on the permission from Germany and Great 
Britain to pass the blockade, was left. 
The blockade became an excellent instrument for the Great Powers for 
extracting concessions because some import materials as oil and certain 
foodstuffs were absolutely vital for Sweden. 
At the other side became ball bearings, which were vital for Hitler's war 
machinery, an important issue in the relations between Sweden and the Allies. 
In the given situation there remained for Sweden in fact only one trading 
partner: Germany. Coal and coke, indispensible for the steel industry, could 
after the establishment of the Skagerrak blockade no longer be obtained from 
the usual suppliers in Great Britain, Belgium and Holland. Sweden became 
almost wholly dependent on Germany which on its turn needed, besides the 
vital ball bearings, the Swedish iron ore, wood products, paper pulp and 
paper. 
Hitler had, in other words, important interests in Sweden, and wanted in 
the first place to guarantee, and if possible, to increase the exports of 
critical war materials from Sweden to the Reich. 
The defeat of the Western Powers in 1940 and the relative weakness of 
Stalin in the Baltic area allowed Germany to establish its hegemony in the 
Baltic area. Because of those geographical factors and because of the 
economic dependence on German imports did Sweden have not much choice 
but follow the German demands and carry out a policy that was acceptable 
for Berlin. 
Hitler could have gained little by an occupation of Sweden which was 
actually under his control and from the strategic point of view there was 
little need for the Nazi's to occupy the Swedish kingdom. Finland and Norway 
were more important and Denmark had been annexed for the safeguarding of 
the lines of communications to Norway. The Soviet Navy was locked up in 
Leningrad because the Germans controlled the Baltic Sea. 
Germany profited from both the Swedish economic production and the 
transport system and an occupation of Sweden would probably have meant the 
destruction of the two. 
The question remains however if Sweden was not more lenient than was 
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absolutely necessary, certainly after June 1941 when Hitler attacked the 
Soviet Union and could not spare troops for actions against Sweden. 
The press appeared to be a problem for the Government in so far as it 
criticized the Nazi system and the Nazi conduct of war. Berlin demanded 
Stockholm to intervene against a number of newspapers. Significant is that 
censorship in the strict sense of the word was not necessary because self-
censorship made it superfluous. The State Information Board, directly under 
control of the Foreign Office, was established in 1940 and "recommended" the 
newspapers what they ought to write and what they better could leave out. 
The Board "advised" about headlines and editorials which ought to be 
objective. Papers were asked to abstain from irony, sarcasm or insinuations 
with regard to the warfaring parties. 
In the fall of 1940 the so called "Information days" were established on 
which the journalists were informed how they best could adapt their opinion 
to the government's points of view. Transgression of the rules was punished 
with confiscation and denial of transport facilities. All those rather far going 
measures served just one purpose: to keep Sweden out of the war. 
In the period 1939 -1942 356 papers, magazines and books were confis-
cated , 293 of those confiscations concerned articles against the Axispowers 
(who accordingly profited most of that measure), 52 against the Allies while 
the rest applied to "the others". During the initial years of the war there was 
a clear tendency to apply the rules to the advantage of Germany. The com-
munist press was hardest hit by the so called transport prohibition which 
denied access to transport facilities: four out of the six papers were com-
munist. 
When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, the leading papers 
in the country appeared to be more ami Soviet Union than and Nazi Germany 
and that should last until the German defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943. 
Since that turning point in the war the sympathy of the papers went 
gradually into the direction of the allies, being the future victors of the 
17 war. 
In Sweden the German "crusade against communism" enjoyed popularity in 
circles of Nazi sympathizers and anti-Soviet citizens. Also king Gustav 
expressed in private that he understood the German necessity of starting a 
18 preventive war against the Soviet Union. 
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The government did not take measures against those utterances of approval 
with regard to the fate of the Soviet Union although the press restrictions 
did not only concern Germany but all the belligerent parties. On the contrary, 
the Swedish government did something else: it gave in to the German request 
in 1941 for transit of the so called "Engelbrecht" division. 9 The Germans 
made the demand on the same day that their troops invaded the Soviet Union 
on June 22, 1941. Permission was asked for the transport of a complete armed 
division under the command of general Engelbrecht from Oslo to Finland 
where the division was to fight against the Soviets. 
Foreign minister Günther is said to have promised Berlin another attitude 
in case of a German attack on the Soviet Union but according to the 
historian Alf Johansson that utterance must be seen in its context whereby 
GÜnther's desire should have been to avoid a German ultimatum. 0 
It was not the only concession that Sweden made to the Germans. The 
German army used in the period 1940 -1943 10 % of the total Swedish Railway 
capacity, transporting over 650.000 soldiers. The German Navy, the Kriegsmar-
ine, was allowed to make use of the Swedish territorial waters and the "air 
courier traffic" of the Luftwaffe, the German air force, flew unhindered over 
Swedish territory until 1944. 
On the other hand Allied bombers were in that very same year (1944) shot 
down when they appeared over Swedish territory. The concessions to the 
Germans before the tum of the war in 1943 exceeded far the concessions 
which were done to the Allies after 1943. Neutrality or Realpolitik! Undoub-
tedly the latter. 
The Nazi dominance in the Nordic area gave Germany an excellent 
opportunity to extract concessions from Sweden which in addition was almost 
entirely dependent on Germany. Accordingly the Allies were far less success-
ful in their dealings with Sweden. They wanted above all that Sweden limited 
its exports of ball bearings and iron ore to Germany -being of vital impor-
tance to the Nazi war machine- but Sweden was only after fierce pressure 
willing to give in to these demands. 
Undén found a most ingenious answer to the question if Sweden during the 
Second World War stuck toits policy of neutrality: 
"Criticism concerned certain departures from neutrality to the ad-
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vantage of Germany, not the policy of neutrality itself." 
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That is, of course, no answer to the question if there still can be talk of 
neutrality if so many concessions, how understandable they may have been in 
the given situation, were done as Sweden did during the last World War. 
May wine still be called wine if water is added. Or does the definition 
depend on the measure of water that is appended? Undén seems not to have 
been bothered by such questions: One can criticize departures from neutrality 
but not neutrality itself. Most important in the period 1940 - 1945 was that 
Sweden had managed to stay out of the war. Staying out had been the 
guiding principle for Per Albin and his government and it should also become 
the guiding principle for Tage Erlander, Hansson's successor and his foreign 
minister Östen Undén. 
It is obvious that Sweden was saved from acts of war on her territory in 
the very first place because of political, geological and strategic circumstan-
ces quite beyond her control and that it had very little to do with her 
declaration of neutrality. See what happened to Denmark, Norway and the 
Benelux countries. 
Nevertheless the period 1939 - 1940 has had an enormous impact on the 
neutrality thinking of the Swedes and after the war the idea of neutrality 
became still deeper rooted in their minds. Sweden's wartime behaviour should 
also influence the relations with the USA, Great-Britain and the Soviet Union 
in the post-war period. 
The word "neutrality" was taboo during the talks about the Scandinavian 
Defence Union in 1948 - 1949. It reminded the Danes and Norwegians too 
much of the Swedish concept of neutrality, or rather her departures from it, 
during the Second World War (see chapter 5). Already during the war did the 
Soviet press sometimes refer to the "neutrality" of Sweden. 
с The cold war. 
When did the Cold War begin? Authors like D. Fleming and F. Schuman go 
back to 1918 when, after the revolution, Western troops invaded Russia. 
Others discern the genesis right after the destruction of Nazi Germany and 
Japan in 1945 or in the years immediately thereafter when tensions between 
East and West grew rapidly. In this dissertation the cold war is chronolo­
gically limited to the period 1945 - 1949 and regarded as a bipolar conflict 
between East and West or rather between the capitalist USA and Western 
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Europe, with extra weight to Great Britain, and the communist Soviet Union 
and its allies. 
In the international system which emerged after the disintegration of 
Europe in 1945, the USA and the Soviet Union were the dominant powers 
fighting for control and influence in the post war world; a struggle which, 
with a term of the American columnist Walter Lippman, should become known 
as "the cold war". The weapons of the cold war were, and still are, of a 
political, economical, ideological and also military nature (arms race and 
armament) but a direct military confrontation is avoided. 
According to Terry Andersson it was not the USA but Great Britain that 
until the second half of 1947 the primary adversary of the Soviet Union. This 
is essentially true for the Scandinavian situation. The Northern countries 
belonged traditionally to the English sphere of influence. 
In the forties, fifties and until the middle sixties did the Western historians, 
the traditionalists as we call them now, depict the Soviet Union as the big 
evildoer, the principal cause of the birth of the Cold War, while the US were 
contributed a more or less passive role. 
From the second half of the 1960s onwards however, much of the blame of 
the cold was attributed to the United States. This school, the revisionists, 
laid much emphasis on economic motives behind US foreign policy, often 
described as "Open door imperialism" which stands for a reckless hunt for 
markets, investment opportunities and raw materials. The US foreign policy 
since the beginning of this century was based on the principle of the "open 
door" which aim it was to penetrate in the closed colonial markets of the big 
imperialistic powers. Now, after World War II, with the old imperialistic 
powers on the wane, the US had an excellent opportunity to make their open 
door dream come true. Also the Soviet Union, with its closed economy, was, 
according to the revisionists, now to be integrated in the new, open world 
economy. Well known revisionists who put extreme weight on economic 
motives are Kolko, David Horowitz, William Appleman Williams and Gar Al-
perovitz. 
The post revisionists which emerged in the 1970's adopted a kind of middle 
position between traditionalists and revisionists; they combine insights and 
themes from both schools. 
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d. the period 1945 -1949. 
The end of the war in 1945 did not bring a lasting period of rest to Europe 
but meant instead an new era of disturbance and upheaval. The wartime Allies 
soon transformed into enemies. It did not come as a complete surprise because 
the contours of the schism could already be discerned at the conference at 
Yalta ° (February 1945) where Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin discussed the 
post war European order and "the right of all people too choose the form of 
government under which they will live". 
It would tum out otherwise. The factual presence of the Red and Allied 
Armies in respectively Eastern- and Western Europe appeared to be decisive 
for Europe's post war borders. "Whoever occupies a territory also imposes on 
29 it its own social system as far as his army can reach.' ^ Later, Stalin should 
remark that that statement was not completely true: If the war time allies 
had found a solution for the German question things would probably have run 
another course. 
The Potsdam Conference in July 1945 where the allied leaders gathered for 
the last of the great World War II conferences, became, with regard to the 
main issues, a failure because the main questions, i.e. the future of Germany, 
Eastern Europe and the German Reparation Payments, remained unsettled. 
They agreed however on the establishment of a Council of Foreign 
Ministers where those problems should be discussed in the future. But not 
settled, as soon became obvious. The mutual distrust had already grown too 
much and the various Councils of Foreign Ministers failed. After the ending 
of the London meeting, on December 15, 1947 the partition of Germany and 
the division of Europe into two hostile blocs seemed unavoidable. Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov pleaded for a "unified" Germany which meant that 
the Soviets wanted to treat Germany as an economic unit so that they could 
obtain reparation payments from the Eastern and Western zone. A unified 
Germany meant at the same time the prevention of the birth of a strong, ami 
communistic and Western oriented West Germany. The Soviets who had 
suffered like no other nation from the Nazis insisted on substantial repara-
tions. Understandable enough, they wanted to castrate Germany economically 
in order to prevent a military renascence in the future, while the British and 
Americans preferred to revive the German industry for the sake of Europe's 
economical recovery. Besides, the West regarded an impoverished Germany too 
easy a prey for communism. 
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After the failure in London, the British Foreign Minister, Emest Bevin, 
considered it necessary to come to some sort of Western Defence system in 
which also the USA had to be involved. Bevin launched his thoughts about 
European cooperation in his well known speech in the British House of 
Commons on January 22, 1948. υ 
•51 
Bevin's proposals resulted in the Brussels Pact which was signed on 
March 17, by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The 
six countries agreed on a joint defence system: If a nation would be the 
subject for an attack, the others would rush to the rescue. Germany was 
named as the potential aggressor but there is no doubt that in fact the 
Soviet Union was meant. 
The Brussels Pact was eventually to result in the North Atlantic Treaty of 
April 1949. The establishment of NATO in 1949 was the most important and 
far reaching event of the Cold War in Europe that is covered by this 
dissertation. The proposals for a Western pact (NATO) and the consequent 
Swedish propositions for a Scandinavian Defence Union have for that reason 
got much attention. It could hardly be expected that Stockholm should change 
its course in the years to come after having rejected the membership of 
NATO. Sweden had successfully passed its neutrality examination and stood 
the NATO test. For that reason I have gone no further than the year of 1949 
which in my opinion was the crucial year with respect to Swedish neutrality. 
The war in KoreaJ was with regard to neutrality less crucial than the 
establishment of NATO because it was much less of an immediate threat for 
Sweden's independence. 
Tensions had been growing constantly in the period 1945-1949 (see chapter 4). 
Ex-wartime leader Churchill made his contribution with his Fulton Speech in 
March 1946: 
"From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has 
descended across the continent" and US president Truman launched on March 
12, 1947 his so called Truman doctrine: 
"It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by 
outside pressure." 
In his "Iron Curtain" speech Churchill remarked as well that the Soviets 
desired "the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines." These words 
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fell in Europe on a fertile soil. The communist coup in Hungary (1947) and 
Czechoslovakia (1948) strengthened the uncomfortable European feelings of 
insecurity. 
Hardly anybody paid attention to the Russian motives and their demands for a 
buffer zone between the Soviet Union and the West and their desire for an 
unarmed, demilitarized Germany. Germany had, after all, crossed the Russian 
borders two times within thirty years. They did not trust the West, no more 
than the West trusted them. Marshall aid was to the Soviets nothing more 
than an attempt to undermine their security and independence with economic 
means: an attempt of the USA to break in into their closed economy. In the 
same year that Marshall aid was announced the USA started its embargo 
•a-a 
policy against the Soviet Union and its satellites. This "economic warfare' 
should also have its effects on Sweden that in 1946 had concluded a credit 
and trade agreement with the Soviets. 
In Scandinavia, The Finno-Russian pact and the rumours about an 
impending Russian move against their territory was experienced as an extra 
confirmation of the Soviet menace and their lust for expansion (see chapter 
4). In those times of unrest, menace and pure distrust, whereas Norway and 
Denmark abandoned their traditional neutrality, Sweden decided to continue 
the way of "non participation in alliances aiming at neutrality in the event of 
war". This dissertation will not deal with all the events that can be put under 
the title of "cold war" in the penod 1945-1949. I have chosen a thematic 
approach. The Swedish neutrality attitude will be analyzed against the 
backgrounds of the events which are taken up to discussion in the various 
chapters. 
e. Problems to be discussed. 
In this dissertation I will try to find an answer to the question why Sweden 
in the above pictured turbulent times stuck to its neutral course. Has there 
been pressure from the Western world on the Swedes to abandon its 
neutrality? Was there counter-pressure from the side of the Soviet Union? 
And was consideration with Finland part of Swedish political decisionmaking 
as so often is assumed? 
The Swedish economy was (and still is) largely dependent on raw materials 
and high technology (also military technology) from the West. Was that factor 
of dependence not a direct threat to neutrality? 
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In brief: Has the Swedish neutrality in those years of fiercely growing 
tensions between East and West ever been at stake and for that reason been 
subject for serious discussions within the government and the political 
parties? 
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CHAPTER 1. THE UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP 
Is neutrality compatible with the UN membership? The question was put 
forward in 1945, but it never provoked such vehement debates as in 1920 
when Sweden discussed her membership for the League of Nations. 
1.1 The League of Nations debate. 
In 1920 there had been a fierce resistance in the Swedish Parliament against 
the League of Nations membership, both from the extreme left and the right. 
The opponents regarded the membership as a latent danger for the nation's 
neutrality because the member states could be compelled to join in economic 
and military sanctions against peace-disturbing nations. 
The League was supposed to include every nation of the world but from 
the beginning it lacked the universal character which in fact was the 
essential condition for making it function properly. The Soviet Union did not 
adhere; no more than the USA although it had been its own president Wilson 
who had proposed the foundation of the League. Furthermore membership was 
forbidden to the losers of World War 1. Germany and the Soviet Union were 
admitted in respectively 1926 and 1934 but that was of course of no influence 
anymore on the adherence debate in Sweden. 
The word "neutrality" did not even exist in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations but it was silently perceived to be non-existent under the system of 
the League. The question of neutrality became concrete when Switzerland 
applied for the membership in 1920 without wanting to give up her own tradi-
tional neutrality. The matter was discussed at a meeting of the Council in 
London (1920). The Council concluded that "complete neutrality in everything, 
economic and military, is clearly inconsistent with the position of a member 
of the League" but it was also realized that the Swiss were in a unique 
position, based on an ample hundred years old tradition that even was 
incorporated in the Law of Nations. The Council solved the problem by 
stating that it believed that Switzerland "would not stand aside when the high 
principles of the League have to be defended." Unanimously the Council 
declared that 
"while affirming that the conception of neutrality of the members of 
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the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be 
obliged to cooperate in enforcing respect for their engagements" 
but recognized at the same time that the Swiss neutrality was not incom-
patible with the Covenant of the League of Nations. There could be no doubt 
that Switzerland was the only exception to the rule that neutrality was 
incompatible with the League's membership. But that remarkable decision in 
favour of Switzerland could not stop the debate on the compatibility of 
neutrality with the provisions of the League. 
Article 16 which dealt with the question of sanctions was the most 
debated one and gave rise to much disagreement. A clear interpretation was 
therefore deemed to be necessary: Who decides when the sanctions of Article 
16 shall become applicable and what are the precise duties of the League 
members when those sanctions have been made effective? The neutral 
governments of Denmark, Norway and Sweden proposed with regard to Article 
16 the following amendment: 
"At the request of a Member for which the applications of the above 
provisions might entail serious danger, the Council may authorize this 
Member to maintain intercourse, in such measure as the Council shall 
decide, with the Covenant-breaking state."" 
The Council refused the Scandinavian proposal. The final resolution of the 
interpretation of Article 16 appeared to be an empty formality, acceptable for 
all: The Council was denied the authority to make a binding decision for the 
League members. The nations could decide for themselves and the role of the 
Council was restricted to giving advice. 
The anti-League members in the Swedish Riksdag argued that the League 
was too small and too powerless to be efficient. The government however 
emphasized that all nations could be expected to become members in due 
course and that the League had advantages for Sweden in case that it ever 
should be attacked. In that situation help could be expected from the League 
of Nations. 
The government led by the social democrat Hjalmar Branting considered 
the League's ultimate aim, maintenance of peace, which was also to the 
benefit of Sweden, so important that giving up a small part of its neutrality 
was justified. That was the price that had to be paid. The struggle in the 
Parliament was long and hard. The Social democrats and Liberals were pro, 
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the communists and conservatives against an association with the League of 
Nations. In 1920 238 Riksdag members voted in favour of the League while 
7 
114 parliament members declared to be against adherence. But the debate 
about the membership did not stop in 1920 and should continue far into the 
thirties. 
One of the Swedes that got an international reputation for his work in the 
League of Nations was Östen Undén. Remarkable was that the Swedes until 
the outbreak of the Second World War abandoned the term "neutrality" to 
delineate her foreign policy. And not unjustly. The League Covenant obliged 
Sweden to take part in economic sanctions against aggressors although the 
rules with regard to participation in military sanctions were less binding in 
character. Moreover, Sweden could on its turn, in case of an attack, count on 
assistance from the League members. 
Switzerland, in contrast, still called herself neutral. The Swiss had 
demanded and received exemption from any commitment to take part in 
a 
military sanctions. 
1.2 The UN Debate. 
The news that the Swedish government in 1946, with Undén as Foreign 
Minister, was willing to join the newly founded United Nations did not come 
as a surprise. Contrary to 1920 there was hardly any resistance. Through the 
years Sweden had become familiar with a peace organization and also the 
situation was quite different this time. All the Great Powers did now belong 
to the original signatories of the new peace organization and the last world 
war, which had come very close to the Swedish borders, had convinced the 
nation that everything should be done in order to prevent a new disastrous 
war. 
The UN was in the eufory of the post war epoch generally regarded as the 
best instrument for maintaining peace. For those reasons there was nothing 
that could be called a real discussion. On June 27 1946 all the parties in the 
Riksdag appeared to be in favour of the UN membership, be it without much 
enthusiasm. Already before that date Undén had concluded that: "Everybody 
seems to agree that it is a political necessity for us to join". There was 
however not a trace of the illusions that had characterized the 1920 
adherence. The liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter remarked in an editorial 
that realism was much greater this time and that that only was attractive 
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far away from despair.' υ 
The same paper published on September 6 1945 a Gallup poll that showed the 
following results. 49 % of the population was pro UN; 6% pro on certain 
conditions, 26% answered negative and 19% had not made up their minds yet. 
The question if Sweden should supply military troops in times of crisis for 
the maintenance of peace resulted in the following answers in which a 
division according to party colour is made: 
Cons. Liberal. Agrar. Soc.Dem. Comm. 
yes 
yes, but under 
certain condition 
no 
don't know 
52% 
4% 
31% 
13% 
43% 
9% 
29% 
19% 
39% 50% 60% 
7% 6% 6% 
29% 26% 25% 
25% 18% 9% 
In the newspapers and in the Riksdag an almost total majority for the 
membership could be noticed but there was some criticism as well. Undén had 
sketched the advantages of a world-wide peace organization as a means for 
friendship, peace and cooperation. He had also underlined the humanitarian, 
social, cultural and economical aims of the organization but he had also 
remarked that Sweden should refuse to choose side if the UN should split 
into blocs of the Superpowers. 
The communist Riksdag member Hagberg showed himself to be skeptical 
about 
"these speculations that we should be ready to draw back ourselves in 
our shell as soon as frictions between the leading world powers arise 
and proclaim our neutrality." 
According to Hagberg that was "rather unrealistic." The question was put 
forward, like in 1920, if the membership was not to be regarded as contrary 
to neutrality. Undén admitted that the UN membership, to a certain extent, 
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meant a departure from pure neutrality. But in contrast to 1920 did the 
13 government continue to describe her foreign policy as "neutral.' J 
The Swiss government considered the Charter of the United nations incom-
patible with her conception of neutrality and refused the membership. This 
time the Swiss had not succeeded in securing for themselves a privileged 
status in the community of nations. Their special kind of perpetual neutrality 
was this time not recognized. 
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status in the community of nations. Their special kind of perpetual neutrality 
was this time not recognized. 
Sweden was of course aware of her responsibilities when she entered the UN 
and realized that the membership implied a considerable limitation of the own 
national sovereignty. Through her association Sweden committed herself to 
take part in economic and military sanctions if the Security Council 
considered them necessary but Undén perceived in that same Security Council 
also the guarantee that Sweden could never, against her will, be drawn into a 
war between East and West, neither on the side of the West nor the East. 
The Security Council decides if sanctions against peace violating countries 
are to be taken but she can do so only with a qualified majority. The Council 
consists of eleven members and a decision to take sanctions against a state 
requires the vote of seven of the eleven members.; including those of the five 
permanent members, i.e. the USA, the Soviet Union, France, Britain and 
China. Because of the fact that sanctions required an unanimous consent of 
the Great Powers there existed, according to Sweden, no danger to find 
herself unexpectedly engaged at the side of Washington or Moscow in a 
future war. The old League of Nations had known no such veto for the Big 
Powers. That things could go wrong anyway as well as the fact that the 
Council was not a warrant for staying outside conflicts -as should become 
evident during the war in Korea- was something that Undén could not 
possibly have foreseen at that time. 
Many times Undén had declared that Sweden did not want to be involved in a 
war between the Super Powers, on neither side. In case war should break out, 
Sweden would follow a neutral course. In the words of Undén to the Riksdag 
on October 22, 1945: 
"if against expectation a tendency for the Great Powers to divide into 
two blocs manifests itself within the organization, our policy must be 
to avoid being drawn into any camp or group.' 
In the first years of her membership, Sweden refused consistently to choose 
side in conflicts and followed a policy of non-involvement in the political 
disputes of the Super Powers. If issues became particularly troublesome 
Sweden rather abstained from voting. It did so for example in the Greek and 
Korean affair. Both were cases in which the USA showed themselves very 
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keen on support from the entire Western world. On March 12 1947 the 
American president Truman delivered his well known speech to Congress 
which would go to history as the Truman Doctrine. In this speech Truman 
drew the contours of a global, ideological struggle between the Soviet-Union 
and the USA. He divided the world into free and oppressed nations and 
declared that 
"(..) it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
1Я pressures.' 
The Swedes, as well as their Scandinavian neighbours, were of the opinion 
that the USA put far too much weight on the help that the Greek guenillas 
were said to receive from Moscow and that they enjoyed a strong support 
among the Greek population. In the case of Korea the Scandinavian countries 
put forward that the US proposal, to create a national Korean government on 
the basis of free elections, was not a matter that should be dealt with in the 
UN. It rather should be settled in the peace treaty with Japan. 
The UN was in Stockholm not regarded as an alliance of States but as an 
organization of nations where colliding mutual interests could be discussed 
and settled. 
The Americans were not happy with the Swedish stand and wanted a more 
pro-Westem standpoint. It was, in the opinion of Washington, not only 
neutrality but also "an ancient fear of Russia" that conditioned the attitude 
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of Stockholm. 7 During a visit that Gumming, Counsellor of the US Embassy, 
paid to Undén he made no secret of the fact that he did not like the Swedish 
course in the UN. The Swedish Foreign Minister on his turn expressed his 
negative feelings with regard to the policy of Washington in the UN. 
But the effects of the Cold War had its influence on Sweden as well and 
Washington could establish that the Swedish position in the past indeed had 
been marked by a "relatively negative position on major political differences 
between East and West" but that modifications in that attitude had been 
observed during the sessions of the General Assembly in 1948 
"when Sweden on several occasions voted with the US and other major 
91 Western powers in opposition to the solid Soviet-dominated bloc.' 
The deep mistrust toward Sweden of only two years ago had disappeared. Still 
in 1947, Lovett, Undersecretary of State, had explained to the US representa-
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live at the UN that he was worried that Sweden had been mentioned as an 
alternative candidate for the Security Council: 
"We feel election of Sweden to this post at this time would be 
unfortunate since it would tend to confirm impression that Sweden is 
very close to if not actually in the Soviet bloc. Because of pro-Soviet 
attitude of the Swedish Foreign Minister this tendency would probably 
be accentuated were Sweden elected to the SC." 
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Lovett preferred India as a Security Council member before Sweden. Sig-
nificant for Lovett's distorted Cold War view was his consideration that 
Undén was more or less a puppet of Moscow. 
But only a few years later the Americans had got what they wanted: moral 
support from Sweden in their struggle against Soviet communism. And not 
from Sweden alone. In the fall of 1947 all the West Europeans countries had 
gathered round the USA and its struggle against communism. The source of 
Lovett's view on the Swedish government might have been an OSS (Office of 
Strategic Services) report of 1945 wherein was reported that Sweden did not 
put much confidence in the UN as a adequate safeguard against possible 
Soviet aggression. 
"The Swedes must, therefore, it is felt, pursue a friendly policy toward 
their eastern neighbor on their own initiative and hope that the USSR 
will restrain any aggressive intent it may harbor in regard to northern 
Europe.' 
The success of gathering Western Europe around the anti-Soviet theme may 
have had its influence on the politics of the State Department with regard to 
Sweden and have induced them to believe that Sweden was sensitive for their 
ideological cold war arguments and that she accordingly could be moved away 
from her position of neutrality and incorporated in a Western alliance in 
1948-1949. But soon it became obvious that the Americans hade made a totally 
false judgement: Sweden refused to align to a Western security system under 
the leadership of the US (see chapter 5, 6 and 7) and even did so with an 
appeal to article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations: 
"Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for 
regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their 
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activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United 
Nations."25 
Switzerland, on the contrary, still did so. The Swiss had demanded and 
received exemption from any commitment to take part in military sanctions. 
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CHAPTER 2. BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. THE CREDIT AND TRADE 
- AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA. 
The credit and trade-agreement, the so called "Ryssavtalet", between Sweden 
and the Soviet Union that was signed on October 7, 1946 has been object for 
much dissension in Swedish politics, media and business life. Erlander remarks 
in his memoirs that the debates about the agreement possibly were the first 
sign that the cold war between East and West had reached Sweden1 and also 
the Soviets considered the agreement as an stage in the emerging tug-of- war 
between the Superpowers. 
Washington protested against the Ryssavtalet, not realizing at that time 
that the agreement offered her an excellent opportunity to coerce Swedish 
companies to take part in their embargo-policy against the Soviet Union 
because of their dependence on American raw materials, machinery and 
technology. 
2.1 History and background. 
Sweden has been one of the few countries that concluded a trade agreement 
with the USSR (1924) but trade in the Interbellum never came up to Swedish 
expectations and exports to the Soviet Union did in 1938 not exceed 17 
million Swedish crowns. A first endeavour to enter into a credit and trade 
agreement with the Soviets was made by the social democratic administration 
of P.A. Hansson in the fall of 1934 but the plans of Trade Minister F. Ekman 
stranded on the opposition of the non-socialist parties. 
The Swedish export industries, which suffered from the international 
economic crisis of the thirties continued making plans for a credit agreement 
with Stalin's Soviet Union and kept in close contact with the Soviet minister 
in Stockholm, Madam Kollontai, but the outbreak of the so called Winter War 
(1939-1940) between the Soviet Union and Finland, in which the Swedish 
sympathies were with the Fins, caused an almost completely stop of the 
negotiations. 
Also the normal, still low profile trade between Sweden and its giant 
neighbour in the East reduced to almost nothing. But already some three 
weeks after the belligerent countries had concluded peace in Moscow (March 
13 1940), the "Russia committee" of the Swedish export association in which 
among others the Swedish roller and ball bearings company of SKI (Svenska 
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Kullager Fabriken) and ASEA (Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget), 
manufacturer of electric machinery, were represented announced that: 
"there were a large number of Soviet Russian inquiries and that there 
was reason to assume that the export possibilities are becoming highly 
important in the near future.' 
Exactly one week after this announcement, on April 9 1940, Germany launched 
its attack on Denmark and Norway and laid a minefield in the Skagerrak so 
that Sweden's trade with the West was cut off in one stroke. 
The Soviet Union now became important as a trading partner, a fact that 
Soviet negotiator Mikojan was well aware off and also skillfully exploited. 
The trade negotiations were hard and prolonged and the result was not very 
satisfying for the Swedes but they had little choice because they needed all 
the products they could lay their hands on. 
The agreement was signed on September 7, 1940. At the same time Sweden 
placed a credit of 100 million Swedish crowns at the disposal of Moscow. 
What the Soviets wanted in the first place was industrial equipment. The 
agreement was shortlived. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in the summer 
of 1941, only eight months after the signing of the agreement, closed also the 
door for Swedish exports to the East. 
Rolf Sohlman had since 1940 been the diplomat who was in charge of the 
economic negotiations with the Soviet Union. His Soviet counterpart was 
Michail Nikitin, trade delegate at the Soviet embassy in Stockholm but 
furthermore also Madam Kollontai played an active part in the negotiations. 
According to Ingmar Hägglöf, a well known Swedish diplomat who spent 
many years in the Soviet Union, it is quite unlikely that this couple during 
the critical years of the war received their instructions from the Kremlin. 
They probably acted on their own initiative in trying to obtain a big loan for 
the post-war reconstruction of their country and "the men in power in the 
Kremlin could reasonably not have anything against it."6 
Another consideration of the Soviet Embassy must, according to Hägglöf, 
have been that the more Sweden exported to the East the more they should 
become tied to the Soviet Union. That may seem true in retrospect but it is 
hardly likely that the Soviets foresaw the rise of the Cold War which in fact 
is the ultimate implication of Hägglöf's remark. Kollontai was a diplomat with 
an excellent feeling for the proper relations, one who knew whom she had to 
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contact at the right time and at the right place. Characteristic for her 
stratagem was that she, most of the times in the company of Nikitin, now 
and then came with rather vague propositions consisting of a blend of 
questions and promises. It seemed then however that she, in tum, barely took 
notice of the answers of Rolf Sohlman cs and sometimes half a year could 
pass by before Sohlman learned the answers on his counter proposals. At a 
reception on the first of January 1944 Michail Nikitin met Sohlman and it is 
exactly there where the basis for the later Agreement can be found. Nikitin, 
who had good contacts with the Swedish industry, informed Sohlman that 
Swedish concerns were eager to do business with the Soviet Union. There was 
after all an enormous industrial over capacity in Sweden after the war. 
Nikitin stated that Moscow was definitively interested in doing business with 
Sweden. The only obstacle was that post war Soviet Union in all probability 
would not be able to pay in cash for the deliveries and that's why he 
proposed that Sweden should export on credit terms. 
Sohlman informed Herman Eriksson, Minister of Trade, who let know that 
Sweden was interested in extensive trade connections, also on credit basis. 
The condition in Stockholm was that the Soviet Union should deliver coal, oil 
and raw materials because the Swedish industries would otherwise not be able 
to export. 
In short: the credit should be in proportion to the deliveries which, in 
their tum, were dependent on deliveries of Soviet raw materials. As usual 
Nikitin and Kollontai kept silent for a long time. 
The armistice between the Soviet Union and Finland in the autumn of 1944 
opened up prospects for transport of goods between the two trade partners to 
be, and Moscow considered the time ripe for new negotiations. 
Stockholm was asked to make a serious proposal that covered a period of 
five years. Kollontai suggested an annual credit of 200 million Swedish crowns 
for 5 years and, for political reasons, preferably a state credit. She also 
pointed out that a trade agreement offered an excellent opportunity for build-
ing up good post war relations with the Soviet Union. 
In the meantime Herman Eriksson had been replaced by the Liberal Bertil 
Ohlin. The new Minister of Trade discussed, accompanied by Sohlman and the 
Minister of Finance Ernst Wigforss, the Soviet proposal with representatives 
of the Swedish industry and banks. With the end of the war in sight the 
latter appeared to be less eager than a year before because the world 
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markets, where the profits might be highest, should in a short time be 
accessible again. 
For the rest of the war the Soviets kept silent on the credit issue but 
when the negotiations finally started it appeared that the Swedish industry 
once again had changed its view on the post war economy. Economists had 
predicted that the war would be followed by an economic depression, 
shrinking markets, sinking prices and increasing unemployment, just as had 
been the case after World War One. 
Professor Gunnar Myrdal, who became Minister of Trade on July 31 1945, 
was an advocate of that conception and had expressed his view in his book 
Warning against peace optimism. Exports would become difficult, Germany, the 
main export market was destroyed and it was expected that the US and the 
UK should oust Sweden from both their own and the world markets. So in the 
summer of 1945 the Soviet Union seemed once again to be the solution for 
the expected and feared export problems. The final negotiations took another 
year but finally, in October 1946, the Ryssavtalet, as the Credit and Trade 
Agreement was called, became reality. 
But what also had become reality was the Cold War. And moreover the 
export expectations had changed again: The Russian Agreement became now 
an object of vehement debate. 
2.2 The terms of the "Ryssavtalet" 
The Soviet Union was not the only country that received a credit from 
Sweden but it was the one that drew the most attention. Other countries had 
for their reconstruction, before the ultimate negotiations with Moscow even 
had got under way, received credits for a total worth of over 2 milliard 
Swedish crowns. 
What were the terms of this so much debated agreement which so clearly 
reflected the urgent need of Moscow for industrial equipment, necessary for 
Russia's reconstruction, and the Swedish hunger for raw materials as well as 
the desire to replace her lost export markets? 
There were two parts to the agreement: a loan and a barter deal. A loan 
of 1 milliard Swedish crowns (about $ 280.000.000) was granted to the Soviets. 
This credit was to be used over a period of five years (1947-1952) at the rate 
of 200 million crowns (about $ 50. million) a year and was to be repaid in 
1962 - 1967. The effective interest rate was no more than 2 3/8 per cent. 
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With the credit the Soviets were able to purchase heavy machinery, motors, 
generators, high quality steel and electrical equipment. 
What the Soviets needed in the first place were the products of the 
electro-technical and engineering industry. In addition Moscow should buy for 
100 million crowns worth of the same commodiries per annum, on a barter 
basis. Russia agreed to pay for the Swedish shipments with raw materials 
which were needed by the Swedish industries. 
Once the agreement was concluded the Soviets should deal directly with 
the Swedish industry and not with the government. An American magazine 
defined the situation exactly in the headlines of an article on the credit 
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Agreement: Swedish businessmen hold key to delivery of goods to Russia. 
It reported that 
"the businessmen of Sweden -not the Government- will determine 
whether or not their country is to be tied closely to the economy of 
Russia. (..) Joker in the agreement is that the Swedish Government does 
not guarantee the deliveries. The Russians are being told that their 
negotiations from now on must be with businessmen. The Government of 
Sweden merely extends credit and promises to grant export licenses, 
once the goods are ready for shipment. Thus, Sweden has left herself a 
loophole in her deal with Russia. (..) The businessmen can make the 
trade agreement work, or they can sabotage it by dragging their feet 
so far as production is concerned." 
In how far businessmen have sabotaged the agreement is not exactly known 
but there was undoubtedly much resistance. 
2.3 Swedish political and press debates on the "Ryssavtalet" 
The Ryssavtalet gave rise to vehement debates in the Riksdag and also in the 
press. Nevertheless it was approved by the Second Chamber where 156 
members voted in favour of the agreement, 18 against while 22 members 
abstained frofn voting. The debates were not so much about the contents of 
the agreement or the origins of the Credit Agreement which is quite 
understandable since the first negotiations took place when the Grand 
Coalition Government of the war, was still in power. So in fact, all the 
parties, except the communist, felt responsible for the contents of the 
Agreement although the opposition dissociated itself now from the contents 
but there 
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"(..) was no choice. The agreement with the Soviet Union was already 
drawn up and signed on behalf of Sweden by the government. The task 
of the Riksdag was not to adjust, to change, to examen one or another 
detail. The Riksdag had to approve or to reject, to say yes or no. A 
third alternative was not there. It was a coercive situation. Who did 
not want to say no, had no other choice than to accept.' " 
Actually the opposition had preferred to vote negative but they were afraid 
of a number of unforeseeable complications with regard to the trade with the 
Soviet Union in the future. It could have meant the exclusion of Sweden from 
the Soviet markets for a long time and that was considered too high a risk 
because there was still the chance of economic crisis in the Western world 
and in that perspective the Soviet Union was, being no part of the 
capitalistic economy, considered to be a safe way out. 
A reliable and stable market in case the Western economy should collapse. 
The fear for depression was rooted firmly in the minds of some leading 
politicians and they knew from painful experience what a global depression 
could do to the overseas trade of which the economy of Sweden was so much 
dependent. The destruction of Germany had already caused a big gap in their 
exports. Moreover Germany had ceased to be the supplier of (raw) materials 
for the Swedish industry and although the Soviets were not able to replace 
Germany as contractor of for instance chemicals, textiles, machinery, coal and 
cokes she could in the future prohibit the by her controlled zone in 
Gennany to resume the im- and exports business with Sweden. Besides the 
Soviets had a strong influence on the vital Swedish coal imports from Poland 
and could cause via that way serious disturbances in the Swedish industry. 
Apart from the fear of a worldwide economic depression and the worry of a 
Soviet grip on their economy there was, and certainly immediately after the 
war, a feeling that something had to be done for the war devastated Soviet 
Union. During the war Sweden had done nothing to linder the needs of the 
Soviet Union. On the contrary: she had allowed the transport of German 
Wehrmacht troops by rail over Swedish territory to the Russo-German front. 
In that light the credit agreement may also be seen as a kind of Wiedergut-
machung. 
But much of the moral feeling, that something had to be done, had 
disappeared at the time when the agreement was signed in the fall of 1946. 
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Most of the criticism of the adversaries was concentrated at the size of 
the credit, which was considered too high, and the interest of 2 3/8 percent 
which was lower than the State of Sweden herself paid for loans. It was also 
less than the other countries, that had obtained Swedish loans, had to pay. 
Another point that was frequently put forward was that the government had 
not taken notice of the capacity of the industry. The capacity, so it was 
asserted, was too small to be able to carry out the Soviet demands. 
Folkpartiet (the liberal party) was of the opinion that the Ryssavtalet 
could be a danger for the freedom of enterprise. Another complaint was that 
the government could take measures and put the concerns under pressure to 
meet the Soviet demands which could be done at the cost of (more profitable) 
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markets in the West. 
In other words: the freedom of trade could be threatened by the Govern-
ment which, being social democratic, was not considered to be the ideal 
guardian of the freedom of enterprise. But despite all criticism the general 
opinion was, to speak with the conservative leader Fritiof Domo "that we 
ought to expand the relations with Russia", something that also Folkpartiet 
leader Bertil Ohlin and the leader of the Bondeförbundet (Farmers League), 
Pehrsson Bramstorp, could agree with. But the opinion, compared with the 
summer of 1945 when the negotiations had started, had definitively changed. 
Everybody, including the industrialists had at that time been convinced that 
an economic crisis would inevitably come. Now, at the end of 1946 there was 
not a trace of a depression to be noticed and the industries worked, as far as 
the supply of raw material and energy allowed at full capacity. The conviction 
grew that the depression would never come, especially in the circles of the 
opposition but it was for the greatest part not shared by the social democrats 
and neither by the communists. The latter had been warm supporters from the 
very beginning and praised the Government with regard to the Ryssavtalet. 5 
Hilding Hagberg, the spokesman of the communists was not only convinced of 
the coming crisis but also of Sweden's relative incapacity to compete with the 
US and the UK on the world markets because of "the unprecedented 
rationalization and effectiveness which has taken place there". " The 
communists expected that Sweden had to deal with this murderous competition 
within two or three years or even less. The Soviet Union with her crisis free 
market could be the answer to the imminent danger of mass-unemployment 
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and industrial inactivity. 
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The opposition as well as the social democratic government party did not 
restrict their debates to the Riksdag. In fact all the parties did ventilate 
their opinions through closely connected or right-out owned newspapers. Best 
known and most vitriolic was the campaign of Herbert Tingsten, editor in 
chief, of the liberal newspaper Dagens Nyheter. We shall later return to 
Tingsten and his campaign of which Tage Erlander has remarked that it 
offered no "edifying reading". At the same time he accused the author of the 
vehement anti-Ryssavtalet prose that his "mental activity was paralysed by an 
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absurd fear of communists". Such a statement, although written down about 
fifteen years later gives an impression of the atmosphere in which the 
debates took place. 
Morgón Tidningen, owned by the Social Democratic Party, and generally 
regarded as the government's mouth-piece did what it was expected to do and 
defended the Ryssavtalet without almost no traces of criticism. And no 
wonder, many of them were written by Undén. Much emphasis was put on the 
expected economic crisis, the loss of the traditional German markets and the 
heavy competition with the US and the UK on the American and English 
homemarkets as well as other markets in the capitalistic world. The Ryssav-
talet was presented as the answer to mass-unemployment which, because of 
the above mentioned factors, soon was to be expected. 
Morgón Tidningen did not restrict itself to the defence of the agreement 
but also attacked the opposition panics and papers and their doubts concern-
ing the agreement. Tingsten's Dagens Nyheter was of course the most 
favoured object for Morgón Tidningen's attacks to which also Östen Undén 
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made his (anonymous) contributions but also the Wiedergutmachung theme 
was put forward. 
There were other Folkpartiet oriented papers that, in the wake of Dagens 
Nyheter, criticized the credit agreement but papers as Stockholms Tidningen 
and Expressen never became as ferocious as Dagens Nyheter. In fact they 
behaved quite moderately. 
The most important conservative newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet, tried to see 
the advantages and disadvantages of the agreement but appeared, like the 
equally conservative Sydsvenka Dagbladet not to be content with the 
concluded agreement and considered it in the end unrealizable. Also the main 
organ of the Fanners' League Skdnska Dagbladet was not so happy about the 
22 terms of the agreement. 
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It remains a strange phenomenon, this dividing line between the Social 
Democratic and Communist Party on the one side and the non-socialistic 
opposition at the other side. The attitude of the Communists, with their close 
relations to the Soviet Union, does hardly need further explanation but it is 
the attitude of the social democrats and the non-socialist parties that deserve 
a closer examination. 
Normally anti-communism was not less strong among the Social demo-
crats than among the non-socialists although the Social democrats never 
went so far as those representatives of the conservative and liberal part of 
the nation who warmly welcomed the German attack on the Soviet Union, 
Operation Barbarossa, in the summer of 1941. They were openly enthusiastic 
about this "Crusade against Communism" because it was considered to be an 
exceptional chance to get rid of communism. Especially in military circles 
many supporters of that idea could be found. 
Yet the anti-Soviet attitude was -for the time being transferred in 
opposition against the Ryssavtalet -at the non-socialist side in the summer of 
1946 much more pronounced than in the ranks of their political opponents. It 
is unlikely that only the non-socialists were infected by the Cold War virus 
whereas the socialists were left in peace. Part of the explanation could be 
that the Ryssavtalet was concluded by a Social-democratic government and 
that the socialists for political reasons could not desert their own administra-
tion. 
The anti-communist feelings had certainly not been abandoned among the 
social democrats but they were suppressed for party-political reasons. Also 
Undén with his outspoken suspicion of both American and Soviet Union 
politics might have had a soothing influence on his partisans and the same 
may be said about Prime Minister Erlander. 
The non-socialists on the other hand were no part of the government 
although they were co-responsible, because the terms of the agreement had, 
roughly, come off during the time that the Grand Coalition Government was 
in power. But there was also something else. The liberals and conservatives, 
i.e. Folkpartiet and Höger had, as contrasted with the Social Democratic 
Party, close connections with the industry that had to make the deliveries to 
the Soviet Union. And that industry was not longer interested in doing 
business with the Soviets. 
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2.4 The industry and the Ryssavtalet. 
Why was the Swedish industry so unwilling to do business with the Soviet 
Union? Various reasons can be found in the existing literature but they have 
all one thing in common: none of them satisfy completely and all carry a part 
of the truth. 
Inflation has been mentioned as one of the reasons as well as political 
hostility to the Soviet Union. It has been put forward that the agreement 
could tie the Swedish economy to that of the Soviet Union in such a way 
that Sweden would have become entirely dependent on the Soviets. The Herald 
Tribune of July 7 1946 wrote that there were two schools of thoughts: 
"The first holds that economic policy must match political policy; that 
Sweden has always sought trade with Russia, though unsuccessfully until 
now, and that now is the time for Sweden to prove itself willing and 
able to establish strong trade relations on both sides of its borders. 
The conservative school, on the other hand, is worried over the size of 
the credit, its barter provisions and the start of a trend that could 
eventually tie Sweden to Russia, as the Balkan countries now are 
finding themselves economically tied." 
Businessmen who had to delivered the goods belonged accordingly to this 
American paper to the conservative school. 
Another objection that was raised was that the Soviet Union could not be 
relied upon as a permanent market. The Soviets wanted in the first place to 
rebuild their industry with the help of Swedish deliveries. But their aim was 
to make their home market independent from foreign countries. If that had 
been realized they should withdraw themselves from the Swedish market, 
leaving the Swedes with an inflated industrial capacity. An economic crisis 
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would be the result. All these American sources breathed a Cold War spirit 
which at that time was more matured in the USA than on the European 
continent. In Washington the Soviet Union was not thought of as a normal 
trade-partner but as a perfidious empire that tried to draw Sweden into its 
orbit by economic means. 
Fear of the Soviets had become a reality in the US although it still had 
the monopoly on the atomic bomb and moreover had an overwhelming 
economic power. Significant of the atmosphere in the USA was that Chur-
chill's speech in Fulton, Missouri,(the "iron curtain" speech of march 5 1946) 
in the presence of president Truman, had caused a nationwide shock and fear. 
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The fear that Churchill generated with this much noticed speech was 
projected by US News on Sweden when it wrote: 
"Fear of Russia has increased in Stockholm with Soviet expansion 
westward. Appearance of rockets in Swedish skies, presumably from 
Russian experimenters, has done nothing to lessen the fear." 
The first signs of the Cold War had probably reached Sweden indeed, as also 
Tage Erlander had assumed, but the rockets in the Swedish skies were the 
product of over-exited minds: they appeared to be nothing else than falling 
stars. 
Nevertheless these non-existing "ghostrockets" had their impact on the 
public opinion, especially in the countryside. It was alleged that the Soviets 
tried to frighten the Swedes to make huge deliveries on credit but according 
to a memorandum of Undén, a few years later, the Soviets had never 
29 exercised any pressure in the case of the Credit Agreement. 
The reasons of the Swedish businessmen for not wanting to do business with 
the East were however less infected by fear than the Americans supposed. 
The terms for the Ryssavtalet had been discussed thoroughly in the utrikesut-
skottet, the foreign committee, in which the parties were represented in 
proportion to their parliamentary strength. 
Representatives of the industries which had to make the deliveries had 
been present at the meetings of the committee and had expressed their doubts 
about the implement of the Agreement because of a shortage of labour, raw 
materials, machinery and energy supply. It was emphasized by the Industry 
Association (Industriförbundet) and Export Association (Exportföreningen) that 
coercive measures by the government that would reduce the freedom of doing 
business would not occur but it was exactly that non-coercion statement that 
made the campaign of Herbert Tingsten of Dagens Nyheter waged to culminate 
as we will see here below. But it was not only lack of labour, raw materials 
etc. that did cause the disturbance, as the spokesman for the Export 
Association Rolf von Heidenstam declared, during a meeting in July 1946 with 
Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson and three other members of his government. 
The industry was fully aware of the necessity of good relations with the 
Soviet Union, not in the least trade relations, because it was likely to become 
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an important market for Sweden in the future, certainly when an economic 
crisis would arise. But it was irresponsible to export the huge quantities that 
the Soviets wanted. It would lay too high a claim on the capacity of the 
industry and hamper the export to Western markets which might result in 
Sweden being driven out of the big profitable world markets, which in its 
turn in the long run could mean the death blow to the concerns. 
The producers of the electrical engineering industry, with ASEA that held 
a key position in the deliveries at the lead, showed themselves very much 
against the agreement, but also from LM Ericsson (telephone) Alfa Laval 
(turbines) and SKF came significant opposition. Their backlog of orders, at 
home as well as abroad, was so big that they were fully booked to capacity, 
as they claimed, for the next two or three years. 
ASEA:s managing director, Thorsten Ericsson, let Myrdal, Minister of Trade, 
know that his company was able to make only a small part of the requested 
deliveries and only under certain conditions such as by the government 
guaranteed supplies of raw materials and labour. 
Myrdal grew furious and proposed in the government a number of solu-
tions: a state owned electrical industry or the establishment of a daughter 
company in Sweden of foreign companies as Siemens, Brown Boveri or General 
Electric.31 
The result of Myrdal's move was that ASEA on the fifth of July 1946 
announced an extension of its production capacity. Apparently did Myrdal not 
believe the allegations otherwise he would not have proposed the establish-
ment of a state owned company or a foreign subsidiary: they would have 
. suffered in the same degree from the asserted fatal lack of materials and 
labour. 
Already at the beginning of July 1946 Herbert Tingsten had started a 
campaign in Dagens Nyheter against the Ryssavtalet. Thorsten Ericsson and 
the bankers Marcus and Jacob Wallenberg who had substantial interests in 
ASEA, SKF and LM Ericsson had provided Tingsten with information. 
Tingsten's campaign culminated in a scandal when he on the 22nd of October 
wrote an editorial called The exposed lie wherein he described Thorsten 
Ericsson's account of the meeting of the foreign committee where Myrdal had 
reflected on a possible solution for meeting the terms of the Ryssavtalet by 
inviting foreign companies to establish a subsidiary in Sweden. 
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Myrdal's move was absolutely contrary to what the government had 
promised the concerns: that it would not exercise pressure. The meetings of 
the foreign committee were secret so it was obvious that Tingsten had been 
informed by one of the committee members. From Tingsten's memoirs it 
appears that the matter was arranged by himself, Ericsson and Folkparü 
member John Bergvall as a kind of a last attempt to prevent ASEA's 
participation in the Ryssavtalet. 3 It is evident why an editor-in-chief as 
Tingsten, "paralyzed by an unreasonable fear of communism", was so opposed 
to the Ryssavtalet and it is equally obvious that he represented one of the 
first Cold Warriors in Sweden. It is also understandable why other conserva-
tive and liberal newspapers took an unwilling stand against the Ryssavtalet: 
They were, apart from their classical aversion to communism, also inspired by 
the industry which had intimate connections within the parties in which those 
newspapers had their political roots. 
But it is much less clear why a concern as ASEA was so unwilling to do 
business with the Soviets. Erlander wondered in his memoirs: 
"Could deliveries of electrical material of at the most hundred millions 
have played a conclusive role for ASEA? Were there other reasons that 
made it desirable for ASEA to abstain from deliveries?' 
Erlander has referred to the Ryssavtalet debate as the first sign of the 
emerging Cold War in Sweden. The Prime Minister's reflection was assailed by 
Ohlin in his memoirs as "poorly based speculations". The leader of the 
Folkpartiet believed on the contrary that the Swedish industry, by mouth of 
Marcus Wallenberg, had talked to Tingsten to calm him down because: 
"The big companies are usually little interested in heavy conflicts with 
the country's government. They prefer to do the discussions in a more 
quiet way and preferably not in the columns of a paper."^ 
That is, of course, in general, quite right, but Wallenberg did certainly not 
inform Tingsten about Myrdal's proposal in the foreign committee to make 
him feel more at ease. 
That Wallenberg informed the newspaperman Tingsten can hardly mean 
anything else than that he wanted to put the Erlander adminstration under 
pressure by revealing the utterances of Myrdal in the secret committee. What 
he wanted was to put the matter to the attention of the public and if 
possible upset the public opinion. He was not out after avoiding a debate. It 
was of course the other way round: he wanted a debate and he needed it. 
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It is evident that ASEA had good reasons for not being eager to do 
business with the Soviets but the burning question is of course: Why not? It 
can't be because of bad experiences in the past. On the contrary: The 
company had always been interested in trade agreements with the Soviets and 
in the thirties ASEA had even promoted the granting of both private and 
state credits to Stalin. In the second half of the twenties the Soviet Union 
had been the largest import foreign market for ASEA and the company had 
even become a concession for the manufacture of electric motors in Jaros-
lav. 0 The Soviet Union was perceived as an enormous market with much 
promising export facilities. A few months after the conclusion of peace, in 
the summer of 1945, an OSS report concluded that the 
"Swedish industry, the Government, and the Press regard the USSR as a 
natural market for Sweden and a potential source of many of the raw 
materials that Sweden needs.' 
Even during the war when the Nazis stood before the gates of Leningrad and 
Kiew did the payments from Moscow to ASEA not stop despite the fact 
"that there are not the slightest possibilities to be able to send 
something from Sweden to Russia. (..) Yesterday (..) came in almost one 
million crowns and a telegram from Moscow confirming that they 
intended to continue payments as per the contract and that the finished 
machines must be stored in Stockholm so that they can be transported 
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as soon as possible.' 
ASEA intended to carry on business according to an intercepted letter from 
the company to the Soviet trade delegation. The letter referred to a 
conference on which quantities were discussed that ASEA should deliver under 
1944-1945. 
However, due to many uncertain factors as for example transport facilities 
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and raw materials a definitive agreement could as yet not be concluded. 
The behaviour of ASEA was, seen in the light of her positive experiences 
with Russia in the past, quite remarkable. And in retrospect the attitude of 
ASEA cannot be blamed either on meager profits on the Ryssavtalet. On the 
contrary: they were excellent. On her total deliveries of about 70 million 
Swedish Crowns the company did gain a profit of approximately 30 million. 
ASEA's asserted inability of carrying out the deliveries to the Soviet 
Union within the frame of the Ryssavtalet was brought up for discussions in 
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the First Chamber of the Riksdag. It was observed that the company, after 
having agreed to take her share in the deliveries 
"had devoted itself to very extensive speculations and negotiations about 
further deliveries to other countries. That does not point to the fact that the 
production capacity of the company should be exhausted by the engagements 
it has assumed on account of the Russian trade agreement.' 
And Minister of Trade, Gunnar Myrdal, remarked at the same occasion in the 
First Chamber that ASEA was 
"an industry which according to my opinion and I believe to the opinion 
of all the experts has a specially good market, not only in the Soviet 
Union, to which country it for a long time past has been a supplier, 
and Poland but in whole Eastern Europe. (..) ASEA is after all a 
company that will have considerable difficulties to meet her moral 
obligations which she has accepted not only through the information 
which the company furnished to the Export Association and Industry 
Commission which passed them to the Russian negotiators, but which 
were also given during the companies direct negotiations with the 
Russians. ASEA's difficulties are caused among others because the 
company received new orders from different sides and are further 
caused by ASEA's special difficulties with regard to labour." 
Undén became confused of ASEA's behaviour. During a meeting with managing 
director Ericsson Undén was given an extensive lecture about the difficulties 
of the company: shortage of labour, raw materials etc. But when the meeting 
was over Ericsson had gone straight over to Myrdal 
"and informed him that ASEA negotiated with Poland about a 60 million 
contract for the electrifying of Warsaw! He does not seem to notice the 
contradiction in proportion to the planned Russian orders.' 
It is not totally clear why ASEA could not have produced the requested goods 
especially now she just had made agreements with LM Ericsson about the 
production and sales within the electrical industries. Or does the ASEA case 
provide us with an example how the US bypassed the Swedish government and 
her course of neutrality by applying directly to private companies on which 
she could exert a certain degree of influence? 
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2.5 The American protest note. 
The USA disliked the Ryssavtalet because it was contrary to her desire to 
promote multilateral trade on an non-discriminatory basis. Sweden had to keep 
her trade open to all other countries. Washington was concerned about the 
long-term effects of bilateral agreements of an exclusive nature and presented 
on August 16, 1946 a note, reminding Stockholm that such agreements might 
have unfortunate consequences. In a note to Moscow the same general 
comments with regard to the consequences of such trade agreements were 
made. 
Undén expressed a kind of polite surprise in his answer of August 29 1946 
in which he reminded Washington of numerous official declarations expressing 
the Swedish devotion to the principles of multilateral trade. Sweden wished 
nothing else than a quick resumption of it's foreign trade but in post war 
Europe such a 
"policy had necessarily to be based upon a bilateral collaboration 
between Sweden and the various European nations with which it has 
commercial relations." 
Undén concluded that Sweden 
"must reserve to itself complete freedom of decision as to the 
opportuneness of concluding such bilateral agreements as well as of 
adhering to an eventual international commercial arrangement can 
hardly understand how the situation, being that set forth in the 
explanation given about Swedish commercial policy, can have given rise 
to conclusions of the sort contained in your Note."46 
It is known however that Undén was more than "surprised" about the note 
and that the Americans were aware of the fact that he regarded the note as 
a form of pressure from the side of the USA. But what the Americans did not 
know was that Undén, anonymous, made fun of them. Referring to a 
Norwegian-American agreement, whereby the American had claimed the 
monopoly of transportation of goods Undén remarked 
"We may hope that the Norwegian government (..) does not neglect to draw 
attention to this American defection from their high principles which they 
preach for us and other sinful people." 
Also the Soviet Government expressed its "utmost surprise" about the note 
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and informed Washington that she and, as she believed, the Swedish govern-
ment as well 
"do not feel the need to consult the administration of the USA about 
the advantages and disadvantages of the trade agreement. The 
government of the Soviet Union is the more surprised about the 
Contents of Your note, since the government of the US herself practice 
conclusioning of long-term bilateral credit-and trade agreements 
regarding the providing of credits directly or through the Export-Import 
Bank for purchasing of American goods.(..) In this connection can your 
interpretation of the projected trade agreement between the Soviet 
Union and Sweden only be understood as an attempt to American inter-
ference in trade negotiations between two sovereign states.' 
Sweden had certainly not furnished the milliard credit to the Soviet Union to 
offer the Russians the opportunity to purchase goods elsewhere. The note 
came for Undén as a complete surprise -State Department had before hardly 
mentioned the Swedish Soviet negotiations- and he considered the matter 
serious enough to call home the envoy in Washington, Herman Eriksson, for 
consultation. 
Before the latter flew to Stockholm he had a meeting with Clayton, 
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, who told him that the note 
should not be seen as a protest but preferably as a kind of "friendly 
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representation", 7 a kind of friendly advise to Sweden not to tie its exports 
for a long time to one country. Erikson was inclined to see the note as a 
kind of accident because recently the real decisionmakers at State Department 
had been elsewhere: Foreign Secretary Byrnes, Assistant Secretary James Dunn 
for European, Far and Near Eastern and African Affairs, Freeman Matthews, 
then Director of the Office of European Affairs, his deputy John Hickerson, 
Chief Division of Northern European Affairs Hugh Gumming, his assistant 
William Trimble as well as Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson. 
Some lower officials at State, who were busy with the preparation for a 
multilateral trading system, which was to be worked out in the United 
Nations International Conference on Trade and Employment, had apparently 
become worried by the reports of Chris Ravndal, second man at the American 
Legation in Stockholm. Ingemar Hägglöf has characterized this Ravndal as an 
open and nice person but with a "weakness for conspiracy theories", a 
diplomat that "believed everything he heard" and who was convinced that 
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Sweden was "drifting to the East". Ravndal alleged that Soviet Ambassador 
Tjemychev, Kollontai's successor, had told him (in Febr. 1946) that the 
Soviets intended to drain so many goods from Sweden and to such low prices 
that the Swedish standard of living should sink to approximately that of the 
Soviet Union. Ravndal was not the only man at the US legation who 
disliked the Swedish agreement with Moscow. Also his colleague Donald W. 
Smith, commercial attaché, resented the Ryssavtalet wholeheartedly and had 
told Herman Eriksson that the US administration disliked the credit agreement 
for practical reasons. He probably did not talk on behalf of Washington 
because Dean Acheson has called the note "idiotic" and said that it never 
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should have been sent if he had been in Washington. 
It is remarkable how hostile staff members at the American Legation in 
Stockholm acted vis à vis the Soviet Union, as early as 1946. It is not 
unlikely that State Department received much disinformation or at least little 
realistic information from their men in the Swedish capital as also was the 
case during the time of the Scandinavian Defence Union negotiations. A nice 
example of Donald Smith's way of communicating with State Department can 
be found in a report to the Secretary of State: 
"Despite the support given to the proposed agreement in the officially 
inspired articles in Morgón Tidningen and in the communist press, it 
has been impossible to find a single person in favor of the agreement, 
aside from Government officials who are, of course, required to support 
the proposals." 
Especially Minister Myrdal was to be blamed: 
"Private persons are unanimous in their criticism, of Mr Myrdal who 
was accused of being a double-crossing, crooked, egotistical politician 
seeking personal power at the expense of his own political party's 
popularity. (..) These comments heard so often from Swedish in-
dustrialists, businessmen and bankers are, we believe, exaggerated."-" 
That the top of State Department disagreed with the officials who had 
prepared the note is hard to believe. It is more probable that State disliked 
the way they had expressed their displeasure because a note could in the 
given circumstances hardly expected to be effectful. Rather the contrary. 
From the diplomatic point of view the note was an ill considered action 
because the reactions from Moscow and Stockholm were, as could have been 
foreseen, quite predictable. 
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Early in the autumn of 1946 the first rumours appeared that the USA 
should refuse to deliver raw materials, semi manufactures and machinery to 
Sweden if they should be used to fullfil the provisions of the Credit 
Agreement appeared. That American unwillingness, a kind of embargo policy 
avant la lettre, was another factor that contributed to the ultimate failure of 
the Ryssavtalet. 
2.6 The failure of the credit. 
The Soviet Union did not use more than 517 million Swedish crowns although 
she was in urgent need of Western currency and despite the very favourable 
conditions of the agreement. 
That is even more remarkable in the light of the fact that Moscow in the 
drawing period, 1947-1952, was not able to obtain credits anywhere else in 
the West. Ingemar Hägglöf has observed that literally everything contributed 
to the failure: from economical conditions at home as well as abroad to world 
politics. Moreover there had been many mistakes made. Furthermore, 
according to this diplomat, it was an illusion to think that extended trade 
relations with the Soviet Union automatically should lead to good political 
relations. Undén, Myrdal and Wigforss, the most responsible in the govern-
ment for the Ryssavtalet, refused, according to Hägglöf, to face reality: they 
were building their expectations on illusions. 
Also Rolf Sohlman, their closest advisor and a man who, according to 
Hägglöf, had made his "lifework" of the Soviet Union had been too much 
engaged. It is little realistic to blame the above mentioned ministers and 
their advisor for the fact that Moscow used only half of the credit. 
It was not on account of their supposed illusory view that the Soviets 
showed "a rather faint interest for the trade with Sweden."5" It is more 
likely that the failure, among other things, had more to do with the 
unreasonably high prices that certain Swedish manufacturers demanded for 
their products, which lay much above the prices at the world markets. 
Already in 1947 did Ambassador Tjemychev make complaints about those 
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ASEA locomotives was cancelled because the price was 100 % too high. The 
Soviet Union had bought hundreds of locomotives in other countries for half 
CO 
the price of what ASEA had charged. Backgrounds for these extraordinary 
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prices might have been, as the historian of the embargo policy Adler-Karlsson 
has suggested, the unwillingness of the companies to export to the East. The 
companies asserted that their order-books were fully booked up and that no 
delivery capacity was left for exports to the East. 7 
In the period 1947-1952 Swedish exports to the Soviet Union remained 
each year consistently below the expected level which was always calculated 
late in the preceding year. At the same time the Swedish import figures 
showed a surplus so that the trade development cannot be explained by a 
failure of Moscow "to find export commodities demanded by Sweden combined 
with attempts at bilateral balancing"c,ü as Adler-Karlsson has observed. Apart 
from the reasons mentioned here above the following reasons, which all may 
be part of the explanation for the Ryssavtalet, can be found: 
- The Soviets used the Ryssavtalet as a showpiece in their credit 
negotiations with other Western countries. 
- Moscow had never the intention to use more than half of the credit 
- Stalin expected a serious economic depression in the West and by 
postponing the purchases to the last year of the agreement the Swedes 
would, because of the crisis have lowered their prices to a more realistic 
level. At the other hand: when the depression not should come in the 
drawing period, it would come in the period of repayment which might 
make repayments in deflated currency quite expensive. 
- Stockholm found it to its advantage not to stimulate the trade with 
Eastern Europe. The expected depression did not come and Sweden 
preferred also to follow a similar course as the West 
- Under the embargo regulations of the US it would not have been possible 
to ship certain commodities (as f.ex. roller and ball bearings) to the Soviet 
Union. Oppositionleader Ohlin blamed it exclusively on the rise in prices: 
"Because of the increase in prices the deliveries became quantitative 
considerably less than half of the planning."0 
Ohlin did not, like Erlander, pay any attention to the effects of the rising 
Cold War and accused Erlander of "peculiar reflections' when the latter 
tried to analyze the influence of the upcoming Cold War on the failure of the 
credit and trade agreement. 
The failure of the Credit and Trade Agreement can certainly not ex-
clusively be blamed on the Cold War but it can neither be denied that the 
strained East-West relations played their own important part. 
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CHAPTER 3. MARSHALL ΑΠ). NOT ONLY FOR THE DOLLARS. 
"Now the Marshall Plan changed quickly into an instrument of the Cold War." 
Tage Erlander, 1973. 
"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against 
hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." George С Marshall. June 5 1947. 
3.1 Backgrounds and history. 
The Marshall Plan did not, as Erlander asserted in retrospect, change into an 
instrument of the Cold War. It was in fact created 05 an instrument of the 
Cold War. 
Marshall Aid was a weapon against communism while it at the same time 
was aimed at the safeguarding of capitalism. It was not Marshall himself but 
his Undersecretary of State, Dean Acheson, who originated chiefly the idea of 
an aid-program for Europe, which was, according to Washington, on the brink 
of economic collapse. And it was also Acheson who presented the idea to the 
public in a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8 1947. 
It had been planned that president Truman should deliver the speech but he 
had other commitments and Acheson substituted for him but did not, being 
Under Secretary, receive much attention. On June 5 1947 the plan was 
presented for the second time, now by the Secretary of State, Marshall, at 
Harvard University in a commencement address. Marshall had been influenced 
during his seven weeks stay at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow 
(March 10 - April 24) by the Soviet attitude towards Western Europe. The 
talks about a common policy towards the defeated Germany had been a 
complete failure and Marshall had from his Soviet colleague got the impres­
sion that Stalin was not averse to chaos and economic collapse in Western 
Europe. In his address Marshall described the situation in Europe and said 
that 
"before the United States Government can proceed much further in its 
efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on 
its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries 
of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those 
countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to 
whatever action might be undertaken by the Government. It would 
neither be fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to 
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draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet 
economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I 
think, must come from Europe. (..) The program should be a joint one, 
agreed to by a number, if not all European nations." 
Although Marshall had emphasized that the US policy was not directed 
"against any country or doctrine" it was nevertheless evident that he did not 
want to join the Soviets in what should become the European Recovery 
Program (ERP). He only did not say it in so many words. It needs hardly any 
explanation that Moscow could not accept a program which was entirely based 
on Western terms, to say nothing of the fact that for the Kremlin the 
treatment of Europe as one economic entity was completely out of the 
question. Alan Milward remarks in his monumental Reconstruction of Western 
Europe that 
"A surprising number of historians are reluctant to admit that Marshall 
and the State Department wished to exclude the Soviet Union rather 
than merely wishing not to be seen to have excluded it.' 
The open invitation was nothing more than a ploy: Washington did not wish 
to be regarded as the power that had divided Europe because that would have 
caused serious political problems in Western Europe. Truman boasted in his 
memoirs that 
"For the first time in the history of the world a victor was willing to 
restore the vanquished as well as to help its allies." 
At the same time he blamed the Soviet Union for taking "the conqueror's 
approach to victory". Europe was not only to be saved from economic disaster 
but it should also be lifted "from the shadow of enslavement by Russian Com-
munism." The American president had a feeling that 
"beyond economic considerations, the idea of cooperation would 
stimulate new hope and confidence among the nations of Europe and 
thus provide a realistic argument against the Communists' counsel of 
despair." 
Milward concludes that the purpose of Marshall Aid was the development of a 
bloc of nations that: 
"would share similar political, social, economic and cultural values to 
those which the United States itself publicly valued and claimed to 
uphold." 
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Undén was, after having analyzed the American aid program with Gunnar 
Myrdal, convinced that Marshall and the American administration basically 
wanted an 
"entirely West European economic bloc. But a pushing away of the 
Soviets and Eastern Europe would make the connection of England and 
France to the plan impossible.' 
Sixteen months later Undén met Marshall at the Paris Conference where the 
latter told him that he wanted the Soviets to join the plan. According to 
Undén his partner did not pay any attention to his part of the conversation, 
in that way it got the character of two monologues. 
The historian LaFeber has observed that the joining of the Soviets would 
have become too expensive and that the Marshall Plan could not be separated 
from the anti-communist Truman doctrine: they were "two halves of the same 
Walnut." American policy makers have described the Marshall Plan as "a 
Truman Doctrine in Action" but emphasized that any connection between 
economic and military aid was to be avoided. 
The Marshall Aid had two components which in fact could not be 
separated: a political one and an economical one. Like before in the First 
World it was the threat of an imminent political and economical collapse of 
Europe that drew the Americans over the Atlantic. The advance of Com-
munism had to be stopped and an economic environment favourable to 
capitalism had to be created, or, rather be safeguarded. 
Western Europe should develop into a bloc of states with roughly the same 
political, economical, social and cultural values, very similar to those of the 
United States; these values of the so called "free world" were the best 
guarantee for the continuation of the American way of democracy. It had not 
so much to do with a fear of an overhanging depression in the USA because 
the export surplus of America to Europe was in the first two years after the 
war no more than a meager 2 percent of the US gross national product. And 
of course the Marshall Aid was an alternative for the German question. 
East and West could not come to terms on the German future. A solution 
had to be found quickly because of the excessive expenses of the occupation. 
The breaking point were the Reparation Payments (agreed at Yalta) which the 
Soviets needed for the rebuilding of the shattered Russian economy. They 
needed it all the more after Truman had abruptly cut off Lend Lease and 
ignored their request for a reconstruction loan for rebuilding their economy. 
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The Lend Lease Act dated from 1941 and supplied the US allies material 
assistance to win the war, after the war it aided the economic recovery. 
The USA now declared that a revival of Europe was not possible without an 
economically vital Germany. Marshall Aid would replace German reparations 
and Germany would be integrated into the West. That was quite different 
from what the Soviets had in mind. What they wanted was a Germany, 
controlled by the victors of the Second World War, and not a rebuild (West) 
Germany under the guidance of the United States. 
Stalin desired also a "unified" Germany, but unified in the sense that 
Germany was treated as a single economic unit from which he could extract 
reparations. Also from the Western zones which meant that he could draw 
upon the industrial power of the Ruhr area. And at the same time he would 
be more able to prevent the birth of a strong, West oriented Germany. 
The Marshall Plan with its economic and political components had far 
reaching implications for Europe and helped splitting the Old World into two 
parts. What were the reasons for Sweden to accept this, seen from a 
neutrality point of view, controversial aid? 
3.2 Swedish neutrality and Marshall Aid. 
From the beginning the Marshall Aid had been a controversial issue between 
East and West. Moscow was suspicious with regard to the American intentions 
and did not believe in US altruism. The Kremlin's first reaction on Marshall's 
announcement was delayed until June 16 when the Pravda wrote that the Plan 
was nothing else than a Truman doctrine in disguise: an instrument for 
political pressure by means of dollars. 
Despite this criticism Foreign Minister Molotov accepted a British-French 
invitation to discuss the Plan and left for Paris with not less than 90 
advisors. Although the Soviets needed the money very badly they were back 
in Moscow within a week because they could not accept the terms which in 
their view were a direct interference in the internal affairs of other states. 
But nonetheless sixteen West European countries, among them Sweden, 
gathered in Paris in the summer of 1948 to organize a general committee, the 
Committee of European Economic Cooperation (C.E.E.C) and some subcommit-
tees which began to prepare a plan for the economic recovery of Europe. 
The Marshall Plan was for Stockholm the first major foreign issue after 
Sweden's entry into the UN. The Swedes were well aware of the many pitfalls 
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and dangers of foreign interference in their home affairs which were 
connected to the acceptance of Marshall Aid. Especially the Counter Part 
funds were a thom in the flesh because through these funds Washington could 
exercise a direct influence on the economy of the participating countries. 
A separate government agency for the administration of the Aid, the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was set up with Paul G. Hoffman 
as director. The ECA required from the participating nations that they set up 
funds in their own local currency equal to the amount of dollars received. 
Those funds could only be used with the consent of the US. The result was 
not only that Washington could control how their dollars were spent but at 
the same time the Americans had the possibility to control how the equivalent 
amount of the local currency was used. The receiving countries agreed also to 
furnish the US with the information that was necessary for planning and 
carrying out the Plan. The Swedes experienced the US demands for informa­
tion as indeed "exceedingly detailed". The Americans wanted exact information 
about their production and consumption, their im- and exports of "selected 
items" to all the countries concerned. Washington wanted the information fast 
β 
and even supplied instructions for the filling in of the questionnaires. 
US Ambassador Freeman Matthews considered the Marshall Aid, and 
definitively not without reason, as an excellent opportunity to tie Sweden to 
the West: 
"However much Undén may publicly proclaim that ERP is economic and 
not political the closer Sweden is associated with it the more it will 
gradually be tied to the West whether the government likes it or not." 
The tying up of Sweden and Switzerland to the West was considered to be 
important: if not for economic reasons, then at least for political and 
psychological ones. Publicly Undén did indeed claim that the Marshall Aid 
was 100% economic and that it had no political implications whatsoever. That 
was also what Undén told the gathered Swedish correspondents in Paris on 
the 15th of March 1948. At that press conference he assured the journalists 
that Marshall Aid in no way was allowed to influence his absolute neutrality 
line. Undén's utterances induced the newspaper Expressen to some critical 
remarks. The paper wondered what he meant with his neutralité à la suédoise. 
According to Expressen it was the same kind of neutrality which was 
practiced in the era 1940 - 1945 and 
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"which among others allowed that foreign soldiers travelled through the 
country and that the foreign policy was adapted to the Great Power 
that the state-and military leaders believed should win the war." 
What did Undén really think about the Marshall Plan and how did the 
government and opposition look at it? Not all the members in the Social 
Democratic Party agreed even if the executive committee accepted the 
statement of the International Socialistic Conference in Paris ((April 24-25 
1948) and drew the conclusion that the party 
"can agree with the main thought of the resolution without wanting to 
tie itself to every particular formulation." 
Sweden supported wholeheartedly the economic cooperation of the European 
countries within the frame of the Marshall Plan and showed interest in an 
extended economical cooperation 
"within the frame of the European Marshall organization and the UN 
economical European commission." 
Military cooperation however was absolutely out of the question. The 
prominent party member and former Foreign Minister, Rickard Sandler, argued 
that the Swedish joining of the Marshall conference in Paris could help to 
prevent that the Aid would be tied up to economic and political conditions 
which were dictated by the US. On the other hand he foresaw that the 
conference could extend the gap between East and West. The minister of 
Social Affairs, Gustav Moller, agreed with Sandler that Marshall Aid was not 
to be politicized but saw no reason for Sweden not to join, otherwise it could 
look as if Sweden choose for the Eastern side. The opposite was of course as 
much choosing side but he seemed not have been bothered by that. 
The international secretary of the SDP, Kaj Björk, pointed out that 
Switzerland had shown itself rather uninterested because of its neutral status. 
At the end of the meeting Sandler said once again that the Soviets should 
consider Sweden as being engaged with the West if it should join the Paris 
meeting. 2 Also P.E Sköld, Minister of Agriculture, doubted if it was wise to 
accept Marshall Aid because of the hold that the US should get on Sweden 
13 
and advised to contact Switzerland. 
Also in the foreign committee the social democrats expressed great doubts 
with regard to the conditions of Marshall Aid. 4 Apart from the very much 
opposed Counterpart funds there was also the much discussed Article X which 
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could be interpreted so that Washington could require the European nations to 
consult with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -if they thought it 
necessary to do so- about alterations in the rate of exchange of their own 
national currency. The greatest objection was that the US in the future could 
force through a devaluation of the European currencies against the dollar. 
The text of article X did also cause the Swedish government a lot of trouble 
and it was discussed if it was 
"advisable to tie itself inextricably in such commitments especially since 
OEEC may have progressively greater political implications.' 
After much deliberation the Americans dropped the article but in the 
meantime Article X could be tied to the US by accepting Marshall Aid. 
One also observed the relation between the embargo policy and the 
acceptance of Marshall Aid. On March 30 1948, the House of Representatives 
in Washington discussed the proposal of one of its representatives, Mundt, the 
so called Mundt Amendment. Mundt's proposal was directed against the Soviet 
Union and he called it "just sheer, utter nonsense and folly" to give economic 
aid to Europe, that was meant to protect the Western world against 
communism and at the same time not to forbid those countries the export of 
important materials to the Soviet Union. 
"Satan must be roosting in our brains to so confuse our thinking" said one 
of the men who voted in favour of this amendment. " There was much 
opposition to the amendment but it was despite of that incorporated in the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 as section 117 (d). Two lists, 1A and IB, with 
strategic materials which were forbidden to sell to the Soviet Union were 
drawn up. Those lists were seen as direct threats in Stockholm (and also in 
Bern) to their policy of neutrality, and caused much discussions as we shall 
see in Chapter 8. 
In the light of this it is obvious that the Marshall Aid caused the 
government in Stockholm rather big troubles. Was their neutrality not in 
danger and was the Marshall Aid in fact not an extension of the Truman 
17 doctrine, as for example the Swedish communists, but also the Soviet Union1', 
asserted? How extensive would the US influence on the Swedish economy 
become and last but not least: what would be the reaction of the Soviets who 
themselves had rejected the Aid and moreover had ordered the East European 
countries and Finland to do the same? As I already showed above the Swedish 
government was well aware of all the ins and outs of the ERP. That seems 
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not to have been the case with the opposition leader Bertil Ohlin who put 
himself without reservation behind the ERP. "He had no sense of hesitations 
because of American control" Undén observed and reading Ohlin's memoirs 
1 Q 
one can only confirm the correctness on Undén's remark.10 It shows at the 
same time that Undén himself was worried about the implications that the 
Marshall Aid might have on Swedish politics. 
The Farmer's League (Bondeförbundet) voted also almost unanimous for 
the Marshall Plan and so did the conservatives (Högerpartiet). Quite 
contrary reacted the communists and going through their arguments, one is 
inclined to call them revisionists avant la lettre. Sweden was out on a 
dangerous way: 
"They who have thought out this plan cannot hid their intentions to 
forge economically and military the Marshall states together to future 
crisis- and crisiscommunities with the USA. The Marshall Plan presup-
poses a close American control over the economic life of the par-
ticipating countries and their currency, price, wage and social poli-
tics."21 
During a radio discussion in September 1948 (election year) Hilding Hagberg, 
the party leader of the Swedish communist party remarked that: 
"The Marshall agreement was not yet a military alliance, but they build 
up a political bloc which can be the first step to a military alliance." 
In his pamphlet Marshallplanen, Västhlocket och Sverige (1948) Hagberg said 
exactly what LaFeber should express about 25 years later when he remarked 
that the Marshall Aid and the Truman doctrine were "two parts of the same 
Walnut". 
Undén accused the communists of having already at an early stage 
politicized the Marshall Aid and claimed once again that the Marshall Plan 
was a purely economic action on the part of Washington. J It is certain that 
Undén and the Swedish government did not themselves believe what they said 
in public about the Aid being something purely economic. Such statements 
were for home consumption and were of course also made with an eye to 
Moscow. The real reasons for their acceptance were in fact purely pragmatic. 
Even if the economy of Sweden had suffered a setback during the War, 
among others because of the blockade, Sweden's economic position in 1945 
was quite favourable, certainly compared with that of most West European 
countries. The country had even been able to grant credits to Denmark, 
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Norway, the Soviet Union and a number of other European countries. After 
the war the United States replaced the defeated Germany as one of Sweden's 
main suppliers of many basic commodities. Receipts derived from export 
surpluses to other countries were not convertible into American dollars and 
for that reason Sweden found herself confronted with a serious dollar 
problem. 
This shortage of dollars had in March 1947 grown so seriously that the 
Swedish Government introduced extensive import controls. The Swedish 
reserves of gold and foreign currency had gradually been reduced to a 
minimum level and Sweden's ambition in the field of foreign trade was 
principally to reach an equilibrium between exports and imports, especially in 
relation to the dollar area. Therefore special attention was given to facilitate 
the increase of exports to the Western Hemisphere. About 90 % of the 
traditional Swedish export products to the US consisted of pulp, paper and 
iron ore. Now heavy efforts were made to expand those quantities but there 
were also efforts to develop markets for other, more specialized products. 
The American export drive was supplemented by measures which were 
designed to limit the exports from the dollar area to such commodities which 
were essential for maintaining and increasing production, mainly machinery 
and spare parts, chemicals and petroleum products. The success of the 
Swedish program, i.e. the achievement of an external and internal equilibrium, 
depended to a large extent upon successful cooperation between the West 
European countries, especially those which were later to cooperate within the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation. 
In short: Sweden needed the USA and was very much dependent on 
Washington, not only because of the products it imported from across the 
Atlantic but also because of the growing US influence in Western Europe 
after the introduction of the Marshall Plan. The growing US influence was of 
course at odds with Undén's line of policy and that was exactly the reason 
why he actually was not in favour of a common plan for the recovery of 
Europe. Undén rather preferred the "shopping list" approach which meant that 
the various European countries delivered a list in Washington with the 
products they needed. 
The Marshall Plan did not change the Swedish economy as Axel Gjöres, 
Minister of Commerce, has argued. Sweden's acceptance of the Marshall 
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Plan did neither imply that the country fell victim to a kind of "dollar 
slavery" as Tiden, a leading social democratic periodical, concluded. The 
amount of dollars that Sweden received was simply too small for becoming 
enslaved. The Paris Convention of April 16 1948 on European Economic 
Cooperation was ratified by Sweden on June 30, 1948 and on July 3 a bilateral 
Economic Cooperation Agreement between the US and Sweden was concluded 
and ratified by the Erlander government on July 21. 
It was agreed that Sweden would not receive financial aid in the form of 
grants, but only in the form of loans. Sweden received for the budget year 
1948-1949 a credit of only 22 million dollars, an amount which was not likely 
to have a profound effect on the Swedish economy. But it enabled Sweden to 
maintain a corresponding portion of its dollar imports which otherwise would 
have been impossible if Sweden wanted to achieve a balance in the dollar 
trade. 
Thanks to the ECA credits Sweden was able to import certain machinery 
and raw materials which were essential for the maintaining and increasing of 
the Swedish industrial production. 
In the light of what is said above it cannot be argued that Sweden 
accepted the ERP only for the sake of the dollars. Actually to Stockholm the 
flow of dollars to the impoverished and economical crippled Western Europe 
was the major reason because the recovery of Europe was a conditio sine qua 
non for Swedish economy. A healthy and recovered European economy served 
the Swedish interests best because it would be able to buy its products. Both 
Erlander and Undén were convinced ofthat. 
More than once the Erlander government pointed out that Marshall Aid in 
their eyes was nothing else but a purely economic matter. But that statement 
also is only a part of the truth. The real question was: Could Sweden refuse 
the Marshall Aid? The answer is "no". The relations with Washington were, 
for several reasons not very good. The Swedish conduct in the Second World 
War was still not forgotten. The Americans abhorred the Credit and Trade 
Agreement with Russia and did neither like the Swedish stand with regard to 
the American embargo policy. Sweden was cooperative but not for hundred 
percent as the US government demanded. 
The Swedish behaviour in the UN had been a thorn in the flesh and 
finally there was the negative Swedish standpoint with regard to the Western 
55 
defence pact, the future NATO. Undén committed to his diary that "a refusal 
29 
should be very much resented and be considered as a demonstration.' ^ Acce-
ptance stood for goodwill from the side of the USA while refusal at the other 
hand could become identical with serious political consequences. 
Summarizing: Sweden could simply not afford to say "no" to the Marshall 
Plan. Not for the sake of her trade with Western Europe and the USA and 
neither because of the political consequences that a refusal might have. The 
acceptance was principally symbolic. Also Sven Andersson, then party secret-
ary of the SDP, has called the acceptance "symbolic" and not of substantial 
interest for the economy of Sweden. He did not, and neither did he some fo-
rty years later, consider the acceptance as a departure from neutrality. 
Gunnar Myrdal's conviction that an economic depression should hit the 
Western World seems also to have played a part in the Swedish considerations 
and so did the communist coupe in Prague on February 25 1948. The rising 
anti-communist wave certainly influenced the decisionmaking in Sweden. The 
acceptance of Marshall dollars may, in the light of the actual developments in 
Europe, also be perceived as a clear signal to the Western world: it left no 
place for doubt where Sweden, neutral or not, stood ideologically. 
Europe was in great upheaval after the events in Prague and the reactions 
in Washington were close to hysteria. It was at that time that General Clay, 
the United States Chief of the Military Government in Germany, cabled from 
Berlin to Washington that he had the feeling that war "may come with 
dramatic suddenness.' Although the general's feeling soon passed away, the 
administration in Washington did not waste any time and took advantage of 
the war scare to persuade the Congress, which had until that time been 
rather unwilling to provide dollars for the Marshall Plan and rearmament. 
President Truman desperately needed a crisis to sell the Plan to the Congress 
and from that point of view the coup in Czechoslovakia was nothing less than 
a gift from Providence. 
Of course the rejection of the Soviet Union of the Marshall Plan played a 
certain role in the Swedish capital but Undén did not think that the Swedish 
acceptance had shattered the Soviets' confidence in his neutrality lineJJ and 
Sohlman confirmed this. The Soviets certainly criticized the Swedish accep-
tance but also showed understanding for the step. The Soviets probably 
knew this was the best they could hope as far as Sweden was concerned. 
Undén explained to ambassador Tjemychev that he considered the Marshall 
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Plan necessary for the economic recovery of Europe. 5 It is remarkable that 
Ivar Anderson, editor-in-chief of Svenska Dagbladet and a Conservative 
member of the foreign committee in the Riksdag, was of the opinion, that 
Undén (and Wigforss) were heavily influenced by the Soviet campaign against 
the Marshall Plan and that he showed an "an increasing anti-America atti-
tude".36 
Undén was not anti America but neither did he take a pronounced positive 
attitude towards Washington. The same can be said with regard to Undén's 
attitude to Moscow. Undén just followed his policy of neutrality. The Marshall 
dollars could to a certain extent increase the US influence but they did not 
cause a departure from neutrality. 
3.3. Scandinavia and Marshall Aid. 
How did the other two Scandinavian countries react to the Marshall Plan? 
The story of Denmark and Norway differs not much from that of Sweden. All 
three were unwilling to abandon their policy of neutrality and bridgebuilding. 
They were also afraid of the political implications which the ERP might bring 
about. That's why they put, with an eye at the public, all the weight on the 
economical aspect which was not considered to be contrary to the concept of 
neutrality. 
Things became more complicated when the Soviets under the guidance of 
Molotov, demonstratively walked out of the Paris Conference in the summer 
of 1947. Lange and Undén had discussed what they should do if the Soviets 
should abandon the Paris Conference but they had quickly come to the 
conclusion that there could be no reason for them to do the same. 
The Scandinavian bridgebuilding policy was in practice not so active as the 
word itself suggests. It was in fact even a rather passive policy whereby 
problems were avoided by not taking sides in disputes between the Great 
-10 
Powers. But the acceptance of Marshall Aid was considered to be a choice 
for one of the blocs, especially after the Soviets had left the Paris Con-
ference and were convinced that the Plan was only the economical 
component of a US plan for the militarization of Europe . 
A significant difference between Sweden on the one hand and Denmark 
and Norway at the other was that the last two had suffered from the war 
and simply needed the dollars badly. That was especially true for Denmark 
which was in such a bad foreign exchange position that it in fact had no 
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other choice than to join. All three were aware that the Marshall Aid might 
be the first step towards the establishment of a Western political or even 
military bloc which at the time of the announcement of the Marshall Plan 
(1947), was absolutely incompatible with the official foreign policy of the 
three. For that reason the economic character of the ERP was publicly 
emphasized. 
Oslo even sent a team of economic experts to Paris, to underline that it 
considered the Plan as purely economic. All three countries preferred the 
"shopping list" strategy which in fact was quite similar to what the Soviets 
had proposed. The Conference of the Northern Cooperation Committee in 
Stockholm on February 7 and 8 1948 resulted in a resolution in which they 
agreed to take part in the Marshall Plan for purely economical reasons. It 
was in the light of their official neutrality policy the only acceptable 
motivation. 
The ultimate choice of Scandinavia had been determined by economic reasons 
even if the arguments of the Swedes (goodwill, recovery of Europe) were 
different from those of Norway and Denmark. But their choice had also 
political implications which soon became evident, not only in relation to the 
US embargo policy but also with regard to the establishment of NATO. US 
ambassador Marvel in Copenhagen warned the Danish Foreign Minister as 
early as September 1948 that he should not be sure of Marshall Aid if he did 
not demonstrate enough cooperation towards a Western military pact. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE GROWING TENSIONS OF 1948: THE PRELUDE TO 
UNDéN'S PROPOSAL. 
The year of 1948 was loaded with events. The first spectacular occurrence 
was the Western Union speech of the English Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, 
which via the Brussels Pact, would lead to the creation of Nato in April 1949. 
Other events that sent real Shockwaves through the Western world were the 
communist coup in Prague (February) and the Berlin Crisis in June. 
Also in Scandinavia these incidents caused much stir in the public opinion 
but what frightened the Scandinavians most was the Treaty of Friendship-
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Finland and the Soviet Union. It 
was suspected to be dictated by Stalin to Helsinki and soon after the 
announcement of the Treaty a wave of rumours about malicious Soviet inten-
tions with regard to Scandinavia swept over Northern Europe. The Cold War 
intensified and times grew rough for members of the communist party and 
other leftwingers, suspected as they were of evil intentions with regard to 
democracy. Discussions about the defence of Western Europe started and 
resulted eventually in the birth of Nato. Roughly at the same time the 
Scandinavian states started negotiations about a Scandinavian Defence Union. 
Those talks broke down definitively in January 1949, three months before the 
establishment of Nato. 
4.1. The situation in Europe round 1948 and the Bevin Speech. 
During the Conferences of Yalta (Febr. 1945) and Potsdam (July - August, 
1945) it was decided by the Soviet Union, the USA and Great Britain that a 
council of Foreign Ministers should be established to deal with post-war 
problems. Also the Foreign Minister of France became a member of the 
Council where the main task was to try and find a solution to the German 
problem. But an agreement on a joint policy with regard to Germany was 
never reached. The imminent break between East and West could already be 
discerned in Potsdam. It became manifest with the declaration of the Truman 
doctrine and the Marshall Plan which was answered by the Soviets with the 
establishment of the Cominform and an economic aid program for the states 
of Eastern Europe which, under pressure from Moscow, did not take part in 
the Marshall Plan. 
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From that moment on Europe was split into two blocs. The Council of 
Foreign Ministers in London in December 1947 was the last of a series of five 
and broke down when a solution for Germany, the central issue , appeared to 
be out of reach. 
Already on 5 March, 1946, Churchill had in his "Iron Curtain" speech spoken 
of an association of the English speaking nations, but -until the Foreign 
Ministers Conference broke down in London- the thought was not further 
elaborated. However on the same day the Ministers Conference in London 
failed, Bevin proposed to his American colleague Marshall 
"the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, 
in Western Europe backed by the United States and the Dominions". 
There was already an Anglo-French military Pact in Europe, the Dunkirk 
Treaty, which could serve as a nucleus and starting point for a West 
European military pact against Eastern Europe. The Dunkirk Treaty was said 
to be aimed against Germany but without doubt the signatories had the Soviet 
Union and not the defeated Germany in mind when they signed the Treaty in 
March, 1947. 
Marshall's reaction was very cautious. Apparently he did not want to 
jeopardize the appropriation by Congress of his European Recovery Program. 
On January 13, 1948 Marshall received a memorandum from Bevin where 
the British Foreign Minister informed his colleague about his plan to conclude 
treaties of alliance with the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. What 
Bevin wanted was a fast creation of a Western European alliance, soon to be 
extended into an Atlantic Pact. Western Europe alone was too weak to resist 
the eventual Soviet ambitions of expansion. Help from the USA was con-
sidered to be necessary. 
On the 22nd of January 1948 Emest Bevin delivered his "Western Union" 
speech in the House of Commons. Bevin was deliberately rather vague and the 
USA, the future pillar of the Western alliance, was not even mentioned. 
"The time has come to think of ways and means of developing our 
relations with the Benelux countries, to begin talks with these countries 
in close concord with our French ally (Dunkirk Treaty g.a.). Yesterday 
our representatives in Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg were 
instructed to propose such talks. I hope treaties will be signed with the 
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Benelux countries making, with our treaty with France an important 
nucleus in Western Europe". 
Bevin sharply criticised the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and concluded 
"that the free nations of Western Europe must now draw closely 
together (...). I believe the time is ripe for a consolidation of Western 
Europe". 
Bevin did not have to wait long before his proposals to the Benelux were 
honoured. Negotiations started on March 4, and only 13 days later, on March 
17, the Treaty of Brussels was signed by France, England and the Benelux 
countries. 
The central article of the Treaty was the fourth: 
"If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an 
armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in 
accordance with the provisions of article 51 of the Charter of the 
United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other 
aid and assistance in their power". 
The American support for Bevin's plan was restricted to words of understand-
ing and sympathy but the coup in Czechoslovakia on 25 February provoked a 
change in the US attitude that Bevin needed. On March 11 Bevin approached 
the Americans anew with his plans for an Atlantic alliance and this time with 
considerably greater success. Marshall invited his English colleague to come to 
Washington and start negotiations as soon as possible. Only Great Britain, 
the USA and Canada (France was considered a security risk) were present at 
the talks which were held in utmost secrecy and lasted from the 22nd of 
March to the 1st of April. One year later the NATO was established. Did 
Bevin want to include the Scandinavian countries? 
He did not mention them by name in his speech but the Scandinavian states 
were mentioned in an earlier draft of his address as possible members in a 
Western alliance but later left out again.' Hector Mc Neil, Minister of State 
at the Foreign Office, informed Boheman, Swedish minister in London, that 
Bevin had not mentioned the Scandinavian states "after ripe consideration and 
for not creating any difficulties in a delicate situation". Especially their 
relations with Moscow could, according to Mc Neil became uncomfortable. Nor 
were the Scandinavians informed of the speech beforehand. Later, Bevin 
should inform the British embassy in Stockholm that he wanted as many 
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nations as possible involved in his project and that he, with regard to Scan-
dinavia, had considered an association for economic and cultural reasons. 
The fact that the Northern countries were not mentioned was indeed due 
to a "delicate situation" as Mc Neil had observed but in fact did that not 
refer to Scandinavia but to Great Britain which would have manoeuvred 
herself in an awkward position. London foresaw that Scandinavia would ask in 
how far the British could support them with military aid in case of a Soviet 
attack. The Danish and Norwegian military establishment had already asked 
that question in February and November 1947 but the Foreign Office had 
avoided to give a straight answer because it had, in fact, nothing or little to 
Q 
offer/ The Second World War had impoverished the country too much and 
moreover military weakness was obvious. A planned visit at the tum of the 
year (1947-1948) of the Swedish Commander in Chief, General Jung, in an 
effort to make the Swedes more interested in military cooperation with both 
Scandinavia and England, had for that reason been postponed because the 
English military did not want their weakness to be shown, afraid as they 
were "to discourage" general Jung. If it should become common knowledge 
that England 
"had no plans at all to help them, they might go and make 
the best deal they could with the Russians to preserve 
themselves.This would be a great loss to us.' 
So Bevin was not in the position to ask, or even to mention, the Scan-
dinavians straight away in relation to his plan before he knew what the 
Americans had in mind. He did not know how big their material and financial 
support would be, if any. That situation would last until the coup in Prague. 
Soon after the overthrow of the government in Czechoslovakia Bevin informed 
Lange ( on March 15) that plans for an Atlantic Pact were going to be 
worked out. It was, in the light of the old British strategic interests in 
Norway, of course not by accident that Bevin started his campaign to draw 
Scandinavia into an Atlantic alliance in Oslo. The relations between the two 
countries had been long and intimate -Norway was considered to be the best 
most British oriented of the Northern States- and offered Bevin for that 
reason the best chances of success. Moreover the British Foreign Minister 
exercised a great personal influence on Lange. 
The coup d'état in Prague, the Finnish-Soviet Treaty as well as the 
"rumours" (see Chapter 4.5 and 4.6) played also their role in helping to 
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smooth the way for England's proposal to Norway to join the West and for 
the final positive answer to this question from the Norwegians. 
4.2. Reactions in Sweden. 
Although Undén had not been notified beforehand of the Bevin speech the 
contents of the address cannot have been totally unfamiliar to him. Already 
on the 21st of November 1945 he had noted in his diary that there had been 
a question in the First Chamber of the Riksdag about 
"an utterance of the English Foreign Minister Bevin concerning 'the 
Western Pact' and Sweden's standpoint." 
Neither was Bevin's viewpoint on the "Russian menace" a surprise for Undén 
because the crownprince had informed him that he had personally heard from 
the English Foreign Minister that the Soviets were out after total power in 
Western Europe. Yet Undén did not comment on Bevin's Western Union 
speech. In his diary, he restricted himself to a thickly underlined "Bevin's big 
speech in the House of Commons." 
In front of General Jung Undén expressed as his opinion that the Western 
Union speech ought to be seen against the background of the Marshall plan 
hearings in the American Congress. He emphasized that "the foreign policy 
attitude of the Swedish government was unchanged."14 
In the same entry he criticized general Ljungdal for having said in Oslo 
that there was little chance that Sweden could stay out of a future war. 
Undén considered it not to be necessary to abandon 
"the working hypothesis that we could stay out. If we consider that 
without any prospect of success, unnecessarily the next question is 
being provoked: on which side?" 
Also in the Riksdag there were no dissonant voices heard and there happened 
to be a general support for the policy of neutrality. The dissonants could 
however be heard in the press. 
Undén was quite sensitive of press comments, Swedish as well as foreign. 
With regard to the Western Union speech he showed little appraisal for the 
home editorials because most of the editors had, according to the minister not 
heard the speech themselves and "that's why they do not know what they are 
17 
writing about."1' 
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"War bloc takes shape" was the analysis of the communist paper Ny Dag 
on the 24th of January while one day later the influential Dagens Nyheter 
started a campaign against the official Swedish foreign policy and pleaded for 
an association with the West. Undén's greatest opponent in the press was 
once again Dagens Nyheter's editor-in-chief Herbert Tingsten who attacked 
the minister personally and with great venom. The day after Tingsten had 
started his campaign for a Swedish association with a Western bloc there 
appeared an anonymous editorial in the social democratic party paper Morgón 
Tidningen "The guardian of moral at Tegelbacken" (the head office of DN was 
situated at Tegelbacken in Stockholm) which should be the first of a (years) 
long series of editorials in which Undén anonymously crossed swords with his 
opponent at Dagens Nyheter. 
Tingsten did not gain impressive support among the Swedish public but 
Undén was aware that that might change in the long run. One of Tingsten's 
colleagues at Dagens Nyheter, Johannes Wickmann, came one day to Undén to 
tell him that he was not responsible for Tingsten's views. Tingsten "was 
intelligent and good in his books 'but'", Wickmann remarked , "no politi-
cian."18 
In an interview with Fleisher of the Columbia Broadcasting System and the 
New York Herald Tribune Undén asserted that he had not conceived the 
speech as an exhortation for the establishment of a military alliance in 
Western Europe. 
Undén's memorandum on the interview continued: 
"On the whole I had not analyzed or commented Mr Bevin's speech and 
I had no authoritative interpretation of it. The principal parts of my 
own speech were worked out several days before Mr. Bevin delivered 
his speech (..). The most important and specified point in Mr. Bevin's 
speech in my opinion was what he uttered about economic cooperation 
on the basis of the Marshall Plan between the sixteen states.' 
Soon Undén should leam that Bevin had been vague on purpose but that he, 
if he wanted, could be "devastatingly clear". His purpose had primarily been 
to get reactions on his "offer" ("offer" was preferred above "Bevin plan") but 
England wanted as much support as possible. The offer to the Benelux had 
been of a military character but "with other countries one could think of an 
association on economic and cultural conditions." And London had not 
understood what Undén meant by talking about a "bloc". 
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Bevin had never aimed at a kind of "bloc building" in the sense of what 
20 
normally was conceived with a "Eastern bloc". Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-
Secretary of State, had made clear to the Swedish Ambassador in London, 
Boheman, that association of Scandinavia was desirable if only to show West 
European solidarity, but he assured at the same time that Great Britain would 
not force the North into an alliance. He repeated that Bevin had not 
mentioned Scandinavia on purpose ("after ripe consideration") but 
"The more extensive and comprehensive the European cooperation would 
be, the better it was with regard to the general attitude of the United 
States and in Western Europe's own understandable interest.' 
As long as the American contribution, pending a (positive) American answer, 
was unclear, the British could not do much more than try to convince the 
Scandinavians of the advantages of membership or, if need be, of a Scandina-
vian bloc with close connections to the West. They were, in fact, paving the 
way for a Scandinavian association, m one way or another. A similar 
strategy was followed by US Ambassador Matthews and his counsellor 
Gumming, let alone in a much less subtle way than the English. 3 
4.3 The Danish and Norwegian reactions. 
Undén's reaction to the proposal of Bevin was negative and so was the 
Danish. On the third of Febniaiy Prime Minister Hedtoft declared that 
Denmark wanted to stick to its policy of neutrality and did not want to join 
any kind of bloc. 
The reactions from Norway were quite different. In his speech in the 
Norwegian parliament, the Storting, on the 12th of February, Halvard Lange 
said true enough "no" to Norway's joining of a bloc but it was less uncondi-
tional than Sweden's and Denmark's rejection. Lange's "no" could easily, so it 
was felt, turn into "yes". The Norwegian Foreign Minister claimed that 
Norway should follow its policy of neutrality as long as possible. But in case 
that war should become inescapable Norway should not hesitate to make its 
choice. Within the Norwegian social-democratic party, DNA, there were many, 
contrary to its sister parties in Denmark and Sweden, who had received 
Bevin's proposal with sympathy. They formed however not a majority. 
The Norwegian reorientation, i.e. a more Western oriented policy at the 
cost of the bridgebuilding policy, could first be noticed in the internal 
discussions of the government in December 1947. The background was the 
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changed international situation. Churchill's Fulton Speech (1946) had exercised 
a real influence, especially when the situation that Churchill had drafted, in 
the eyes of the Norwegian government, became more and more real. 
The Truman doctrine and the Soviet rejection of and agitation against the 
Marshall Plan had done the rest. Before Bevin's proposal there had simply not 
been a Western pact one could join. 5 In front of the Swedish ambassador in 
Oslo, Johan Beck-Friis, Lange did not conceal that Norway in the long run 
had to make a choice. But he did not want to do something before he had 
discussed the matter thoroughly with Undén. Beck-Friis also reported that his 
English colleague, Sir Laurence Collier, was satisfied with the opinion within 
the Norwegian government which appeared to be more and more inclined to 
join a Western Union in one way or another. 
linden's statement of the 4th of February, to stick to the old neutrality 
concept, was not well received in the Oslo governmental circles. Very 
enlightening, with respect to the point of view of leading Norwegian 
statesmen regarding the Bevin Plan, is Beck-Friis' report of a conversation 
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with Trygve Lie , General Secretary of the UN and Lange's predecessor, on 
the 4th of February. Lie had declared that he did not believe in a Russian-
American war in the foreseeable future and expressed as his opinion that 
Scandinavia certainly ought to join in some form of economic cooperation but 
to abstain from political and military obligations. He said he was astonished 
"to find here in Norway an almost hysteric atmosphere concerning the 
Soviets. The Russians may be not to be trusted, but to establish politics 
on Russophobia could not be good (..). He told me in the strictest 
confidence, while urging me (..) to report to you (i.e. Undén) only in a 
personal letter that he at Lange's had had a meeting (..) with Ger-
hardsen and some bigwigs of the social democratic party. There he had 
given an account of his view on the situation and definitively advised 
against a Norwegian association to the Bevin plan, to the extent it 
implied political and military cooperation. When I (i.e. Beck-Friis) said, 
that I recently more and more had become convinced, that they (..) 
already more or less had made up their minds to join the Bevin plan in 
one form or another, he answered that that certainly was true but that 
he hoped, that he through his intervention had succeeded in changing 
the Norwegian view on that matter." 
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Only for that purpose he had travelled to Oslo but nobody had, during the 
meeting, adopted Lie's opinion. However he had been promised that his view 
should be discussed later. Lie had advised the closest cooperation with 
Sweden, also in military matters. Beck-Friis remarked that he had "got the 
impression" that Lie was of the opinion that both Gerhardsen and Lange were 
on his side. That surprised Beck-Friis because: "Lange's statements to me go, 
9 0 
as is known, in another diгection."·i,0 Beck-Friis was right and Lange 
approached in the Storting the Western Union speech with sympathy. He even 
said with some emphasis that Undén in his statement of February 4 not had 
acted on behalf of all the three Scandinavian states. 
In the meantime however the Norwegians did not abandon their old 
neutrality course although Lange during a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of 
Scandinavia (23 - 24 February) declared that he did not believe that Norway 
had much chance to stay outside a new war and that English military circles 
had advised him that the Norwegian coast in case of conflict had an 
"extraordinary great significance.' The impression in Stockholm was that 
Lange did not really mean what he said and that he did not want to say what 
he really had in mind. 
4.4. Soviet reactions. 
The suspicions of Moscow had come true. For the Soviets the Bevin plan was 
nothing else than the proof that an economic bloc, constituted by the 
Marshall Plan states, logically should be followed by a military bloc. The navy 
newspaper Krasnu Flot warned the Scandinavian nations 
"that the Russian government contemplated every bloc building, with or 
without the Bevin plan, as an aggressive threat in the first place aimed 
against the Soviet Union". 
And an eventual Scandinavian bloc was just 
"a ramification of Bevin's Western bloc, meant to build Europe into a 
military and economic base for American imperialism.' ^ 
Yet it seemed as if the Soviets were rather content with the official 
reactions from the Scandinavian capitals. The Pravda at least, the mouthpiece 
of the Kremlin, paid much attention to the negative reactions of Undén and 
Hedtoft. But on the other hand there was still a number of papers that 
continued to accuse the Scandinavians of having concluded a secret military 
alliance with the USA and Great Britain. The source of that allegation was 
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the Danish communist paper Land og Folk which argued that if the Northern 
Countries were not invited to participate in a Western Union, there must 
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already be a secret engagement between them and the West. The reason for 
those articles in the Soviet press, which differed clearly from the Pravda 
approach, might have been that the Kremlin, although not unsatisfied with the 
Northern reactions, also wanted to warn the North not to participate in a 
Western military bloc and that it neither was enthusiastic about an eventual 
Scandinavian alliance. 
On the whole the Soviet press conducted an aggressive campaign against 
Sweden in the post war years. Yet the relations of Undén with the Soviets 
were not bad. Ambassador Tjemychev came to see Undén, on 29 January 1948, 
and asked him directly if Bevin had also made a proposition to Sweden. 
Undén answered negative and said that he knew the plan only from what he 
had read in the newspapers. On the same occasion he assured Tjemychev that 
Sweden had not the slightest intention of joining a military pact and that he 
doubted that Bevin even had had such a pact in mind. 
Undén seems indeed to have been convinced that it was doubtful that 
Bevin aimed at the foundation of a military pact. 
4.5. Czechoslovakia and Finland. 
The Bevin speech was only the first of a series of events in the turbulent 
spring of 1948. In Czechoslovakia the communists seized power on the 25th of 
February and two days later the Soviet-Finnish Friendship Treaty was 
announced. For the many scared Europeans the speech of the English 
Foreign Minister became a symbol of hope: A Western Union might be able to 
prevent the establishment of Soviet domination in Europe. But was the coup 
in Prague a genuine surprise? To the Western public opinion it has undoub-
tedly been a shock but it is also a fact that the policy makers in Washington 
practically already had written off the country. Secretary of State Marshall 
explained to his government on November 6, 1947 that: 
"The halt in the communist advance is forcing Moscow to consolidate 
its hold on Eastern Europe. It will probably have to clamp down 
completely on Czechoslovakia, for a relatively free Czechoslovakia could 
become a threatening salient in Moscow's political position." 
And he continued: 
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"As long as communist political power was advancing in Europe, it was 
advantageous to the Russians to allow to the Czechs the outer 
appearances of freedom. In this way, Czechoslovakia was able to serve 
as a bait for nations further west. Now that there is the danger of the 
political movement proceeding in the other directions, the Russians can 
no longer afford this luxury, Czechoslovakia could easily become a 
means of entry of really democratic forces into Eastern Europe in 
general. The sweeping away of democratic institutions and the 
consolidation of communist power in Czechoslovakia will add a 
formidable new element to the underground anti-communist political 
forces in the Soviet satellite area. For this reason, the Russians 
•je 
proceed to this step reluctantly. It is a purely defensive move.' 
It seems that the Americans considered Czechoslovakia already a communist 
state before the coup d' état of February 25. To be sure, the communists 
enjoyed a far greater popular support in Czechoslovakia than anywhere else in 
Eastern Europe and at the elections of 1946 they had gained 37% of the votes 
but their popularity was on the wane in 1948. 
Czechoslovakian requests for aid (1947) were turned down by the USA 
thereby giving the Soviet Union the impression that the West had already 
abandoned the country. Stalin profited from that situation and intervened, 
knowing that Western counter actions were unlikely. That does not mean of 
course that the West wanted a communist take over in Prague even if it 
served the plans for an Atlantic coalition quite well and could be used for 
the mobilization of the public opinion by those Westem politicians who had 
proclaimed communism the greatest menace for mankind. President Truman and 
Marshall used Czechoslovakia to overcome the opposition to the European 
Recovery Program. 
What concerns us most are the reactions in Sweden. Erlander mentions the 
coup in his memoirs but he gives no comment. Undén showed himself 
surprised that it all had gone so quickly and relatively easily; surprised 
because the country possessed "a relatively free press and a politically 
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matured class of workers." Undén did mention the crisis in Prague in his 
•30 
diary and estimated it "growing seriously.' In the minutes of the various 
party committees there is nothing to be found on Prague. The Swedish 
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political parties were more interested in home politics. They were, as a 
matter of fact, quite provincial in their outlook. 
But there were reactions from other sources than the party committees. 
The communist party did express itself positively with regard to the take over 
on 
of power in Prague. The liberal leader Ohlin said that he was shocked-37 but 
that was usually the case when the Soviet Union was concerned. 
Swedish public opinion was shocked and the editorials of Sweden's leading 
newspapers display a similar state of mind. However, Czechoslovakia did not 
lead to a change of course in Swedish politics and neither the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Lange intend, as he told Beck-Friis, to change his politics. * 
Nevertheless did the English ambassador in Oslo, Collier, want to make use of 
the opportunity: 
"if we want to bring Norway into the 'Bevin plan' now is the psychol-
ogical moment to do it, when the Czechoslovak tragedy is still fresh in 
the public mind."42 
With the announcement of the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Coopera-
tion and Mutual Assistance (TFCMA) on the 27th of February, only two days 
after the coup in Prague, the feelings of crisis and insecurity grew and it 
was generally felt that crisis and menace were now just across the border. 
For Undén, the TFCMA came not as a surprise because it had been "in the 
air" since November of the preceding year. But its history reached even 
further back. Already in 1938-1939 there had been secret discussions about a 
treaty between the two neighbour countries. Before the end of the Second 
World War, in January 1945, the Soviets had again brought forward the 
possibility of a defence pact and that suggestion was repeated again in May 
of that same year. This time directly to president Paasikivi. Also Soviet 
Foreign Minister Molotov discussed the matter with a Finnish delegation in 
November 1947. So the letter of Stalin to Paasikivi on the 22nd of February 
in which he suggested to start negotiations about a treaty of friendship and 
mutual assistance came hardly as a surprise. 
Actually it was more surprising why the Soviets had not occupied Finland 
in the Second World War. They could have done so rather easily and without 
serious problems with the West because the Fins had, at the side of the 
Germans, waged war against them. It was of course shocking for the 
Western public opinion, that Stalin's suggestion (the letter was announced to 
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the public on February 27) came two days after Czechoslovakia. His proposi-
tion, to establish a defence pact against eventual future German aggression, 
was generally regarded as a pretext. 
Germany was divided, poor, disarmed and reduced to a country of ruins. 
Forgotten was that also the Treaty of Dunkirk was said to be aimed against 
Germany. Seen from Moscow the proposal was quite understandable. The 
Germans had attacked the Soviet Union over Finnish territory and Finland 
formed now, in 1948, a gap in the Soviet defence system. And in the view of 
the Soviets one of the aims of the Marshall Plan was the restoration of a 
Germany that would be a part or even a spearhead in a new anti-Soviet 
coalition. Stalin had not forgotten that Germany twice in his own lifetime, in 
ample 30 years, had attacked and destroyed great parts of Russia. 
It was a surprise that the final text of the TFCMA of April 6, 1948, to a 
large extent corresponded with the text that the Fins themselves had 
originally proposed to Stalin and which was tailored to their own needs. 
Finland managed to maintain her independence in so far that is possible for 
small nations that border on a worldpower. The Soviets got the guarantee 
that Finland would not allow that her territory would be used as a spring-
board for an attack on Russia. The big question remains why Stalin showed 
himself so moderate VIÎ à vis Finland, especially because he was informed 
about the highly secret Pentagon talks, March 22 - April 1, 1948, which 
should lead to the establishment of NATO. Donald Maclean, a member of the 
British delegation in Washington, was a Soviet spy and kept his employer in 
Moscow informed. 
The public opinion was upset, when the news of Stalin's letter to Paasikivi 
was broken but how did the policymakers in Stockholm react and did they 
discern a connection with Czechoslovakia? Undén was not genuinely surprised 
as was observed here above and neither did he necessarily believe in a direct 
connection with the events in Prague. 
Also Undén considered that the Soviets had behaved quite moderately 
which he attributed as the effect of the strong Western reactions on the 
communist coup in Czechoslovakia. But he also believed that the Soviets were 
not interested in a Treaty with severe terms that could have divided the 
Finnish people. " Undén was not really worried about the coming treaty 
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because he knew from the embassies in Helsinki and Moscow that the Soviets 
in the first place wanted to fill up a gap in their defence system which for 
the rest was completed. 
The Soviet Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Zorin, had, as soon as the 
proposal of Stalin was proclaimed, asked his Finnish colleague Enckell "to 
supply Scandinavia with quieting information with regard to the Finnish-
Soviet talks" which should be done via ambassador Sohlman in Moscow. The 
Swedes let know that they would appreciate a moderate Soviet position during 
the negotiations. At the other side it was realized in Stockholm that the 
Russian indulgence to a large extent depended on the continuation of their 
policy of neutrality. That fact was confirmed by Helsinki. 
Already on March 2, Undén advised the British ambassador that there was 
no reason for a change of his foreign policy and he added that the relations 
with Moscow were "quite normal." Erlander shared Undén's view and called 
in a memorandum the visit of two leading businessmen who pleaded for close 
military and economic relations with the USA very unpleasant. War was, 
according to these businessmen, unavoidable. Like the businessmen the 
Swedish crown prince did not share the government's point of view with 
regard to the political situation: 
"Equally unpleasant was Undén's and my conversation with the crown 
prince, who stubbornly clings to his narrow-gauged thoughts. Just now 
he thinks that a Scandinavian Defence Union would be a guard for 
peace in the North. He also believes that the developments in Finland 
are going to have a decisive influence on our policy." 
The TFCMA had no influence on the foreign policy of Sweden nor had those 
rumours about impending Soviet actions against Scandinavia. But things were 
quite different in Copenhagen and Oslo where much weight made was put on 
the rumours and the Treaty. 
4.6. Rumours. 
"A series of very disquieting rumours go through the capitals (..)." wrote 
Erlander on March 10, 1948. They should have much influence on the political 
developments in Scandinavia, especially in Norway. The rumours spread in the 
days just after the coup in Prague and the announcement of Stalin's letter to 
Paasikivi, i.e in those days that the public opinion was frightened and 
prepared to believe everything, how unlikely it might be. 
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The Foreign Office in Oslo had received disquieting reports from its embassies 
in Helsinki, Moscow and Warsaw: Norway could expect a similar proposal for a 
non-aggression pact from Stalin as Finland had received. The reports were 
quite vague and inaccurate but they had nevertheless a great impact in Oslo. 
There were also rumours, on both sides of the Atlantic, about an impending 
Soviet move against Norway. Also those hearsays were taken seriously in 
Oslo, which is seen in the light of the actual situation, not so astonishing. 
The Soviet "threat" was also felt in Denmark and had probably got there 
some extra weight because of an aggressive campaign in the Soviet military 
press against Denmark in January and February of that year. 
Unrest and uneasiness in Oslo and Copenhagen but not in Stockholm. The 
Swedes were course aware of the rumours. Undén recorded that ambassador 
Westring in Warsaw had informed him about Soviet plans against Norway. 
From Prague he got the "news" about communist actions in Denmark and the 
Hungarian ambassador in Stockholm, Vilmos Böhm, told Undén that Rakosi, 
the communist leader in Hungary, after coming home from Moscow had said 
that 
"Finland will be finished soon. Even more important is Scandinavia. But 
that is a matter of money(!!)."JJ 
Johan Beck-Friis phoned from Oslo that Lange had asked him to travel to 
Stockholm that very same evening to discuss the new developments. "It seems 
disquieting" noted Undén in his diary. He informed Erlander while he asked 
the Minister of Defence, Vougt, to notify General Jung.54 But Undén did not 
inform the leaders of the political parties during a conference the next 
morning. After that meeting Erlander, Vougt and Undén discussed what Beck-
Friis had reported that morning: that Lange expected an offer from Stalin for 
a non-aggression pact but that he was not going to accept and that he had 
contacted the American and English embassies on the matter. 5 
Still on March 4 Lange had told Beck-Friis that Czechoslovakia could not 
change Norway's policy but only a couple of days later that statement 
appeared to be more or less out of date: He even asked the British an 
American ambassadors which help Norway might expect in case of a Soviet 
attack. Again one week later Lange met Bevin and Marshall in Paris at a 
conference about the European Recovery Program and there the matter was 
taken up again (see chapter 5). In a contemplative letter from Beck-Friis to 
Undén, one year later, the Swedish ambassador ascertained that Lange's "total 
73 
tum-over" had occurred about at the time of the incidents in Czechoslovakia. 
Yet he thought it hard to believe that the events in Prague had come "as a 
bolt from the blue" because they could have been foreseen. The Norwegians 
had made the impression as if they were stricken by panic when they asked 
England and America what kind of assistance they might expect in case of a 
Soviet attack. 
Beck-Friis was convinced that the rumours were used by Lange as a pretext 
and that he had already made up his mind before: he wanted closer military 
relations with the West and he was convinced that Denmark wanted the same. 
Bay, the American ambassador in Oslo, learned from Lange that he believed 
that Denmark was 
"sufficiendy aroused by recent Czechoslovak and Finish crises (..) to 
place Denmark safely on side of the West.' 
The reactions in Sweden on the rumours were totally different. They were 
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simply not believed and there was accordingly no change in foreign politics. 
There is little doubt that Bevin used the rumours to convince Truman that he 
ought to come to the aid of the Europeans and preferably very quickly: 
"before Norway goes under". The USA, that thus far not had shown much 
interest in the North of Europe, turned now her attention also to this part of 
the world. 
4.7. "The communist danger" 
Did the events in the spring of 1948 or the escalating Cold War on the whole 
affect the attitude of the Swedes towards their communist fellow-citizens, as 
did happen practically everywhere in Europe? Right after the war the 
communists had been quite popular, also in Sweden, because of the struggle of 
the Soviets against the Nazis. The communists could not be overlooked and 
CO 
also Swedish politics had to reckon with them. The Swedish social 
democrats however refused to cooperate with the communists in the elections 
of 1948. 
P.A. Hansson said in 1946 that that decision did not need a public discus-
sion. The public was only to be informed that such a decision had been 
taken. " In January 1948 the communist party had proposed the social 
democrats to cooperate in the May demonstration and had also pleaded for 
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electoral-technical cooperation but the SAP party committee declined the 
offer.60 
Also the Scandinavian social democratic parties discussed at their meetings 
what to do with the communists. About half a year after the end of the war 
(January 1946) the minutes of the Copenhagen conference report that the 
relations with the communists were, true enough, rather good but that it was 
nevertheless better to distrust them. One year later, this time in Oslo, there 
was an extensive discussion about communism. But now it had evolved into a 
"communist problem" which especially could be found in "the big towns". 
Party secretary Sven Andersson expressed in a letter to the English Labour 
Party what the attitude of the Swedish social democrats vis à vis the 
communist party was: 
"On account of Your question about our attitude towards the com-
munists I can inform you the following: There is no collaboration at all 
between the Social Democratic Party and the communists in Sweden. At 
different opportunities the Communist Party has proposed collaboration 
in commun and especially some sort of co-operation at the elections, 
but this proposals have always been refused. An annual proposal for the 
joint May-Day demonstrations has also every time been rejected. It will 
be the same this year. 
The communist party in Sweden, which (..) has had certain success 
after the war, now presents itself as a democratic, reformistic, national 
labour party. This adaption to the politics of the Social Democratic 
Party, a tactically well-grounded adaption or not is met with suspicion 
by the Swedish workers and by the public. None believe in this new 
politics of the Communist Party as an expression for a serious change 
of its real politics. The devout aspect to Soviet-Russia manifests that 
the party is not independent in its acting. Accordingly the Social 
Democratic Labour Party in Sweden refuses every advance from the 
Communist Party." 
The best thing, according to Secretary Andersson, was that all the com-
munists should join the social democrats as individual members because that 
was "the best way to unity.' 
Times grew quickly worse for the communists after Czechoslovakia and also 
their resistance against the Swedish joining of the Marshall Plan, which in 
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connection with the Truman doctrine, was regarded as an endeavour of the 
USA to extend their military, political and economic power over Europe was 
bad for the goodwill that they had enjoyed after the conclusion of peace in 
1945. 
The leader of the conservative party. Domo, asked Erlander if the 
communist party leader Hagberg could not be locked out from the regular 
meetings of party leaders and his fellow party member and editor of the 
conservative Svenska Dagbladet, Ivar Andersson, made a similar request with 
regard to pressconferences. Erlander's answer was negative. Svenska Dagbladet 
refused to be present at press conferences which were also attended by 
communists. J But also Andersson's colleague of the liberal Dagens Nyheter, 
political-editor-in-chief Kihlberg, was very much opposed to the presence of 
communists at press conferences. Kihlberg was a real die-hard with regard to 
communism which is shown clearly in his booklet of 1950 The Russian agency 
in Sweden <Den ryska agenturen i Svengo which may serve as a good 
example of cold-war-thinking in Sweden. 
Also Folkpartiet (liberal), which was closely connected to Dagens Nyheter, 
kept its end up and declared already in the summer of 1947 that its attitude 
against the communists could be taken for granted and pointed out to their 
unreliability. In drafts of their election campaigns for 1948 it was explicitly 
formulated that 
"Through information an intensive struggle against communism and 
other subversive doctrines of violence ought to be fought.' 
Bertil Ohlin wanted to lock out the communists from the various Northern 
interparliamentary groups meetings but that was opposed by Prime Minister 
Erlander who argued that the communists had their rights too and that they 
were quite entitled to join such meetings. э Communism was a steady 
returning item between Ohlin and Erlander whereby the former made use of 
the common fear for communism to attack the social democrats who were 
accused by Ohlin accused for being too soft on communism. " 
Also the British Embassy was seriously worried about the attitude of the 
Erlander administration vis à vis communism. In a top secret note to the 
Foreign Office in London it was concluded that Stockholm was certainly 
aware of "the facts about the danger of Communism" but that actually little 
was done against it. According to the report the authorities were deterred 
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"from taking drastic measures by the Swedish abhorrence of the use of 
secret police against a section of the community". 
It was considered undesirable to approach the Swedish government on the 
matter of communism because it might produce an inverted effect. But what 
the Swedes neglected the English did for them. Agents in Stockholm kept an 
eye on communist people, papers and organizations. The results were every 
month reported to London and the Foreign Office was exactly informed about 
the conducts of the more important communists: their residence, there 
journeys, how long they had been away from home and whom they had met. 
Not only during their travels but also in their domicile. 
Also the conservatives were panic-stricken by the "red danger" and produced 
in 1948 a folder with titles on anti-communist and Soviet propaganda as 
"What is happening behind the 'Iron Curtain'?", "Soviet spies", "Russia's real 
face" etc. The titles could be ordered from Svenska Dagbladet, which was 
closely connected to the conservatives. The conservative party did also 
organise anti-communist meetings and produced a leaflet with anti-communist 
propaganda which could be obtained "free of charge". There was also a 
proposition to make a map with places where communists could be found (and 
how many) because such maps could be very useful, in anti-communistic 
campaigns. 
Yet the Swedes were not so scared for the Reds that they sought their 
security in a Western Alliance. An important factor for the treatment of the 
communists in Sweden might have been that the government did not want to 
jeopardize her fairly good relations with Moscow through openly adopting a 
harsh attitude against her communist citizens. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE SCANDINAVIAN DEFENCE UNION1 
» 
5.1. A thought with a tradition. 
Undén's idea of building a Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU) was not a 
brandnew one but it had one thing in common with the earlier proposals: 
there was little chance that it ever would become a military reality. The 
earliest thoughts about a SDU deserve however hardly the name "Scan-
dinavian" and it would be more correct to talk about a Swedish-Finnish 
defence community. 
When the Swedish foreign minister Carl Hedenstiema, unofficially, launched 
the idea in 1923 he could not have foreseen that his proposal should mean 
the end of his career in the conservative Trygger administration. The Danish 
conservative leader Christmas-Möller had no success either, neither in his 
homeland nor in the neighbour countries, when he put forward his ideas about 
a military cooperation. 
Only the Finns received thoughts about a union with more enthusiasm, 
afraid as they were for eventual future interventions of the Soviet Union, and 
so a defence union could mean some extra protection. In the final phase of 
the Finnish-Soviet Winter War (30-11-1939-13-03-1940) the Finnish government 
put forward an official request (11-03-1940) to the governments of Sweden 
and Norway to explore the possibilities of a defence union. Both governments 
answered politely that they were willing to investigate the possibilities but 
very soon they let Helsinki know that a union with Finland was out of the 
question as long as Helsinki was at war with the Soviets. Peace was 
concluded a few days later but due to the outbreak of war in Scandinavia 
(april 1940) the matter was not taken up again. 
Madame Kollontai, Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm, said in a reaction that an 
eventual defence union had to be of a purely defensive character and that it, 
first of all, should enforce the neutrality of the three countries but foreign 
minister Molotov expressed his disagreement to the Swedish ambassador in 
Moscow, asserting that such a pact would basically be aimed against the 
Soviet Union and advised the Swedish representative to abandon the plans. 
As long as Europe was involved in the most atrocious war in its history 
the question of a SDU was of course totally irrelevant but already early in 
1945, the war had not even ended by that time, at a meeting of the Northern 
cooperation committee of the social democratic parties of Denmark, Finland, 
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Iceland, Norway and Sweden the question of a SDU was put forward again. 
Close cooperation in military matters was not excluded beforehand but real 
decision were not taken. 
The Danish foreign minister definitively seemed to have made up his mind 
in september 1945 when he stated that joining a Northern defence union as 
well as the adherence to an eventual Western Pact was out of the question 
and that the change of government in november 1947 did not alter that 
standpoint. 
However there were secret talks on military cooperation between Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden which started in September 1946. The Soviets, who soon 
appeared to be informed about the talks were suspicious, according to the 
Finnish historian Nevakivi, because they considered them a first step in a 
closer connection with the West. 
It must be stressed however that these talks were of a preparatory character 
and dealt mainly with practical questions (types of weapons, calibre etc.) and 
that they were conducted by the military leaders of the three Scandinavian 
countries and not by the governments. The views of the military leaders in 
Sweden in the period were always different from those at the political top 
(see chapter 6.4). The top brass of the Swedish armed forces welcomed close 
cooperation with Norway. Denmark, on the other hand, was from a military 
point of view regarded as a millstone round the neck of an effective defence 
apparatus (see Chapter 6.1 and 7.2). 
5.2. A short survey of Norwegian and Danish neutrality. 
In the turmoil of early 1948 there was one thing that more than anything 
else disturbed Undén: the increasing interest in Norway for closer collabora-
tion with the West which could, at least in the eyes of the Swedish foreign 
minister, easily tum into a drifting away from pure neutrality. 
Much more than Denmark's foreign policy the Norwegian international 
relations had been subject to changes and the history of independence was 
also different. From 1814 to 1905 Norway had formed a Union with Sweden in 
which the latter had been the determinating factor and Norway feared that 
something similar would happen again in case of a SDU being established. The 
Swedish preponderance had left traces in the Norwegian national 
consciousness and should play a (minor) role in the failure of the SDU. 
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Norway's geographical remoteness had been the main source of its 
inclination to isolationism. In 1814 Nikolai Wergeland warned in an eloquent 
speech to the Constitutional Convention even for a continuation of the links 
with Denmark which he regarded as an unnatural liaison with a neighbour 
country which could involve the fatherland 
"in unnatural wars and entangle us in disputes with powers with which 
it was neither natural nor necessary for Norway to quarrel." 
It was easy enough to hold aloof from the quarreling European powers 
because Norway was situated in "a hyperborean comer of the globe" and 
furthermore "protected from the Continent by deep seas and palisades of 
numberless cliffs (..)." 
A second factor that had given the Norwegians a feeling of safety was the 
reliance on England. It was assumed that it could never be in the interest of 
London to admit other big powers a foothold on the Norwegian coast. The 
English (and French) guarantee for Norway's (and Sweden's) territorial 
integrity against Russian aggression during the Crimean War (1853-1856) had 
strengthened the conviction that England was a silent and remote watch-dog 
of Norwegian isolationism. Also after the dissolution of the union with 
Sweden, Great Britain's implicit guarantee remained the cornerstone of 
Norway's policy of neutrality. 
The First World War convinced the Norwegians that they could stay out of 
European wars. The dream was shattered in April 1940 when the Germans 
invaded the country and already in October 1940 the Govemment-in-exile in 
London launched the idea of an "Atlantic policy". In that new strategy the US 
and Great Britain were considered as the axis of a North Atlantic security 
system embracing both North West Europe and the US. 
After the war Norway returned to her old policy of non-alignment and to a 
policy of bridgebuilding which main aim was not to become involved in the 
political conflicts between East and West. Acceptance of the Marshall Aid, for 
example, was the object of debates because it could be seen as choosing the 
American side. 
Under the influence of events in the first months of 1948 the feeling of 
insecurity grew and the idea of an "Atlantic Policy" became appealing again. 
It was the return to those ideas that was the immediate cause of Uiidén's 
proposal for a Northern defence community. Also during the period of bridge-
building there had been cooperation between Oslo and London in the military 
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field (training and supplies) and in internal discussions the possibility of a 
Western orientation in case of growing tensions between the Superpowers was 
not excluded. 
A Western guarantee for help, explicit or implicit, was a conditio sine qua 
non for Norway as it in fact had been since the Crimean War. Here lies the 
principal difference to the Swedish foreign policy and this discrepancy would 
eventually prove to be unbridgeable. 
Was 1949 a turning point in the foreign relations of Norway the Norwegian 
historian Riste asks in a paper with the same title. His answer is negative; 
there was no break but continuity because Norway continued in fact its policy 
which was traditionally based on the (tacit) assumption that the guarantee of 
the Western big powers for her national security was indispensable. ' 
The attitude of Denmark in the rising cold war did not differ much from 
that of Sweden and accordingly it did not trouble Undén. Denmark had, in 
contrast to its Scandinavian neighbours, been involved in a few armed 
conflicts (1848-1850 and 1864), both times with the German Bund and both 
times over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein which both had a mixed 
population of Germans and Danes. Like the other Scandinavian states Denmark 
managed to stay out of World War 1 but the Second World War shattered the 
Danish neutrality. The Danes did not fight the German troops when they 
invaded the country in April 1940 and the government did not, like the 
Norwegian, go into exile. The war brought considerable damage to the 
country. Denmark, being a part of the European continent and furthermore 
economically heavily dependent on it, was far more Western oriented than 
Sweden and Norway and their attitude toward European integration was not 
so declining as was the case in Oslo and Stockholm. Yet after the war they 
returned to the old policy of neutralism and showed also in 1948 little 
enthusiasm to enter a Western military alliance. They preferred a Scan-
dinavian, i.e. the Swedish solution. 
5.3. The "drifting away" of Norway. 
Of course Undén's proposal of May 1948 did not come not as a bolt from the 
blue. For about four months Undén had been worried about the change in the 
Norwegian attitude to absolute neutrality and he had noticed the influence of 
the January and February events on the Norwegian foreign policy. 
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The first signs of Undén's wonying can be found in his diary on 
December 14, 1947 when he made the following remark: "Sensational reports 
from Beck-Friis in Oslo about Norwegian views on the international situation. 
May be I ought to travel there and talk thoroughly with Lange soon". 
Professor Skodvin dates the first indications of Lange's "drifting away" on 
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October 28 1947. Lange's reaction on the Bevin speech further convinced 
Undén that something was "wrong" in the foreign policy of Oslo. True 
enough. Lange had reacted negatively on the speech of Bevin, negative in the 
sense that he had not said a whole-hearted "yes" to the Western Union 
speech but he had also remarked that Norway in the first place belonged to 
Western Europe, leaving the impression that Norway wanted to keep the 
possibility open of entering a Western pact at a later stage. 
The Swedes had enough reasons to be suspicious of the Norwegian 
intentions. Beck-Friis reported on February 6 that Sir Laurence Collier, 
English minister in Oslo, could please himself with the thought that certain 
members of the Norwegian government became more and more attracted by 
the idea of an association, in one form or another, with a Western union and 
that Undén's reaction on the speech of Bevin had been received with regret. 
Lange had personally told Beck-Friis that taking a stand in the future should 
become unavoidably. On that occasion he did not mention what standpoint 
Norway would choose but the hint was enough for the experienced Swedish 
diplomat. 
Beck-Friis was already at that time convinced that leading Norwegian 
circles intended to join, in some form, the Bevin plan, a view which was 
confirmed by Trygve Lie, former Norwegian Foreign Minister and General 
Secretary of the UN, himself being positive regarding a military cooperation 
with Sweden. A steady flow of reports by Johan Beck-Friis on the Norwegian 
inclinations to turn to the West reached Undén. The ambassador in Oslo 
expressed as his personal view that Norway was slowly drifting to the West: 
"Sweden has to take into account the possibility, if not to say the 
probability that Norway, preferably in the company of Sweden, but in 
case that appears to be impossible, also without Sweden is going to try 
to get a guarantee from the West in one form or another.' 0 
Also Gerhardsen had expressed the necessity of making a choice on a SAMAK 
conference in February. 
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Beck-Friis reported what Lange had put forward on a secret meeting of 
the Storting (April 8). Eleven days later Lange repeated his speech before the 
Norwegian military, saying that Norway did not want to separate its foreign 
policy from that of Sweden and Denmark but that the military-political and 
security problems of the three countries were not identical. The text of his 
speech was given to the newspapers and in that Beck-Friis perceived a 
further step on the Norwegian road of adherence to a Western pact: 
"I cannot help getting the impression that the Norwegian foreign 
leadership intends a step by step association of Norway to the Western 
powers, preferably together with or otherwise without Sweden and 
Denmark."12 
There can be no doubt that the Swedish government was directly worried 
about the direction of Oslo's foreign policy. As late as four weeks before 
Undén made his SDU proposal he showed little enthusiasm for a SDU - in 
fact he had, never been eager about it, the proposal was merely a last 
attempt to prevent Norway from joining the West - and in an address to the 
Social Democratic Party committee he estimated the chances for a SDU very 
small and referring to both a Western as well as a purely neutral Scan-
dinavian defence pact he remarked: 
"We must remember that the Danish defence is weak, so is the 
Norwegian, even though it is a little stronger. A defence union would 
mean, that Sweden would take upon itself to help Denmark as well as 
Norway. There are neither political nor psychological grounds for 
that."13 
Undén contemplated that a SDU "would be worth consideration if the 
countries were armed about equally well" Another prerequisite was that the 
countries were willing to bind themselves to a similar foreign policy. Undén 
felt that a SDU in the present situation would only cause increasing risks for 
Sweden "corresponding advantages for Sweden's security" could not be 
expected. Furthermore he doubted if Norway was willing to give up its 
freedom of action in foreign politics in exchange for help from Sweden. 
One month later the situation had become so alarming that Undén considered 
it his duty to propose a SDU, being the only chance to keep the Western big 
powers out of Scandinavia because also a West associated Norway could bring 
the Swedish policy of neutrality in danger. 
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5.4. May 3,1948. Sweden proposes a SDU. 
On April 22 the Swedish foreign committee (utrikesnämnden) was informed 
about the military situation and the next day Undén gave an extensive survey 
of the foreign policy. Afterwards he asked the committee-members if there 
were any objections against his plan to investigate in how far Norway and 
Denmark were interested in a neutral Scandinavian Defence Union. There 
appeared to be none. 
The decision to make a proposal had not been easy. About the discussions 
within the government itself little is still known16 but Erlander writes in his 
memoirs that he as late as March 24 still was very skeptic about a SDU but 
that a feeling of growing uneasiness about war had overwon his objections. 
Undén, as we saw above, nursed similar feelings. 
Swedish politics are like the politics of all nations determined by self-
interest. The conviction was (and it still is) that the Swedish interests were 
best served by staying out of military pacts so that Sweden could not, against 
her will, be drawn into a war that she did not want. In this conception there 
is no room for moral reflections because 
"no country regards it its duty to interfere in the course of events 
17 sacrifying its own safety.' 
Undén's main preoccupation was to prevent aggression on Swedish territory. 
The basic thought of Undén's neutrality considerations, also in this period of 
the cold war was, that Sweden had managed to stay out of two World Wars. 
Undén admitted more or less that the chances to stay out of a global armed 
conflict were small but all the time that Sweden could stay aloof was 
important. If both East and West could be convinced of the Swedish inten-
tions of staying out of conflict, the country could, at least at the beginning, 
avoid to become a theatre of war. 
Arrangements for help in advance (i.e. from the West) were of no use, 
since help most likely would come too late. If a policy of neutrality were 
maintained there would be at least a few weeks time to mobilize troops and 
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to negotiate with the Soviet Union. 0 Undén did not want to expose Sweden 
to the pressure of the Great Powers, which, he feared might be the result of 
a pact membership. Undén was not blind to the disadvantages of Swedish 
neutrality: 
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"Soviet can attack whenever it wants to without risking a World War. 
We are written off by the West. The other alternative: ally ourselves 
with the Western Powers. Disadvantages: we are placed by the Soviets 
among their enemies. No total security of effective help." 
But the advantages were not very attractive either: 
"Soviet must say that an attack means world war. Possibilities to get 
war material from USA. Difficult choice. Incredible responsibility. Both 
alternatives can lead to our destruction.(..) But we cannot wait too 
long." 
He wondered if there was no other way: "Is there may be a third way? A 
regional pact within the frame-work of the United Nations may be suitable 
O."19 
Russia was an important factor in Undén's considerations to relinquish the 
membership in a Western Pact because it would, and not unreasonably 
according to Undén, assume that Sweden would admit the West to erect bases 
on Swedish territory, aimed against the Soviet Union and react accordingly in 
her policy vis à vis Sweden. It would do anything to prevent such a 
development. The result: 
"Sweden would become the object of power struggle for political 
influence (..) between Russia and the USA. Our country would become a 
centre of unrest.' 
Undén had no confidence in the Super Powers, neither from the East nor 
from the West. Both in case of a Western aligned SDU and in case of a 
direct adherence to the West, foreign influence in Sweden would be a fact. A 
neutral, not Western linked SDU, was more attractive. On the one side the 
foreign policy of the three countries would be coordinated and on the other 
side Norway and Denmark would be assured of Swedish assistance in case of a 
Soviet attack which might have a deterring effect on Moscow but the biggest 
advantage was of course that Sweden would be able to continue its traditional 
foreign policy. 
First and foremost it was an possible Norwegian engagement with the West 
that could endanger Undén's foreign policy and that fact convinced him of 
the necessity of his proposal. 
Minister of Defence Vougt explained the Swedish proposal as follows: 
"There are greater prospects to keep the war away from the North, if a 
defence union is established and the Scandinavian states follow a 
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common policy on a clear independent course between the Great 
Powers." 
He considered that: 
"the interests of the Great Powers could not be of such a decisive 
strategic importance that Scandinavia would be drawn into a war (..) A 
unified North is a great and arduous undertaking, if these states have a 
strong defence." J 
A week earlier Prime Minister Erlander had expressed as his conviction that 
"A connection of the Scandinavian countries to the Atlantic Pact 
increases the risks of war. We belong then to the most forward 
outposts. If Norway joins; we also are in a dangerous position. That is 
why the SDU is our safest option."24 
Sverker Aström, Secretary at the Foreign Office, emphasized that Sweden's 
position in case of a Scandinavian splitting up into a Western- and non-
Westem aligned part would be more exposed in times of peace as well as war. 
The probable result in peacetime would be military and political pressure and 
there was also the danger that Moscow should invite Sweden to join a 
military or political pact. The proposals would of course be rejected but they 
could result in increased political tensions. It was also possible that Sweden 
would become subject to pressure "for instance in commercial connection." 
In wartime, an isolated Swedish neutrality would be much more difficult to 
defend than a common Scandinavian neutrality. 
A possible effect of a SDU was that the iron-ore mines of Sweden could be 
defended more effective if use could be made of Norwegian territory and air 
bases. Should the Soviets plan an attack on Norway then it was almost 
unavoidable that they would make use of Swedish territory, thereby automati-
cally drawing Sweden into war.In that respect a SDU did not mean an 
increased risk of war. 
A liaison with Denmark however was another case altogether. If The 
Russians would break through to the West, on their way to the European 
continent, they should undoubtedly occupy Denmark. Such a Westward 
operation would not necessarily imply a contemporary action against Sweden. 
A Danish joining of the SDU meant an "unnecessarily" increased risk of war 
with the Soviet Union. Aström pleaded that a limitation of Sweden's military 
obligations to Denmark "both can and must (..) be brought about" and 
'ye 
proposed to limit the Swedish help to Zealand or parts of it. Denmark was 
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generally regarded as indefensible and therefore as a burden. The invitation 
to Denmark was made for both political and psychological reasons. 
The Swedish proposal did not arise out of concern for Norway's fate, not 
to speak of the Danish, but purely out of the Swedish national interests: to 
keep war away from Sweden as far as possible and the prerequisite for that 
was that the Swedish conception of neutrality included the whole of 
Scandinavia. The position of Finland, which is often mentioned as a important 
factor.did not play a role of any importance. ' 
On April 27 Lange learned via Beck-Friis that Undén intended to travel to 
Oslo to discuss the possibilities of a SDU. The date was set on May 3. 
However Lange let know that if Sweden should stick unconditionally to its 
concept of neutrality he would not accept the offered cooperation. The 
different approaches could already be distinguished before the preliminary 
talks even had began and in fact they should not alter. (See also chapter 7.5) 
Lange told Beck-Friis that he had the impression that Undén had two main 
arguments against a military guarantee from the West: the Soviets should look 
upon it as a provocation and secondly that a guarantee for help had not much 
worth. Yet another point of difference was that Lange, as contrary to Undén, 
expected war soon. 
Also Copenhagen was informed about the Swedish plan. Undén should travel 
personally to Copenhagen on the 9th of May to explain his SDU proposal. 
The first discussions with Norway took place at Lange's home and present 
were, beside the host, defence minister Hauge, Prime Minister Gerhardsen and 
the chairman of the Norwegian social democratic party in the Storting, Mr. 
Torp. At first Undén talked to Lange alone and he started their talk with the 
somewhat sarcastic question if any information of disquieting nature had 
reached Lange lately. The answer was negative. Lange explained that he 
preferred a unilateral American declaration that a Russian attack on Norway 
would be considered a casus belli to the USA. 
In Undén's opinion such a promise would result in an American demand for 
bases in Norway which, in its tum, would imply worse relations with Moscow. 
Scandinavia was not to become part of a Western bloc and should stay out of 
war in case of a conflict. That was the basis for his SDU concept, but Lange 
did not agree with this unconditional policy of neutrality. Undén emphasized 
87 
that all the Swedish political parties had united round his foreign policy, 
although the debates in the press might give another impression. 
Stockholm was not especially optimistic about the possibilities of neutra-
lity, but none the less the chances of staying out of the next war ought not 
to be thrown away beforehand. Undén stressed the importance of peace-time 
relations and the urgence of avoiding frictions with the big powers. 
Hauge shared Lange s views but Gerhardsen appeared to be much more 
on the Undénian line and attached great importance to a similar Norwegian-
Swedish foreign policy but he emphasized as well that the word "neutrality" 
should be avoided because of its bad reputation in Norway. Gerhardsen 
referred here of course to the Swedish attitude in the last World War. 
Undén agreed not to insist on the word "neutrality" or "strict neutrality" 
but remarked at the same time that he in his tum could not agree to an 
"investigation, which was so extensive, that it also included the 
alternative of a guarantee from the Western Powers and thus alliance 
policy." 
No decisions were taken during this meeting because the entire Norwegian 
government had to be consulted on this matter but the different views were 
hardly going to change during the several SDU meetings which were to come 
in the next 8 months and the positions had in fact not altered when the SDU 
plan finally and definitively shattered in Oslo on January 29 -30, 1949. 0 
Undén's visit to Copenhagen was cancelled. It was decided that he should 
meet the Danish government members on the party congress of the Swedish 
Social Democrats in Stockholm on May 18. Also the Norwegians would be 
there. With the answer on Undén's proposal. 
5.5, The SDU negotiations. May 1948 - January 1949.31 
One day before the Scandinavian govemmentleaders were discussing the SDU 
plan Undén gave his views on the SDU problems during a lunch with his 
Danish colleague Rasmussen and "(..) did not hide" as Undén wrote in his 
diary on the 9th of May that "the question of cooperation with Denmark 
appeared to be more difficult than the corresponding question about Nor-
way."32 
Rasmussen shared however Undén's views on the necessity of neutrality: 
"Concerning preconditions for cooperation, i.e. the ambition to keep out 
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of the Great Power blocs and the policy of neutrality in case of war he 
had the same idea as I." (Undén's underlining). J 
Rasmussen pointed out however that both the Conservatives and the Liberals 
were inconsistent in their views. Thus when the Scandinavian leaders gathered 
in the afternoon of May 10 after the party congress, Undén knew the 
viewpoints of the two other parties. Present from Sweden were Erlander, 
Undén, Vougt (Minister of Defence), Wigforss (Minister of Finance), Möller 
(Minister of Social Affairs) and Sköld (Minister of Agriculture and long time 
Minister of Defence); for Denmark Prime Minister Hedtoft, Foreign Minister 
Rasmussen and Minister of Finance Hansen while Norway was represented by 
Gerhardsen who found himself in a rather peculiar situation as he saw himself 
placed before a united Swedish-Danish front that proclaimed an idea that he 
also preferred but that he could not openly accept because of the controver-
sies in his government about this issue. 
It was an unpleasant experience for the Norwegian Prime Minister who had 
travelled to Stockholm supposing that the negotiations would take place in a 
confidential atmosphere with his Danish and Swedish colleagues. 4 It was 
decided that the SDU negotiations would be continued in the future and 
Gerhardsen drafted the text for the communique. Undén was pleased because 
"It covered the Swedish point of view but avoided the word neutrality, 
which the Norwegians and Danes do not like.' 5 
But Oslo was not pleased with the communique that would go to history as 
the "Stockholm Memo" and according to which the purpose of the SDU would 
be 
"to secure the independence and freedom of the three countries to keep 
them outside any groupings of other powers and outside a possible war 
between the Great Powers."-'" 
Of course Lange and his supporters could not accept the Stockholm memo. 
Undén noted in his diary (May 25) that a majority of the Norwegian 
government could not agree with the text. Gerhardsen had suffered his first 
defeat. Oslo informed London about the memo of Stockholm and sent a 
representative to discuss the alternatives. Traditionally Norway expected that 
the British should rush to the rescue and offer help. Already before, on 
March 8, Lange had asked for military guarantees from England (and the 
US). 
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On May 15 Lange, accompanied by Hauge, had a long conversation with Sir 
Winston Churchill who said that Norway probably could get American 
guarantees. It was the conviction of the old English wartime leader that the 
Swedish hope of maintaining their neutrality in a next war was "purely 
nonsense." However he did not expect war soon. Churchill has, according to 
Beck-Friis, been a further stimulus for the Norwegian Western orientation. 
In the meantime there was still no other text than the Stockholm memo on 
which the talks could be continued. For Stockholm it became abundantly clear 
that the government in Oslo was split in the SDU case and that they stood 
all the time in very close contact with London on which protection they had 
relied for one and a half century. 
London was very much against a neutral SDU, as proposed by Sweden, 
because it meant that England would loose her grip on the Norwegian coast 
which was supposed to be of vital importance to her security. If a SDU would 
come into being then London would hold Stockholm responsible, so was the 
opinion of Swedish ambassador Boheman in London. He also reported that he 
had got the impression that London was convinced to have "Norway in hand" 
and referred to the possibility that Lange made use of his English connections 
"to draw Sweden over to his course.' 
In the beginning of June things seemed hopeless when Lange asserted in a 
speech in Malmö, South Sweden, that there was no common Northern line 
with regard to the main themes in foreign policy. Undén was angry that 
Lange had not contacted him before delivering his speech. Erlander phoned 
immediately his colleague in Copenhagen who appeared to be "depressed" 
because of what the Norwegian Foreign Minister had said. 
In the meantime Lange seems to have become more at ease with regard to 
Russian aggressive intentions towards Norway. 
Anyway that was the impression of Undén when he met Lange and Rasmussen 
in Stockholm on June 16. Lange told that he had heard from different sources 
that Norway had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union. Trygve Lie had on 
behalf of Oslo made enquiries with Gromyko in March about the policy of 
Moscow vis à vis Norway and obtained the assurance that the Soviets had no 
evil intentions as regards Norway. Similar information had also reached Oslo 
also from other directions and all messages had emphasized that the Soviets 
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had not taken action against Spitzbergen (Svalbard) which could serve as 
proof for the peaceful intentions of the Russians. Lange pointed out that fear 
of a isolated Soviet action against Norway played an important role in the 
Norwegian public opinion. He appeared now to be willing to limit the inves-
tigations to the "neutrality alternative" but did not want to admit that 
publicly because that could leave the impression that Norway once again had 
changed its foreign policy. 
Denmark was only too glad that the talks could get started. A definite 
date was not set however. Both Lange and Undén did not appear to be in a 
great hurry and it was decided that a definite date for the first sessions 
could be made at the next meeting of foreign ministers in Stockholm. Most 
important for Undén was that in principle the decision was taken to start the 
SDU talks according to his line. The final outcome of the negotiations were 
expected around February 1 1949. It was agreed that until then the three 
countries would not enter negotiations with other nations on military 
cooperation. Should however in the meantime, due to unforeseen events, 
anyone decide to start such talks with a third country the others had to be 
informed. 
In a letter to Undén Lange insisted that the SDU committee, which was to be 
established to investigate all the ins and outs of a SDU, should be ready with 
its work before January 1 1949. What was the motives for this request? Beck-
Friis gives a possible answer: Hauge had been to England during the tum of 
the month (July-August) and on that occasion he had learned that the 
Western powers at the very moment did not want to actualize the question of 
an eventual Norwegian joining of a Western bloc. Lange had advised Beck-
Friis that this question should be suspended until the new elected American 
president had taken office. That was why he was willing not to negotiate 
with the West for the durance of the SDU negotiations. 
Beck-Friis commented: 
"that the Norwegian foreign leadership despite all wishes for the best 
relations with Sweden is not willing to give up the security, which it 
seems to consider, a future guarantee from the West can give the 
country. I have reasons to believe that the willingness of the Nor-
wegian foreign minister to agree to an investigation of the possibilities 
for a military cooperation is found partly and chiefly in an absolute 
conviction, if not to say assurance, that the investigation is not going 
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to have any worth as to practical results, partly in a wish to avoid in 
this way criticism from that part of his own party that wishes coope-
ration with Sweden."42 
Summing up: Beck-Friis thought that Lange had already made up his mind to 
join a Western Pact, in the meantime however, until January 1 1949, as long 
as he could not negotiate with the West, he wanted to use the SDU talks to 
convince his opponents that a Scandinavian pact was not the solution for 
Norway's safety because the key to security lay in the West. 
On September 8-9, the three foreign ministers gathered again in Stock-
holm. Arms-aid from the USA appeared to be an important subject. Both 
Lange and Rasmussen thought that the USA would be more inclined to sell 
war material if a Scandinavian cooperation would take shape. Until then the 
USA had turned down their requests for weapondeliveries. 
But later during the Conference Lange showed himself to be skeptical about 
the chance in how far inter-Scandinavian cooperation would induce Washing-
ton to give military aid. An assurance for Scandinavian cooperation was not 
enough. He also feared that a SDU would be insufficient to protect Norway's 
integrity. Undén on his side pointed out that the US should want quid pro 
quo for their guarantee. 
The result of the Stockholm meeting was that the Foreign Ministers agreed to 
authorize discussions on the desirability and extent of possible military 
collaboration. The bulletin in which the intended SDU discussions were made 
public did not reveal the supplementary agreement: neither Norway nor 
Denmark would form any other military pact until the decision had been 
taken with respect to effecting an understanding regarding the mutual defence 
of Scandinavia. It was agreed that the investigations about the common 
defence should be finished by about the 1 st of February 1949 although Lange 
was of the opinion that it had to be finished as soon as possible, preferably 
before the new elected American president too office. The Scandinavian 
countries were around the 1st of February expected to give a straight "yes" 
or "no" to the SDU.43 
The Ministers of Defence met in Oslo on October 15 and the SDU negotia-
tions were definitively started. The Scandinavian Defence Committee was 
constituted on October 16. It consisted of twelve members, four from each 
country. Sweden was represented by Sven and Elon Andersson, members of 
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the Riksdag^Sven Andersson was on 28 November replaced by Riksdagmember 
G.F. Thapper) Governor <landshövding> Carl Hamilton, and General Nils 
Swedlund. 
These had the assistance of a number of military and civilian experts. The 
final report was presented on January 14 1949. The Committee's task was to 
investigate the possibilities and conditions of two alternatives: a) a defence 
union and b) a partial defence cooperation. With reference to alternative a) 
the defence union, the most important assumptions were that a military attack 
on one of the three countries would be answered with armed resistance of 
the others and that none of the three would abandon territory without 
combat; further the three agreed to stay out of war and not to enter military 
agreements with third nations during the SDU negotiations. And finally they 
should carry out as effectively as possible the commitments they had taken 
according the UN statutes. 
Defence minister Vougt made during the conference in Oslo (October 15) 
an oral restriction which was (also orally) accepted that 
"certain restrictions regarding solidarity remained necessary with regard 
to special areas outside the homeland territories for example Greenland 
and Spitzbergen." 
Also in the Committee the arms question was a steady returning point of 
debate. In the final conclusions of the Committee of January 14 1949 the 
three could not unite on two points: Swedish-Norwegian military assistance to 
Denmark in case of a Soviet attack on Denmark, the preventive effect of a 
SDU and the need for help from outside. 
The Danes and Norwegians agreed on those points, which is quite 
remarkable because in the talks on government level it was always Sweden 
and Denmark who agreed with each other. The conclusions of the Committee 
were not binding for the governments and it seems that the effect of the 
Committee's final conclusions on the decisionmaking government leaders was 
none at all. 
Prof. Carlgren concludes that the Committee tried to formulate their final 
conclusion as "elastic" as possible and that: 
"Equally general, careful and vague wordings also could be found in 
other less conflicting parts of the report. Obviously the three govern-
ments could on this basis conclude both that the conditions for a 
Scandinavian Defence Union existed as well as not existed (..)." 
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After all, before the Committee was ready with its final report the govern-
ments themselves had already started the discussion whether the prerequisites 
for a SDU could be found or not. 
London and Washington did not leave Oslo and Copenhagen in peace during 
the SDU deliberations. On the 23rd of September, Hickerson, Chief of the 
European Office of State Department, had informed the Danish Ambassador, 
Kaufmann, about the Atlantic Pact talks and advised that a Danish and 
Norwegian adherence, also without the company of Sweden would be warmly 
welcomed. Also the Norwegian embassy was informed. Hickerson maintained 
that he had the impression that Denmark and Norway were more interested in 
joining a Western Pact than Sweden and for that reason Stockholm was not 
informed. 
Tactically Hickerson explained (and it was even emphasized) that he did 
not expect an answer directly. The only thing he wanted was to give the 
Danes time to consider a future adherence. Only Washington, London and the 
government in the Canadian Ottawa knew about this so called "pré-avis" (pre 
advice) The Norwegian and Danish embassies in London received an equal pré-
avis from the Foreign Office. Both Oslo and Copenhagen had the impression, 
because of incoming reports from their embassies in Washington and London, 
that an official invitation to join the Atlantic Pact talks could soon be 
expected. 
Sweden knew immediately what was going on. Hedtoft informed Erlander 
about the pré-avis and also about his own point of view. During his recent 
visit to Oslo he had "lively and strongly" advised not to "give an advance 
promise to the USA - England of Norway's adherence to a union of Atlantic 
countries." It was his reaction on a message of the American and British 
governments to Oslo and Copenhagen (Stockholm received none), which said 
that they 
"considered the appropriateness that Denmark and Norway and eventual-
ly also Sweden should adhere to an Adantic Agreement.' 5 
Lange and Rasmussen advised Undén about the pré-avis when they met on the 
UN Conference in Paris at the beginning of October. 
At the conference both Lange and Rasmussen had pointed out to the Foreign 
Ministers of the US and Great Britain how inconvenient it was to make an 
application to join an Atlantic Pact at a time when the SDU investigations 
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were still in full swing. The pré-avis also interfered with the Stockholm 
agreement of September that the planned SDU talks should be carried out 
undisturbed. 
Bevin and Marshall denied during Lange's first visit to know something about 
the pré-avis. If that was true the explanation could be that the question was 
taken up by the State Department and the Foreign Office but that it was not 
taken up by the political heads of the departments. 
Hickerson had met Kaufmann about two weeks before Lange met Marshall in 
Paris and had asked him to keep the pré-avis secret. The Dane had done so 
but only as long as he stayed with Hickerson in the same room. As soon as 
the meeting was over he went straight to Erik Boheman, the newly appointed 
Swedish ambassador in Washington, and informed him about the latest 
developments. Boheman was also allowed to make copies of the report 
Kaufmann had made of his meeting with Hickerson. Also the English e-
quivalent "Oral Message. Top secret" found quickly its way to the pertinent 
desk at the Foreign Office in Stockholm. It stated among other things that 
"to be fully effective the pact must provide not only for the security 
of the countries participating in these talks but also for that of other 
countries, including Norway and Denmark (..).' 
Bevin and Marshall agreed afterwards that also Stockholm was to be informed 
about the pre-avis but that was not necessary anymore because Stockholm 
was already completely informed. Undén also met Marshall in Paris but the 
pré-avis has apparently not been discussed. 
On the whole the meeting between the Swede and the American had not the 
character of an exchange of thoughts but resembled more "two monologues". ' 
One delivered by Undén, the other by Marshall. The American complained 
about the Russian lack of "decency" which was, according to Marshall, the 
trade mark of Russian politics. Over and over again Marshall repeated how 
much he abhorred the police-state and how much he feared the spreading of 
such states. This monologue was clearly meant to frighten Undén but it was, 
of course, wasted on Undén who knew exactly what he wanted. Undén was 
not impressed, rather bored: 
"All the time he talked about his foreign policy and one did not get 
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the impression that it was the president who made the general 
outlines." 
Undén in his turn repeated the principles of the Swedish foreign policy and 
said once more that Sweden did not want to be a puppet in the hands of the 
big powers. Undén did not meet Bevin in Paris and the Swedish points of 
view concerning the SDU and Atlantic Pact were explained to the British 
foreign minister by the newly appointed ambassador in London, Hägglöf. It 
appeared that Bevin did not want to admit the pré-avis; it had only been a 
"suggestion" and he had "turned it down" immediately. 
In Paris Undén made use of the opportunity to explain his politics to his 
French colleague Schuman, who, according to Undén, clearly understood the 
argumentation for Swedish neutrality. When Lange met Undén on October 20, 
he was informed about the latters meeting with Marshall and Schuman. Lange 
noted: 
"I almost got the impression that Undén apprehended this talk (with 
Marshall), as well as his talks with Schuman as if they were more or 
less content with the Swedish neutrality's point of view." 
Lange had quite another experience because of what he had learned from the 
Americans about the talk between Marshall and Undén and because of "what 
Schuman told me about his conversation with Undén." It was a good example 
"how different a conversation could be experienced by the two who took part 
in it."50 
There would be no more English an American pre-advices but the two 
existing had clearly impressed Lange which is indicated by the fact that he 
wanted the Scandinavian Defence Committee to do its work as fast as 
possible. At the same time he had advised Beck-Friis that he never would 
accept a Northern cooperation. He thought however, and that might have been 
another reason for Lange to agree with the investigations on Swedish terms, 
that the results of that investigation should make it clear to the Swedes that 
a certain form of cooperation with the West was unavoidable, not only from a 
military point of view but even because of the industry which for a great 
part was dependent of the import of raw materials. About one week later 
Hägglöf reported from London that there were many indications 
"that several Norwegians in high official positions already were 
prepared for a quick termination of the Scandinavian deliberations and 
52 thereupon following association with the West." 
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The Danish point of view was completely different. When Hedtoft visited 
Undén in the fall of October he thought it not likely that Washington would 
give a guarantee without demanding compensation. On the other hand he 
considered it out of the question that Denmark could join a defence 
cooperation with Washington that would give the USA rights to establish 
bases in his country. He concluded that the Americans had to be satisfied 
with a neutral Scandinavian bloc. Denmark and Sweden should try to get 
Norway on that line. It would be the task of the three Scandinavian 
ambassadors in Washington to convince the Americans of the rightness of a 
neutral Scandinavia. 
When the three Scandinavian Foreign Ministers met in Paris at the end of 
November Undén made clear to Lange that he had not come to any other 
thoughts and that he was still convinced to be on the right way. The 
Soviet Union and the arms question were discussed. Undén was of the 
opinion that arms were used as a means of pressure and considered it 
unsatisfactory that the Swedish foreign policy could be dictated by the USA 
"by laying down conditions for armsdeliveries." 
Lange was however worried and impressed by the words of Marshall who 
had told him that according to the Vandenberg resolution, which sanctioned 
American participation in a regional security pact, deliveries of arms could 
not be made to neutrals. Undén believed that it was in the interest of the 
West that the Northern countries had a good defence so that they could take 
care of themselves in case of an attack and that the West therefore would 
deliver arms, if only to defend its own interests. 
"We might say the Americans that, if we could not buy from them, we 
would tum us to the East." whereupon Lange answered that Norway 
would never accept such a thing. 
Uddevalla. 
On December 18 and 19 the three Prime Ministers met on the initiative of 
Denmark in Uddevalla and continued the talks in Gothenburg the following 
day where they agreed to speed up the SDU discussions. It was Hans Hedtoft 
who had urged for the speeding up in order to be able to present a Scan-
dinavian defence plan before the Western powers were ready with their own 
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pact negotiations. Hedtoft appeared to be very upset that the Swedish 
members of the Scandinavian Defence Committee had said that it would be 
desirable to keep Denmark out of a defence union. "I had to spend almost 
half an hour in explaining what the military fools had meant" recorded 
Erlander in his memorandum. 
Erlander reported the course of the meeting to his Foreign Minister. 
Gerhardsen had been careful, so we leam from linden's diary, and had been 
incessantly concerned to find a new course. "He had adopted my [Undén's] 
way of thinking by reflecting on the possibilities of a guarantee from both 
sides". But that was not what Undén had said. "I remarked that I had talked 
about the acknowledgement from both sides, not about guarantee." Gerhardsen 
had also reflected about the possibility of ordering war material in Sweden on 
credit via the Marshall Aid. " It was also agreed that the three Foreign 
Ministers should meet soon to talk about the establishment of a SDU. In the 
Swedish documents I consulted there is no ground for Lange's statement in 
front of the American ambassador in Oslo, Bay, that during the meeting of 
Prime Ministers on 18 and 19 December, there had been signs of a "certain 
change in the Swedish attitude towards the safety problem."5' The cause of 
this confusion might have been due to the difference between "acknowledge-
ment" and "guarantees", (see here above). 
Before the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, upon which the Premiers in 
Uddevalla had agreed, could take place the situation reached an acute stage 
because of an American initiative. On Christmas eve Hickerson called the 
Norwegian ambassador in Washington, Wilhelm Morgenstieme, to the State 
Department to inform him that Norway and Denmark within one or two weeks 
could expect an invitation to join the Atlantic Pact negotiations. 
One week before Hickerson had advised Kaufmann that he quite well 
understood that the three countries first wanted to bring their SDU talks to 
an end. But he had also expressed his doubts if an invitation to Norway and 
Denmark to join the Atlantic Pact could wait that long. Apparently, State 
Department wanted to speed up the Norwegian Danish decision which could, 
as Robin Hankey told Hägglöf, be attributed to: 
"American military circles who wished to include Norway in the Atlantic 
Group, before consideration with Truman's expensive social program 
eventually would cause the Congress to haggle over the price of grants 
for armament of the Atlantic States" 
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Hägglöf reported also that the French and British, in vain, had tried to 
persuade the Americans to wait with their application until the SDU talks 
CO 
were finished. 
The news of this approach to Norway was a very unpleasant message for 
Undén who through Beck-Friis was aware of the Norwegian inclination to 
choose for the West and Hickerson's démarche could be an extra stimulus for 
the Norwegians. It had earlier been reported that Lange had accepted the 
SDU talks because he was sure that they would lead nowhere. The advantage 
for him was that Norway could show its good intentions and at the end of 
the talks more or less prove that only an adherence to the West could solve 
their safety problems. 
In the beginning of December, after a talk with Lange, Beck-Friis reported 
that he was now more than ever convinced that Lange wanted an adherence 
to the Atlantic Pact, that there were no signs of active opposition within the 
government and that only a minority in Lange's social democratic party 
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seemed to be against it. 
Hickerson's request was not wasted on Norway. Right after Christmas, on 
the 27th of December, the Norwegian ambassador in Stockholm, Bergersen, 
came to see Undén with the request that a Scandinavian Prime- and Foreign 
Ministers Conference could be arranged on New Years day. "The reason for 
this hurry", noted Undén in his diary, "he would get to morrow through a 
special courier from Oslo." Undén discussed the proposal at great length with 
Erlander. They agreed that there had to be a certain connection to Uddevalla 
but could not figure out what it was. Finally they agreed, in principle, on a 
meeting but not before January 5 or 6. 
Karlstad.61 
The Karlstad meeting on January 5 and 6 made on the outside world the 
impression that new hopes for the establishment of a SDU had arisen but it 
is to go much too far to call this meeting, as many did, a conference of 
hope. What was it that gave so many the feeling that a SDU could be 
realized? In fact nothing at all. The hope was illusory. 
On the evening before Karlstad (Jan. 4 1949) Erlander wrote in his diary 
that also the most optimistic criticizers had to admit that Lange, through his 
New Year speech, had succeeded in his efforts to shatter the SDU. In fact 
Karlstad was not much more than a postponement of the admittance that 
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there would not be a military Northern pact although the official decision was 
taken that the talks should go on. 
It was also declared that an agreement on a SDU was still possible. They 
agreed to make inquiries in London and Washington in how far the Anglo-
Americans were interested in the founding of a neutral SDU and if they were 
willing to provide such a pact with military material. 
But the unanimity was only formal. Sweden insisted, as it had done all the 
time, that direct ties with the West could not be accepted although an 
exception was made now for the delivery of arms provided they were not 
given free. The furthest going concession of Stockholm was that the Union 
could enter in force directly while until then the prerequisite had been that 
Norway and Denmark should raise first their own defence standard to a 
specified level. 
Norway still preferred some form of association with the West but was 
now willing to leave the door less wide open than it actually preferred. 
Denmark felt most for the Swedish option but would probably have accepted 
any joint Norwegian-Swedish settlement. 
If it is true that Norway (i.e. Lange and Hauge) in their heart of hearts 
wanted an adherence to the West or at least a Western linked SDU it was all 
part of the game they had been playing from the onset. That game was that 
ff) Lange es tried to convince their opponents that everything possible was 
being done to found a SDU but that it finally failed because of the unwilling-
ness of the USA to accept a neutral SDU and without American support the 
Norwegian safety could not be assured. 
Norway was convinced that the USA, the main pillar of the Western Pact, 
never would agree with a neutral Scandinavian military pact and seen in that 
light the "concession" of Norway was no concession at all. Also Undén gave 
thought to the possibility that the Norwegians relied on the assumption that a 
neutral SDU under all circumstances would shatter on the US attitude in the 
arms question which appeared to be the main problem in the SDU negotiations 
(see also б.г).6 4 
Erlander remained pessimistic about the chance "to save the North from 
the grip of the Big Powers". ' 
Both the US and England reacted as could be expected and rejected the 
Karlstad formula. Ambassador Matthews reacted strongly on the Karlstad 
meeting and reported to the Secretary of State that: 
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"The Karlstad formula is in my view completely contrary to the whole 
conception of the Vandenberg resolution; its avoidance of any provision 
for mutual aid either to the US or to other West European countries 
outside Scandinavia is against both the spirit and the letter of that 
basic document. The essence (..) of the Danish arguments for US 
blessing on Karlstad formula seems to be that (1) we are relieved of 
the burden of defending Norway and particularly Denmark (2) we gain 
Swedish agreement to go to war in defence of Denmark and/or Norway 
(3) we lose nothing essential re Greenland and Faroes. As to (1) I 
assume that decision to invite Norway and Denmark to join Atlantic 
Pact was based on our overall conclusion that advantage would accrue 
to our national security from their membership. I do not see how their 
failure to adhere would lessen their importance to us strategically, nor 
lessen our real interest in defending them if they are attacked. On the 
other hand their non-adherence to the Atlantic Pact plus their 
membership in a rigidly neutral Nordic bloc (Sweden will accept no 
Scandinavian alliance at this time which would permit anything but 
absolute neutrality by any of its members) would prevent us from the 
vitally important prior planning, coordination and other advance 
preparations for their defence which are so essential in modem warfare 
if such defence is to be in any way effective. Of possibly greater 
importance the Karlstad formula completely ignores the whole concep-
tion of the Atlantic Pact as a preventive or deterrent to war by 
serving notice on the Soviet Union that an attack on any pact member 
is an attack on all and is an attack on an Atlantic group pledged and 
ready to act in concert. (..). 1 feel strongly that acceptance of the 
Karlstad formula by us would be generally interpreted in Sweden, in 
Moscow, and elsewhere as a diplomatic setback for us of the first order 
and that it might well have serious consequences for the whole Atlantic 
project and for our success in the vital task of coordinating the 
defence strength of all western countries now living in fear of Soviet 
aggression.""7 
On the 17th of January Matthews visited the Foreign Office in Stockholm 
with the message that: 
"The United States favours a Scandinavian defence pact 
provided its members are not impeded thereby from entering 
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a larger regional pact - the North Atlantic Pact. The 
Scandinavian group alone would clearly not have enough 
strength to protect its members from aggression. (..) 
Limitations of American supply would in the foreseeable 
future preclude furnishing any weapons or war materials to 
countries not so qualified for assistance." 
And he added: 
"The American government hopes that the Scandinavian governments 
entertain no illusions with respect to the foregoing." 
Matthews explained that the word "assistance" also included financial help and 
even export licenses. It remains a question if his remarks on financial matters 
and export was not a part of Matthews personal warfare against neutrality 
(see 6.2 ) Matthews did not leave an official note but read his message in 
front of cabinet secretary Hans Beck-Friis. 
Hägglöf reported from London that the English attitude vis à vis a neutral 
Scandinavian bloc was very much like the American one. The West had such a 
vital interest in the Norwegian coast and the entrance to the Baltic that they 
dared not leave these territories to a rather fragile Northern collaboration 
but also for psychological reasons it was considered desirable that at least 
two of the Scandinavian countries were members of the Atlantic Pact. 
Lange could be satisfied, if that were the reactions it had been expecting 
and had hoped for. For Sweden the last chance to found a neutral SDU, if 
there ever had been a chance at all, was gone. 
Copenhagen and Oslo. 
As was agreed in Karlstad that the Scandinavian Prime- Defence- and Foreign 
ministers were to meet in Copenhagen. There were also parliamentary 
representatives of the three countries at the 3 day conference. From the very 
beginning there was no hope for Sweden. The idea of a neutral SDU was 
skillfully slaughtered by Lange when he, on the first day, declared that the 
best solution was a neutral SDU of which all the three countries were 
individual Atlantic Pact members. Because he realized that such was unaccep-
table for Sweden he had worked out a compromise: Norway could accept a 
defence union which formally had no ties with the Atlantic Pact but which in 
practice was part of the Pact, which in its tum would guarantee arms aid and 
assistance in case of a Soviet attack and there would also be contacts 
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between the military staffs of the SDU and the West.' Lange's "compromise" 
was of course completely unacceptable for Sweden because it would mean a 
actual connection with the West. The hope, how even little, for positive 
results in the SDU negotiations were definitively gone in Copenhagen. After 
the speech of Lange, Erlander said that "it was finished". The only reason 
that Sweden joined the final conference in Oslo (Jan. 29-30) was to give the 
SDU "a decent funeral."72 
Immediately after the Oslo break-down he used a similar expression 
although the funeral apparently was not a very sad one because Erlander 
refers to a "fantastic feast at Akerhus (..) Think what a place for a feast and 
a funeral!"73 
Also Undén considered that the dinner at the medieval Akerhus 
"despite of the failure of the negotiations was a brilliant feast. The 
speech of Gerhardsen and Erlander and much singing saved the 
night."74 
Despite everything the Danes wanted to keep the door open and refused to 
give up all hopes for a Scandinavian cooperation. They argued that the 
Americans could change their minds and might finally agree that a neutral 
SDU was the best solution for everybody. Norway and Sweden refused to 
accept that. 
The Danes wanted in the Oslo communique also a reference to a continua-
tion of the talks which was also rejected by the others: "Should contrary to 
expectations a change set in, the problem could be taken up again."'5 
For Sweden the SDU was finished, dead and buried. But Norway that never 
had been enthusiastic about a non-aligned SDU, contrary to Denmark, kept on 
playing the game that she preferred a SDU, even after the failure of Oslo. In 
February Lange travelled personally to Washington to propagandize a neutral 
SDU (see Chapter 7.1). Undén, although he never had cherished much hope 
that a neutral SDU would be realized, was after the definite failure depressed 
and thought about resigning which was opposed by Erlander because Undén 
represented in a very high degree the Swedish foreign policy . He was 
convinced and noted in his diary: "My departure could be interpreted as a 
change in the governments policy etc."'0 That was the last what Undén 
wanted. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE SCANDINAVIAN DEFENCE UNION. SOME FACTORS 
AND VIEWS. 
6.1 The strategic importance of Scandinavia. 
The upcoming Cold War had manoeuvred Scandinavia into the unenviable 
position of serving as a buffer between the power blocs of East and West. All 
three countries offered some attractive strategic prizes for eventual future 
aggressors. The industry of Sweden, which had not suffered from the Second 
World War, was varied and well developed. The country offered excellent 
communication and transportation facilities and possessed many forests and 
iron-ore mines. 
Norway was from an industrial point of view rather under-developed. It's 
geographical position however was, as Great Britain had long been aware of, 
of great strategic value. The newly risen interest in Arctic air routes, ("polar 
strategy") being the shortest way from the USA to the industrial heart of 
Russia, made Norway, which owned the isles of Jan Mayen and Spitzbergen, 
where air bases could be established an attractive partner for Washington and 
the Norwegian coast was of utmost importance for the control of the 
Atlantic, particularly the sea routes to and from Murmansk in the Soviet 
Union. 
Also Denmark was valuable because of its strategic location at the 
entrance to the Baltic but most important was the fact that it owned 
Greenland. "Topographically", reported an Intelligence Review of the US War 
Department, "Scandinavia, excepting Denmark, present a few easy routes of 
entry for the overland or seaborne invader.' Airborne invasions however 
were not likely to offer problems. Denmark, low and flat, presented only a 
few natural barriers but the coasts of Norway and Sweden are rocky and 
precipitous, moreover they have a skerry-guard of offshore islands. The 
Intelligence Report mentioned only a few favourable landing beaches. 
In Sweden around Gavie and on the Skâne Peninsula; in Norway suitable 
beaches could be found south of Stavanger and in the Oslo Fjord. The 
interior defence of Norway and Sweden is favoured by dense forests and vast 
mountain and lake areas. Both countries were quite vulnerable to air attacks 
which could be launched from various directions. 
Already in May 1946 the US War Department concluded that for a 
successful defence "Sweden must have the support of a strong ally (..).' As 
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time went by that feeling should grow only stronger but Stockholm did not 
happen to be in search of such an ally. Sweden held a vital position on the 
north western flank of the Soviet Union and had of course a central strategic 
position with regard both to the Danish Straits and the Baltic Sea. 
It would have been of virtual importance for the West to have advanced air 
bases in Sweden (and Scandinavia on the whole) because it would reduce the 
distance by half for their missiles and planes and also the reliability of their 
early warning systems would substantially increase. A series of radar installa-
tions in northern and eastern Sweden were considered essential for giving the 
earliest possible warning of air attacks on targets in Great Britain, the USA 
and Canada. 
An additional factor was that naval and air operations in the Baltic could 
be covered much better from bases in Sweden. Yet there are also a lot of 
official documents that allege that Sweden was of hardly any strategic 
importance. The aim of those statements was probably to scare Sweden and 
give it a feeling of isolation, of standing alone in a war with the Soviets. 
There was also a preventive advantage for the West with regard to Scan-
dinavia: denying the Soviets access to the Scandinavian realm in case of war. 
Neutral areas were considered zones of uncertainty, a hole in the defence 
barrier, and could, in the opinion of the Western policymakers, be regarded 
by Moscow as an invitation to extend their influence. 
Another reason for the American desire .to attach Sweden to a Western 
Pact was that they, for psychological and moral reasons, wanted as many 
members as possible: The West should stand firm, shoulder to shoulder, in the 
struggle against communism. What was needed was a united front of the West 
European democracies. But there might have been another, additional, reason 
for the American anxiousness to associate Sweden to a Pact: Sweden's rich 
supplies of uranium. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had asked the 
State Department to start negotiations with Sweden about this raw material 
for Atom bombs. Denial of Soviet admittance to the ore might have been one 
of the incentives of the AEC. 
There is no doubt that Scandinavia was of strategic importance to the 
West. Yet the approach of the UK and the US, the main founders of the 
Western alliance to be, to Scandinavia was not similar because of different 
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options and historical backgrounds. Great Britain had been interested in 
Scandinavia for a long time, the USA up to about 1948 hardly at all. 
The views within the American administration with regard to Scandinavia 
were also not at all homogeneous and there appeared sometimes to be a 
substantial lack of coordination, not only between London and Washington 
(see 6.3) but also within the American government. 
I have already discussed the traditional English interests in Scandinavia, 
especially Norway. Great Britain was more interested in the defence of the 
North Sea, the Baltic and the North Atlantic than the Americans and 
accordingly more occupied with Norway and its long coast line, which was of 
vital importance for the defence of the British isles. The British ambition was 
therefore to keep the Soviets as far as possible from that coast. Sweden was 
said to be of less importance. Already in June 1946, Hankey in the Foreign 
Office wrote to the British Embassy in Stockholm: 
"We shall take a much closer interest in Norway and Denmark than in 
Sweden because they are allies, are closer to us and of somewhat 
greater direct strategic importance." 
However, that view should alter with the lapse of time. But the Swedish 
attitude was so very unforthcoming that the English considered it not 
opportune to invite Stockholm into the Atlantic Pact: 
"Denmark and Norway are, however, rather a strategic liability to us 
without the Swedes and it would be in every way better if the Swedes 
could somehow be got to assist, though we can write off any possibility 
of their joining the Atlantic Pact themselves."6 
Contrary to the United States the British were very well aware of the 
Swedish points of view with regard to a Western alliance and considered the 
chance that Sweden could be persuaded to join such an alliance, one way or 
another, as hypothetical. 
A Top Secret document from the Ministry of Defence to the Joint 
Services Missions summarizes the (military) view of the British on the 
strategic role of Scandinavia as follows: 
- to deny its territory to the enemy 
- to grant to the allies the use of Greenland and the right of entry to the 
Faroes should this be necessary. 
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The English military preferred a Western aligned SDU but realized at the 
same time that 
"political considerations might outweigh the military considerations, 
which are not very strong either way." 
Direct military assistance in war was considered "unjustifiable". If Norway 
and Denmark joined the North Atlantic Pact the strategic requirements of the 
Pact with regard to Greenland and the Faroes would be met and the 
likelihood that Iceland would join considerably increase but the greatest 
disadvantage was that the Atlantic Pact 
"should be under great pressure to give Norway and Denmark appreci-
able military equipment which could only be at the expense of Western 
Union." 
Furthermore, assistance was considered useless 
"as without Sweden, the resistance of these two countries is bound to 
be ineffective, however much equipment they have been given." 
In an submitted document ( a telegram of the Foreign Office) 
it is made clear that "Mr. Bevin is also strongly of the opinion that the issue 
is primarily political and not military" 
The main objective for the British was to maintain the status quo, i.e. the 
coast of Norway free from the influence of the Russians. It was feared that 
the Norwegians should not be able to withstand the Soviets in case of an 
attack but if it was allied to Great Britain the purpose, preventing Russia 
access to the coast of Norway, could be reached much easier. 
The Norwegian membership had another big advantage as well: (for the 
USA the overseas Norwegian possessions might have been decisive) England 
would get admittance to Iceland and the Faroer, which both were of 
importance because of their strategic position in the Atlantic and therefore 
indispensible for the defence of the British isles. Access to these islands 
would have been endangered if the Norwegians should decide not to join the 
league to come. 
Of course it was not Norway but Denmark which could decide upon the 
use of the Faroer and Greenland, (Iceland was independent since 1944) but it 
was expected to follow the course of the old Danish motherland). It was 
known that Denmark, for the sake of its national security, had little choice 
but following Norway as Sweden had no intention to ally itself with Denmark 
alone. 
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Sweden was a serious problem for the British and Americans because it 
advocated a neutral SDU. To the UK it meant a strong reduction of her 
traditional influence in Norway. In case of a neutral SDU the foreign policy 
of Norway would be closely tied to the policy of Stockholm which of course 
could not accept the British influence. Sweden was dangerous for British 
politics because there was a substantial chance that they could turn Norway 
to their option of a neutral SDU, more or less automatically followed by 
Denmark. Hankey summarized for the Swedish ambassador why a neutral bloc 
was not in the interest of Great Britain: 
- the Soviets would not be impressed by a neutral Scandinavia with a 
population of 16 million people and a rather small production capacity 
- the North would not be able to resist an attack on its territory 
- the Vandenberg Resolution prohibited the deliverance of the arms 
- the Second World War, still fresh in mind, had proved the importance of 
the Scandinavian coast and its hinterland. 
- what should a SDU do in time of war? Should they hunt Soviet submarines 
and shoot down British planes, returning from a mission in the Soviet 
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Union? Moreover it was considered absolutely out of the question that the 
Russians would leave 
"the entrances to the Baltic in neutral hands in the event of war. They 
would want to control the entrances themselves in order to assure 
ingress and egress for their submarines, and deny the same to the 
Western Powers."7 
The Foreign Office feared that Sweden intended to press his neighbours to 
adopt a neutral course. 
Ingenious proposals were worked out to assure Denmark's and Norway's 
membership in the Atlantic Pact while at the same time being members of a 
SDU. The plan, mostly referred to as the Hankey plan and which was worked 
out in various options, was discussed with Oslo and Copenhagen. In the 
archives of the Swedish Foreign Office that I researched I did not find any 
indication that the plan was ever discussed in Stockholm. 
The plan was conceived in the English Foreign Office and confidentially 
submitted to the Americans for their comments. It aimed to secure the 
adherence of Norway and Denmark to the Atlantic Pact while at the same 
time permitting a Scandinavian mutual aid pact (including Sweden). Sweden 
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only tied to the SDU could remain non belligerent in any war in which the 
other two, because of their Atlantic Pact membership, might become involved, 
except if their metropolitan areas were attacked. Only then should Sweden 
enter the war. 
Denmark and Norway in their turn would assist Sweden in the event of an 
attack on its territory in accordance with the Nordic agreement of mutual 
aid. The Atlantic Pact would not automatically come to the rescue: Sweden 
would be entitled "to immediate consultation (Hankey's underlining) with the 
Western Powers.' It is not clear precisely when this plan was conceived, 
probably October 1948. Still, on January 17th there seems to have been 
some hope (or perhaps wishful thinking) that the above mentioned plan could 
be carried out. It was realized that it would be difficult but not wholly 
impossible "provided that we are fairly tough as regards the supply of arms." 
It was known that the Swedish military favoured an alliance with the 
West. The solution as proposed in the Hankey plan 
"would give everybody the best of both worlds and above all would not 
leave Sweden herself altogether in isolation though she would not, 
strictly speaking, have departed from a neutral position.'·3 
Lange rejected the plan, after discussions with Gerhardsen and Hauge because 
it would have placed Sweden in a more favourable position with regard to 
commitments than the other two countries. Hankey has played with the 
thought of another possibility "although it is very much less good." Oslo and 
Copenhagen would join a Scandinavian Pact but not a Western Pact. In this 
option the Danes would grant bases to Great Britain and the USA in the 
Faroes and Greenland (neither of both would be covered by the SDU), Norway 
would defend her own coastline against enemy vessels ("which was such a 
menace at the beginning of the last war") and both governments (i.e. in Oslo 
and Copenhagen) would make provisional plans with the Anglo American Staffs 
"so that they could receive assistance if ever it was asked for." 
The West would on their tum supply Scandinavia with arms and military 
advice. The advantage of this construction was that it would bring the most 
needed defence facilities, the disadvantage was that it would leave both 
countries under Swedish leadership with the danger that they at some time in 
the future would turned to isolationism "and perhaps even into appeasement 
of Russia." It was feared that in that case Iceland would follow the examples 
of Denmark and Norway 
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"so that the USA would not get strategic facilities which they regard 
as essential for the protection of the North Atlantic in time of war. 5 
It is not known yet if the Hankey plan was officially accepted by the 
governments of Great Britain and the USA or if it never was anything more 
than a strategy upon which (prominent) policymakers could philosophize. 
The Americans also were in favour of a Scandinavian adherence to the 
Atlantic Pact, if not for exactly the same reasons as the British. Furthermore 
there was within the American administration, due to the lack of coordination 
not one strategy but several (see 6.3). Still generally speaking the chance 
that Sweden would join an Adantic system was regarded as small. The only 
factor that might bring Sweden in was the realization that it had become 
isolated from its neighbours. Also in the USA there were various Hankey-like 
scenarios put forward but it was also alleged that for strategic reasons it was 
of relatively little importance "whether or not Sweden would come into the 
Pact." By that of course nothing is said about the political and psychologi-
cal importance of a Swedish membership. 
Soviet access to Sweden had to be denied but Sweden had a fairly strong 
defence and could fight the Soviets for some time. The greatest advantage of 
Sweden's strategic position was her control over the Baltic but the exit and 
entrance could equally perfect be controlled from Danish territory. Even more 
important than Denmark proper was Greenland. Just as the Norwegian 
overseas territories (especially Spitzbergen) were more important to Washing-
17 ton than Norway. 
The polar strategy was gaining importance and in that scenario Greenland 
was absolutely essential. The strategy was build on the development of bases 
in Canada, Alaska and the islands in the North Atlantic. The distance to 
Russia was considerably shortened if the route via the North Pole was used. 
Greenland and Iceland were considered essential for communications ("stepping 
stones") because of the range of the long distance bombers. The North 
Atíantic sea- as well as air routes could be controlled from those islands. 
With regard to Spitzbergen the main aim of US politics was to prevent 
Russian military bases and installations on this overseas part of Norway. 
The Spitzbergen Archipelago (including Bear Island) was of greater 
importance to Moscow than it was to Washington because it could provide the 
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Soviets with advanced naval and air bases. Additionally it had a dominating 
position with regard to the sea straits to Russian harbours in the Barents 
Sea. That was why the island should be denied to the Soviets for military 
19 purposes. ^ 
Many sources confirm that the US interest was more focused on Greenland 
than on Norway and Denmark. Greenland belonged, together with the Azores 
and Iceland, to the most important US bases in the world, all three being 
indispensable for communications between Europe and the USA. Since the 
Second World War the Americans had maintained air force bases on Greenland 
and they had no intentions whatsoever to abandon those bases. In the 
Defence Agreement of April 9 1941 it was agreed that those bases would be 
maintained 
"until it is agreed that the present dangers to the peace and security 
of the American Continent have passed.' 
Those dangers had clearly not passed in the eyes of the Americans. On the 
contrary: it had 
"become apparent that the strategic need for defences in Greenland still 
exists and in view of the developments in modem warfare is likely to 
increase." 
The USA refused to leave Greenland and even tried to purchase it which was 
refused by the Danes, as being politically impossible. Also Undén was of the 
opinion that Greenland "should be sold to the USA." He made that remark as 
a "private person", not as the Swedish Foreign Minister in a conversation 
with the Danish ambassador Svenningsen. Undén probably knew what it was 
all about and the sale might have saved him a lot of trouble. The Danish 
government was in a difficult situation vis à vis Greenland according to the 
Swedish ambassador in Copenhagen, Dardel, as the result of an incident 
regarding the isle of Bomholm. When the Russian troops left the island in 
April 1946, after having liberated it from the Germans, Copenhagen had 
promised Moscow that Denmark would not allow foreign troops to be 
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stationed on Danish territory again. 
Sweden lost the tug-of-war with Great Britain and America about Norway 
when Oslo decided to join the Atlantic Pact and Denmark followed suit. The 
United Kingdom and the USA had both their own specific reasons for wanting 
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Norway and Denmark to join the Atlantic Treaty although there were some 
parallel interests as well: Boheman in Washington and Hägglöf in London 
reported several times that Swedish membership of the Atlantic pact was 
desired in the first place for moral, ideological and psychological reasons, 
rather than for strategic purposes. The main fear in both capitals, according 
to those Swedish top diplomats, was that Sweden would draw its two 
neighbours into a Scandinavian isolation which would make it much harder for 
London and Washington to settle their problems respectively with regard to 
the Norwegian coast and the bases on Greenland and Iceland. 
The Brussels Pact countries did not seem over enthusiastic to welcome the 
Northern countries into the Pact because of the weapon deliveries. It was 
feared that a Scandinavian association would be at their expense: The same 
amount of weapons would have to be divided among more countries. This 
view was however not constant and seems to have been liable to the level of 
crisis feelings. At least one time Undén seems to have been skeptical about 
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the importance of Scandinavia to the Big Powers. In a memorandum^ in 
which he noted his impressions of his visit to Copenhagen in the autumn of 
1948, Undén remarks somewhat sourly that 
"Scandinavia is obviously strategically valuable but only if it is placed 
for nothing and without combat at the disposal of one of the contest-
ing parties."[?] 
Scandinavia could not be used as a concentration area in a war between East 
and West [?] and could not be used for naval warfare but was on the other 
hand suitable for air-borne troops "but only in summer". And even on this 
usefulness in summer he had his doubts. An attack against Sweden would go 
via Finland and partly over the Baltic but according to Undén the Russians 
were not yet prepared for that. The Norwegian argument against a SDU 
without ties with the West had always been that Scandinavia could not run 
the risk of having no friends in the West but 
"in Sweden we do believe however that we can assume that it for the 
English and Americans always must be a top priority to prevent the 
Russians from establishing bases on Swedish or -best of all- Norwegian 
territory." [?] 
Sweden could not join an Atlantic Pact, because it should loose its complete 
independence. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion that it was to the 
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advantage of both East and West to leave Scandinavia out of a new World 
War and on that assumption the Swedish policy should be based. With regard 
to the Danish Sound Undén remarked that it was not of direct strategic 
importance in a Third World War. 
"Personally I emphasized that the Baltic Sea from a Russian point of 
view preferably ought to be kept closed and that the Western Powers 
of course can not imagine to enter the Baltic to wage an offensive war 
against the Soviets there."[?]26 
Would Undén have taken another standpoint if he had not been convinced of 
Western help in times of crisis? Probably we will never know but the fact 
remains that he was convinced that the West -for its own sake- should come 
to the rescue and that he, on the other hand, did not expect a Russian 
assault in the near future. So why then should the pragmatic Undén have 
opted for the Atlantic membership? 
6.2. Anglo-American Pressure. 
Whether Great Britain and the USA put pressure on Sweden to opt for the 
Atlantic Pact or a Western linked SDU is a controversial issue. Historians 
have been able to present material confirming either opinion. I do not doubt 
that pressure was exercised because both the UK and the US were interested 
in the joining of Sweden. 
First of all there is the well-known remark of US Foreign Secretary 
Marshall to John D. Hickerson, his Director of the Office on European 
Affairs, "to lay off on such outspoken tactics with Sweden" with that of 
course confirming that Hickerson exercised pressure, and there is the 
statement of the Foreign Minister Bevin, that: 
"it remains my view that these countries (Denmark, Sweden and 
Norway) should be left to decide freely on the policy they will follow 
and that no pressure should be used to influence them to adopt a 
course which they themselves do not conceive to be desirable.' 
There is, perhaps, no reason to doubt the sincerity of those statements of 
both Foreign Secretaries but Undén and his Staff in the Utrikesdepartementet 
in Stockholm did not deal daily (in fact hardly at all) with Bevin and 
Marshall. 
Among the (influential) officials they regularly met or got messages from 
through the ambassadors Hägglöf and Boheman there were some who did not 
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hesitate to use pressure, especially by threatening with non-aid (i.e. no 
weapon deliveries). The remarks of Bevin and Marshall are in this matter 
therefore of little or no importance because what really counts is how the 
Swedes experienced the attitude of London and Washington. 
Men like Hankey, Sargent, Hickerson, as well as the reports of the 
Swedish ambassadors of conversations with those men made a large contribu-
tion to the opinion of the Swedish policymakers. That Undén expierenced 
certain aspects of the British politics as pressure cannot be doubted. In his 
diary he wrote, after having received a telegram from Boheman who reported 
that Bevin in an interview had asserted that Sweden exercised pressure on 
Norway and Denmark: "It is of course the other way round. It is England that 
exercises pressure!" Equally clear is Undén's reaction on an American 
démarche with regard to weapons which should not be delivered to a neutral 
SDU. "Pressure!" Further it is known that the US ambassador in Stockholm, 
Matthews, and his Counsellor of Embassy, Gumming, waged a "private war" 
against neutrality which went so far that they threatened to bomb Sweden if 
that, in US eyes, might be considered necessary. 
The Americans exercised more pressure than the British which might be 
due to the fact that they were less well informed about Swedish policy than 
the English were. Furthermore, it is hard to believe that London and 
Washington, which both had an enormous interest in a (at least partly) 
Scandinavian association with the Atlantic Pact, would sit down and wait, 
with folded arms, until it pleased those countries to join the Atlantic 
community. 
The pressure on Norway might not have been too hard because was not 
necessary. Lange and Bevin were on excellent terms with each other and it's 
not impossible that the latter might have relied on Lange's influence on 
Norwegian politics to bring the matter finally to a -for the Atlantic Pact-
favourable end. It is quite likely that Lange was flattered by the illusion that 
he got secret information which was not being divulged to Denmark and 
Sweden and it is equally likely that the Anglo Americans made a psychological 
use of the Norwegian sensivity with regard to Sweden, due to the fact that 
Norway had been under the Swedish crown (the Union lasted until 1905) and 
therefore extremely sensitive for English and American suggestion that 
Sweden tried to exercise pressure on them. 
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Already in May 1948 Boheman reported that the English (he was referring 
to Sir Orme Sargent and Hankey) were remarkably well informed about the 
Norwegian points of view. They had warned Oslo that it would be regarded as 
"very disquieting" if the "door to the West would be closed" but at the same 
time they seemed to be convinced that such "with regard to Norway would 
not happen." Boheman added as his personal opinion that Great Britain via 
Norway should try to prevent to come a neutral SDU into being. The 
English Ambassador, Collier, had warned Lange immediately after the first 
SDU deliberations in Stockholm (May) and asked him "in what kind of 
madness" the Norwegian government had engaged itself. 
Also Denmark was strongly and openly warned by Me Neil, Minister of 
State at the Foreign Office, reported Erik Boheman from London, not to 
enter a SDU on "Undénian lines" and Sir Orme Sargent had taken the trouble 
to meet the Danish Ambassador Reventlov with a similar message. Me Neil had 
also warned Boheman's Norwegian colleague, Prebensen, that English weapon 
deliveries would depend on the future Swedish attitude. That was not true, 
according to Boheman: "It may be added", he telegraphed, 
"that I through a direct démarche to Mc Neil have got off radar-
material which is hit by a general English export prohibition to all 
countries, including the Benelux.' 
Also the so-called pré-avis (warning) may be considered as an at least 
psychological and moral means of pressure to draw Denmark and Norway over 
the line. 
Both Marshall and Bevin emphasized that the pré-avis was not meant to 
exercise pressure. They might have been sincere but the question remains 
why the démarche was done. Fact is that the pré-avis was related directly 
with the weapondeliveries. The military planners had to present their 
programm for the American Congress in January 1949. Bearing that in mind 
the message is clear: Weapon deliveries could only be made if they were 
planned in good time and if Norway and Denmark wanted their piece of the 
cake they had to decide quickly. 
Marshall and Bevin both agreed that the SDU negotiations should run as 
planned but expressed hope that the SDU talks would be finished before 
January 1949. The pré-avis produced some effect in Oslo. Lange agreed that 
the SDU talks had to be speeded up and it was for that reason that he 
wanted to inform Stockholm about the pré-avis. He hoped that this informa-
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tion might induce the Swedes to accelerate the SDU negotiations while 
Hedtoft had advised Erlander because he was worried about foreign influences 
on the negotiations. 
Lange did not keep it a secret either that he wanted to speed up the SDU 
talks. He told Beck-Friis that Scandinavia should take a stand about an 
American inquiry with regard to cooperation with the West and said that he 
expected a new inquiry shortly after the inauguration of the winner of the 
1948 president elections. That's why he considered it important that the SDU 
talks should go as fast as possibly. It was probably no coincidence that 
Hickerson again, on Christmas Eve 1948, informed Norway that it could expect 
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an invitation to join the Atlantic Pact negotiations. John Hickerson had a 
personal aversion against the Swedish neutrality. Boheman, the in August 1948 
newly appointed minister in Washington, described Hickerson at his first visit 
as "I would like to say aggressive." Hickerson had followed Swedish politics 
with "considerable dismay" and asked Boheman if he wanted his view on 
neutrality in diplomatic language or in "plain American." It was because of 
this meeting that Marshall warned that "Department officials lay off on such 
outspoken pressure tactics with Sweden.' 
Hickerson was not the only State Department official who took a personal 
dislike to Swedish neutrality. Boheman reported that 
"From what I have heard from my Norwegian and French colleagues the 
top of the Swedish Foreign Office is becoming steady more impopular in 
leading circles. This may in the first place be thanks to the triangle 
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Hickerson, Matthews and Gumming." 
Like Hickerson Matthews declared that America "wished to avoid any 
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appearance of exerting pressure (...) but in practice it appeared to be much 
different. Matthews and his Counsellor of Embassy Hugh S. Cumming waged a 
"private war"-^  against the evils of neutrality and did their utmost to scare 
Sweden over to the West. Matthews had been Hickerson's predecessor as 
Director of State Departments Office of European Affairs and came to Sweden 
in the summer of 1947. 
Until then the Americans had only a legation in Sweden. Matthews had 
tight connections with European Affairs at State and it is not unlikely that 
his personal views were shared by many of those whose immediate chief he 
had been. Matthews disgust of neutrality was not limited to that of Sweden, 
as became clear in one of his conversations with Undén, who at one occasion 
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had pointed out to him that also the USA had known a long tradition of 
neutrality. Matthews remarked that he had disliked the American neutrality as 
well because it had been just as wrong as the Swedish. 
At the same occasion Matthews put forward that the Russian -Swedish 
relations would improve if Sweden should join an Atlantic community. In that 
case the Soviets would know exactly how far they could go. 
In March 1948 Matthews and Gumming declared to everybody who wanted to 
listen that the threat of a new war was real. The Dutch Ambassador, who 
knew his American colleague quite well, reported to the Hague that they did 
so to scare the Swedes "out of their wits.' Both diplomats did not hesitate 
to threaten that the US would destroy Swedish industry if she deemed it 
necessary to do so in a next war, for example if Norway and Denmark would 
be occupied by the Soviets. 
Within three months after his arrival in Sweden Gumming had decided that 
Swedish policy was determined by Russophobia. He also declared that the 
State Department thought that every country, which stood not clearly on the 
side of the US, would be considered as being a part of the Eastern bloc. 
"Shameless methods of pressure." was Undén's reaction. 
The Berlin crisis of the summer of 1948 again offered Gumming an 
excellent opportunity to attempt "consciously and openly to intimidate Sweden 
into joining the Western Alliance.' Matthews went so far as to hint that he 
had information that the Finnish Prime Minister was 
"in fact acting as Mr. Undén's 'stooge' and beating the neutrality drum 
at the latter's request.'5 
The behaviour of the two produced some effect although it remains an open 
question if the reactions were what they had hoped for. Boheman reported a 
widespread suspicion towards Sweden in Washington which, he said, was fed 
by Gumming. Erlander called him a "fawning slanderer" who "poisons the 
atmosphere" in Stockholm. The Prime Minister was on the whole very dis-
pleased with Matthew's "war of nerves" against neutrality and was of the 
opinion that Washington was "foolishly" informed from its Stockholm Embassy 
"about what we think and believe" which he very much regretted. 
Also the colleagues of the two American diplomats were not impressed by 
their skills and judgement with regard to Swedish politics and wondered if 
they were the right men in the right place. Their poor judgement cannot be 
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blamed to lack of staff at the embassy which numbered to about 190, 
including Service Attachés. 
Gumming thought that the Swedes were difficult to deal with because of 
their assumption that they knew so much about Russia "whereas", he remarked 
"in fact, the contrary is the case.' ^ That statement reveals probably more 
about Gumming himself than about the Swedes. 
The US admiral Stevens doubted that "an aggressive type like Matthews is 
the right man for us in Sweden" and the Dutch minister Texeira reported "On 
the whole I deem the mission of Ambassador Matthews until now not a 
success." He was, true enough, a fine colleague, "surely capable" but he used 
"the wrong tactic" in dealing with Sweden in "those great political questions." 
Texeira considered the English approach much better. ° 
Matthews and Gumming favoured two weapons in their crusade against 
Swedish neutrality: no weapondeliveries (non aid) in case of a neutral SDU 
and the "carrot and stick" treatment whereby the stick (no military or 
economic aid) was meant for Sweden and the carrot (favourable treatment) 
for Norway and Denmark. In the words of Matthews: 
"I believe that in our thinking and in our policy we should carefully 
distinguish between 'neutral' Sweden on the one hand and Norway and 
Denmark on the other. Any gestures of aid to the latter coupled with 
refusals to aid Sweden will help shake Swedish neutrality.' 
Ignoring was part of the carrot and stick policy. The US Navy paid a visit to 
Norway but did not to Sweden. Intentionally Matthews did not visit Undén 
from about July 1948 to February 4 1949. He did however appear at the 
annual dinner at Undén's Foreign Office where he happened to sit just 
opposite Undén who said to him in a very friendly voice and so loudly that 
everyone could hear: "I have not seen you for a long time Mr. Ambassador. I 
hope you will come and see me soon."-' Of course that was of not the 
reaction Matthews had hoped for. Over and over again Matthews repeated 
that "the cure for isolationism is isolation.' Early in January 1949 he seems 
to have thought that his approach would be successful. He appeared to be 
very much against a possible Anglo-American invitation to Sweden to join the 
North Atlantic Pact because 
"there were many signs of effectiveness of our tactics of showing 
indifference to Swedish policy all of which would be undone if we made 
any approach to Swedes at this time. Let the Norwegians and Danes tell 
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the Swedes about North Atlantic Pact if and when the time seems 
proper to them. I consider this of greatest importance from point of 
view Swedish psychology if we hope for eventual Swedish association in 
pact."53 
Matthews had warned Sweden according to the US radio "to stop sabotaging 
the North Atlantic alliance". He should have told, according to commentator 
Drew Pearson, that 
"US may stop all Marshall Plan Aid if Sweden continues trying to 
persuade Norway and Denmark to join a neutral Scandinavian Pact 
instead of joining us.' 
The chief pressure put upon Sweden was the threat of non-aid which worked 
very well with regard to Norway but appeared to be useless in the struggle to 
draw Sweden into the Atlantic Pact. 
The big difference between the two was that Oslo believed the non-aid 
story while Stockholm did not. The Swedish government was convinced that 
the US and Great Britain would counteract their own interests by not 
delivering arms and believed that the West was best served by a strong up-
to-date Scandinavian defence system and considered the threat of non-aid as 
a purely tactical move. Besides, Sweden possessed already a strong army, air 
force and navy and had a well developed defence industry. 
The Swedes were however not able to produce technically advanced 
military material such as radar and for her raw materials it was dependent on 
the USA and the UK but the latter did not take the same stand regarding 
weapondeliveries as Washington. During an UN meeting in Paris Undén and 
Lange discussed the non-aid: 
"Mr Lange referred to the difficulty for Norway to build up a defence 
without priority for buying in the USA. I [Undén] remarked that maybe 
one should not be too nervous in this respect. It ought to be an inte-
rest of the USA to make it possible for Norway as well as for Sweden, 
to strengthen her defence, as it was well known that our peoples were 
determined to defend themselves with all possible strength. Of course a 
refusal of licenses might be used as a means of pressure, but it seemed 
unlikely to me that our countries, attached or not to an Atlantic Pact, 
in the long run would be denied the buying of war materials.(..) I told 
Mr. Lange to point out to Mr. Marshall how unmotivated it would be, 
to deny Norway for political reasons to buy war materials, regardless if 
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it were attached to an Atlantic Pact or to a Scandinavian defence 
pact."55 
Secretary of State Marshall, who was also present in Paris advised Undén 
that, according to the Vandenberg Resolution, which sanctified American 
participation in a regional security pact, arms supplies could not be made to 
Sweden upon which Undén remarked that he did not appreciate attempts by 
the US to influence Swedish policy by making conditions for arms deliveries. 
Lange however had been more impressed by Marshall's words which 
inspired Undén to the remark that: "We might say the Americans that, if we 
could not buy from them, we would tum to the East" but that was unaccep-
table for Norway. Once again Undén pointed out that if it came down to it 
he did not expect great difficulties in obtaining war material from the West 
and once again he warned Lange and Rasmussen 
"for a development which would mean that the US decided upon 
Scandinavian territory and that Russia for that reason might get the 
feeling that the borders of the USA ran along the Norwegian border. 
(..) It is better policy to try to create a calm situation than to 
aggravate the frictions by pulling the Americans over here." 
Lange in his turn answered that it would be a relief for Norway if the US 
border was extend to the Norwegian-Russian border and that the biggest 
difference between the Swedish and Norwegian attitudes was that Norway saw 
it as her moral duty to show solidarity with the Western democracies. " 
Undén's conviction that weapons would be furnished because it was in the 
interest of the West that (also a neutral) Scandinavia had an adequate 
defence can be found elsewhere. 
Neither Erlander expected real difficulties regarding the deliveries of war 
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materials. Stockholm was however well aware of the importance of weapon 
deliveries for Norway and its major concern was that Norway would take the 
menace of no deliveries serious. 
Undén himself did not like the expression "American aid" as he explained 
to Boheman, because it was incorrect. Sweden had always paid cash for US 
arms deliveries and intended to do so also in the future: Also Sweden 
exported arms and considered that "normal foreign trade. " J 7 
Matthews took of course full advantage of the non-aid opportunity. He 
visited Hans Beck-Friis at the Foreign Office to give him an "informal but 
official" message which was based on "some loose thinking" as regards the US 
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"military policy". Informal but official means that Matthews read his message 
from a paper. The US government did of course not want to influence 
Swedish policy, he said, but to avoid misunderstandings he wanted to make 
clear that 
"any Scandinavian defence arrangement based on neutrality would be 
incompatible with the intent of the Vandenberg Resolution and of 
course would disqualify the signatories from getting any American aid, 
at least until the requirements of a collective arrangement (an Atlantic 
Pact) would be fully met."60 
Erlander considered this message as 
"probably a new, maybe, serious element against our neutrality. I 
imagine that no one here feels specially surprised. We had well 
expected something along those lines after the presidential elections, as 
foolishly as Washington must be informed from Stockholm about what 
we think and believe.' 
Matthews stated as well that the Norwegian and Danish governments would 
receive a similar message but that did not appear to be correct: They were 
only informed about Matthew's démarche in Stockholm but did not receive a 
similar oral message. 
In this connection it might be illuminating to pay attention to Cumming's 
visit to the deputy chief of the defence staff, colonel Thord Bonde, on the 
same day Matthews saw Beck-Friis (26-11-1948). Gumming declared that the 
Swedish policy was not realistic. Weapondeliveries could no longer be counted 
on because of the Vandenberg Resolution which was accepted by the American 
Congress that summer. Besides: Scandinavia had, so explained Gumming, been 
subject to a strategic revaluation and in that concept "Sweden was no longer 
of any interest at all." Bonde wondered if it was not more risky to take an 
interest in Denmark than in Sweden whereupon Gumming replied that the US 
was only interested in Greenland. 
Exactly one week later (3-12-1948) Gumming came to see secretary Beck-
Friis with roughly the same story that he told colonel Bonde: No assistance in 
time of war, no deliveries in peace-time and that a strategic revaluation had 
taken place ("if I understood him right about a year ago."). Gumming 
expressed himself "somewhat vague" and Beck-Friis asked if he meant the 
whole of Scandinavia but Gumming refused to be clear and did not want to go 
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into that. Beck-Friis got the impression that only Sweden was meant. J It 
looks as if the duo Matthews-Cumming now had intensified their private war. 
Undén reacted in a letter to Boheman in Washington to Matthew's 
démarche. Undén expected no real changes in the US policy and thought that 
Sweden also in the future would be supplied with raw materials and other 
commodities important for the production of defence materials in Sweden. 
"A discriminating treatment of Sweden in this respect would give us the 
impression that our country for political reasons would be put in a not 
favoured class by itself." 
Undén did not believe in this because the measure would be counterproductive 
to the Americans. Stockholm did see no reason to abandon her policy but 
Boheman was warned to operate extremely careful and got detailed outlines of 
how to deal with his contacts in the State Department. He should avoid to 
ask State for definitions and definitive answers. 
It was emphasized that a principal US refusal to export war material to a 
neutral SDU probably would bring about an increased schism in Scandinavia 
"which seemed to be little consistent with the normal guiding principals of 
the US foreign policy." Boheman was more or less advised to avoid Marshall 
because 
"There could be a certain risk that he prepared himself to answer off-
hand the Swedish governments request for precision of the concept of 
'American aid' and also in other respect immediately would take a stand 
to the problems concerned and in that way , may be, lock himself in a 
position which is, we hope from our side not yet fixed." 
Stockholm still hoped that its points of view after a further examination, 
would get more comprehension from the Americans "than what can be deduced 
from Mr. Matthew's message.' 
Boheman did as he was told and visited Hickerson who also referred to the 
Vandenberg Resolution. Boheman pointed out that Stockholm believed that 
Matthew's démarche was intended "to torpedo the planned Scandinavian 
cooperation." Hickerson answered that he understood Sweden's difficult 
position but that all European countries should unite, or that they otherwise 
would be lost. Even if not all three Scandinavian states would join a Western 
alliance 
"it would be in any case very much desirable that Norway and Denmark 
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would join, especially due to the strategic interests of those coun-
tries."65 
A few days later Boheman once again took up this meeting with Hickerson in 
a letter to Hans Beck-Friis. Again he mentioned that the USA wanted Norway 
and Denmark to join in the Atlantic Pact but added now that it was believed 
in Washington that after the Danish and Norwegian adherence the position of 
Sweden would become so isolated that it sooner or later would choose to go 
same way. Boheman took the non-aid seriously which he had not done a 
month before. 
When Boheman became ambassador in Washington in August 1948 he had 
been convinced that the State Department first of all wanted a Danish and 
Norwegian membership in the Atlantic Pact. But after a few conversations 
with Lovett, Undersecretary of State, and Hickerson in October and November 
he believed to perceive a growing understanding for Stockholm and in a letter 
to Hans Beck-Friis on November 11, he did not even want to completely 
exclude the possibility that State would accept a SDU without connections to 
the Atlantic Pact. 7 
Ambassador Hägglöf in London informed Hankey about Matthew's démarche 
but Hankey did not feel obliged to defend the wording of Matthews' message. 
Hankey emphasized that the British government hoped for a positive result of 
the SDU negotiations and he said he was sure that Washington wanted the 
same. Hägglöf however stressed that Matthew's statement in Stockholm had 
evoked contrary impression and that the Swedish government had wondered 
whether the USA wished to obstruct or downright prevent a positive result of 
the Scandinavian defence negotiations. 
Also the British Ambassador in Stockholm emphasized during a meeting 
with Undén that neither Matthews nor the Foreign Office wanted to exercise 
pressure on Sweden. Farquhar, who had just met Bevin in London, said that 
Bevin hoped for positive results so that a SDU could be realized and that it 
in one way or another would ally itself to the West. It is evident that 
"positive" in this matter represents two opposite views, respectively a Western 
allied and a non Western allied SDU. A purely neutral SDU was in fact no 
less unacceptable to London as it was to Washington. It was only the 
diplomacy that was different, more skillful and not so clumsy as the American 
approach. Farquhar stresses the fact that the West did not refuse to sell 
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weapons but that it was merely a matter of resources and that it therefore 
was natural that the allies would get priority, something that Undén could 
not understand and he wondered why the deliveries should depend on 
Sweden's ties with the West because, seen from the Western point of view, it 
ought to be 
"an advantage if we militarily should be as strong as possible, so that 
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we could offer an effective resistance in case of an attack." 
What was the truth about the often returning statement that weaponsupplies 
were short and that deliveries would first be made to the allies? Right after 
the war, in 1945-1946, there had been a big surplus of warmaterials but that 
situation changed in 1947 when the relations with the East grew tenser and 
soon the situation arose that Great Britain could cover neither her own 
requirements nor that of her allies. 
Swedish arms production was now considered very important not least 
because it would help covering the Norwegian and Danish requirements. In an 
early draft of the Bevin speech the Scandinavian countries had also been 
mentioned as possible members in a Western alliance but later left out again 
because London foresaw Scandinavian demands for weapondeliveries which 
71 Great Britain was not able to meet. ' 
So the shortage was real but so was the strategic importance of Scan-
dinavia, neutral or not. Weapondeliveries were in the interest of the West as 
Undén and Erlander had declared and their thesis was confirmed by the 
British Chiefs of Staff although the reservation was made that the require-
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ments of the Western Union Powers had to be met first. 
During the Karlstad meeting Erlander made the cynical remark that if the 
Western weapon resources were too small, they would not automatically 
73 increase if Norway and Denmark joined the West. It seems quite unlikely 
that the deliveries to the Western Pact powers would have decreased 
considerably if the relative small defences of Norway and Denmark would 
have been supplied with the weapons they needed. 
Also the deliveries to Sweden would on the whole have been relatively 
small because it had one of the best post-war defence systems in Europe. The 
problem was more a political than a military one and the non-aid question has 
been more an American than a British matter. Swedish purchases in the USA 
were relatively small so it was no real disaster for Stockholm that the USA 
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were reluctant so sell. Great Britain was Sweden's main supplier of arms, 
especially planes, but in the UK the Swedes did not meet great difficulties. 
In the leading English military circles there were advocates for deliveries 
to Sweden. The Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence, captain Baker Creswell, 
told the Swedish naval attaché in London that they were convinced of the 
importance of a military strong Sweden. Asdic, radar and radio equipment had 
already been sold to the Swedish navy and Baker Creswell did not expect 
great difficulties for the future but he could give no guarantees because 
Washington had also influence in such matters. "In other words, the whole 
thing was not a military but a political problem." reported the attaché. Also 
the Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Longley-Cook had nothing , 
as far as he was concerned, against deliveries. Unfortunately it was not the 
British Admiralty alone that made the decisions, sighed the naval attaché: also 
the Foreign Office had to give its consent and the attaché was afraid that 
the answer would be "a more or less direct echo of what the powerful circles 
in Washington have to say." 
But the US deliveries to the Swedish Navy were so small that he had good 
hope to get what he wanted. The naval man reported also that his Danish 
colleague, together with the Ambassador, had lunched with Hankey who then 
appeared to have full understanding for a SDU (in February, the SDU failure 
was a fact and it was almost certain that Norway was going West) but 
nevertheless would like a "more flexible interpretation of the concept of 
neutrality." What the Foreign Office had in mind was that the SDU members 
"'confidentially', that is wholly 'privately' and thus non officially, admit 
to certain cooperation with the Western Powers with regard to a joint 
planning." 
If the Scandinavians, and first of all the Swedes, accepted that solution, the 
English standpoint vis à vis a non allied SDU would become much more 
favourable but Hankey feared that if they could not come to terms the 
deliveries to Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries would become 
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"negligible small, probably non existent." J 
Those "in power" in Washington who decided on weapon deliveries were 
according to Boheman a small group of "policymakers" and their views could 
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change somewhat from person to person and from time to time. Something 
similar can be said of the British, who as regards the non-aid, often referred 
7R to Washington in that way avoiding a straight answer. Illuminating however 
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for the more realistic British view is a letter from Bateman of the Foreign 
Office to ambassador Farquhar in Stockholm. It could have been the words of 
Erlander or Undén: 
"It is really in our general interest to keep Sweden as strong as 
possible, even if she does not join an Atlantic Pact (..). Furthermore, 
the stronger Sweden is, the smaller our commitment to Norway will be, 
if Norway enters the Atlantic Pact, (..). In point of fact the Chiefs of 
Staff recently advised that we should continue to supply arms to 
Sweden." 
Bateman added that allies should get first priority. Sweden had a lower 
priority than Norway and Denmark but that would become relevant only if 
there was a conflict of requirements but such a conflict was not actual at the 
moment. Bateman informed Farquhar that radar supplies could not begin "much 
before 1950 by which time the position may have changed" and both countries 
could be supplied. 
"It would therefore be pointless for us to make a show of cutting off 
arms from Sweden now and yet to supply them in the future." 
Bateman added as well that that line "seems to be in accordance with the 
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more flexible attitude which the Americans are now adopting."" There is 
little doubt that arms deliveries were used, especially by the US, as a means 
of pressure to turn Scandinavia to the West. From my point of view it is less 
important what the real motives have been. What counts here is the Swedish 
experience: the way they felt the pressure of the outside world to abandon 
their neutrality. That's why it is not so important that Bevin in a personal 
message to the English ambassadors in the three Scandinavian capitals 
declared that he, after having once again read the records of his meetings 
with the Scandinavian ministers in Paris, March 1948, still took the same 
approach: 
"It remains my view that these countries should be left to decide freely 
on the policy they will follow and that no pressure should be used to 
influence them to adopt a course which they themselves do not 
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conceive to be desirable." 
The reaction of Farquhar was furious: 
"(..) I may be wrong, but I feel that I am being censured and reproved. 
(..) If there is anything in my dispatches , telegrams or letters which 
make you think that I have gone contrary in any way to the Secretary 
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of State's directive (..) or said anything to the Swedes which I not 
ought to have said, please quote it back to me as evidence against 
me."81 
It seems that the English, especially Orme Sargent and Hankey, and it were 
those two men who Boheman (and later Hägglöf) regularly met, tried to 
prevent the establishment of a neutral SDU through Norway which was much 
more sensitive to the non-aid problem than Sweden. Boheman reported to 
Undén that both policymakers stood in close contact with Lange and his 
department and that Sargent considered the Swedish position absurd. The 
military importance of the Scandinavian states was 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 and could 
never become more than zero, whereupon Boheman answered that England + 
France + Benelux was 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1 and never could become more 
than one. Boheman was convinced that the English believed to have Norway 
on their side and he wondered if Lange did use his English connections to try 
to get Sweden on his line. 
Through his talks with Orme Sargent and Hankey Boheman concluded that 
the attitude of the London Foreign Office was thoroughly discussed. His own 
conclusion surprised him because Bevin and Me Neil had shown at least some 
understanding for the Swedish position. Boheman thought it hard to believe 
"that this so well tuned department not also reflects the attitude of the 
political representatives.' 
About one month later when Bevin met Boheman on a party he asked 
"Well, how is Mr. Undén going and his neutrality?" Bevin explained that 
cooperation between Scandinavia and Great Britain and other countries would 
develop in the course of time in a natural way. "I do not want to hurry 
anybody but do not shut doors!" One day later Boheman was called to Bevin 
who received him "without a trace of his common joviality." This time Bevin 
appeared to be worried about the discussions in Sweden and warned it not to 
exercise pressure on Denmark and Norway (and added of course, as usual, 
that he did not want to exercise pressure). He also said that he considered 
the Swedish attitude vis à vis Western cooperation unfriendly and playing into 
the hands of the Soviets. Bevin also put forward that the mood in his own 
Labour party as regards Sweden became bitter. The opinion within the party 
was that the Swedish government would "shoot as willingly to the West as to 
the East." 
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Finally Boheman reponed that the Swedish air force could expect "great 
difficulties" with regard to her purchases in Great Britain and that "These 
difficulties surely had, at least partially, a political background.' J In that 
connection political background can hardly be interpreted otherwise as 
"pressure". 
The English refusal in December 1948 to sell surplus material (among other 
Baily bridge- and some amphibious material can hardly have removed the 
feeling that political motives were involved. 
What happened in fact with the actual deliveries? There appeared to be little 
difficulties as regards Sweden's principal supplier, Great Britain. Neither the 
USA took a negative attitude towards Sweden concerning the question of war 
material, Undén learned from defence minister Vougt in June 1949. Vougt also 
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appeared to be quite satisfied with the English deliveries. Hankey was 
pleased to inform Hägglöf that the Swedish military had showed willingness to 
cooperate and also the allied states had, in studying the defence problems of 
Norway and Denmark, paid much attention to the position of Sweden and the 
importance of its military preparations. On Hägglöf's question about weapon 
deliveries Hankey answered that as far as he knew everything went fine. 
In an indirect way Hägglöf touched upon the question that Danish and 
Norwegian military authorities had showed themselves surprised vis à vis the 
Foreign Office that Sweden both with regard to deliveries and information 
seemed to be treated as well as the Pact members Denmark and Norway. 
Hankey did not give a straight answer but Hägglöf got the impression 
"that the British authorities did not see the necessity of differentiating 
between the Scandinavian countries" 
and added that no matter how one looked at the problem the Scandinavian 
countries from a Western point of view remained "parts of one single strategy 
problem.' So, as soon as the problem with regard to Norway's and Den-
mark's adherence to the Nato was solved, the path for deliveries to Sweden 
was cleared. The conclusion must be that non-aid not only was felt by the 
Swedes as pressure but that it also was meant as pressure or at least more 
than an incentive not to hamper Norway's adherence to the Western Alliance. 
It depends on how one wants to define pressure. 
The different approach from the US and Great Britain was not only caused 
by the different historical relations with Scandinavia, the private opinions of 
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policymakers at State and the London Foreign Office or at the embassies in 
Scandinavia (Matthews, Gumming). There was, as far as England was con-
cerned, also an economic aspect. Before the autumn of 1948, 70 British 
Vampire planes plus 60 spare engines had been delivered. The contracts had 
been signed already in January 1946. Breech of contracts would also have 
resulted in juridical difficulties. A worried Lovett of the State Department 
delivered an aide-mémoire to the British ambassador in which was established 
that the orders from RAF, Commonwealth, and Brussels Treaty governments 
alone would not be sufficient to enable the English aircraft industry to keep 
going. Countries that were important for England's strategic defence were 
also to be supplied. According to Lovett the British government had earlier 
that year considered to delay the supply of war materials to Sweden 
"in order to influence the attitude of the Swedish government on the 
possible association of Sweden in collective security arrangements of 
the Atlantic area. They had decided however, that there was nothing to 
be gained by trying to press the Swedish government on this matter 
before the Swedish elections in September."0 ' 
Until 1946 the British had followed a policy of low military priority with 
regard to Sweden because of the Swedish attitude in the Second World War. 
Ironically, rumours that Washington was interested in selling military planes 
and radar equipment to Sweden caused a change in British policy because they 
were afraid that the Americans should remove England from the Swedish 
weapon market. Swedish crowns meant hard currency and this was something 
that the British could use.**8 
Finally the British had a small hope of a change of government in the 
autumn of 1948 and it was expected that in an eventual non-Socialistic 
government Erik Boheman would succeed Undén as Foreign Minister. Boheman 
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was considered to be pro Western Alliance. 
6.3. Coordination. 
The pressure which was exercised on Sweden to influence her to choose for 
an Adantic Pact was for a number of reasons not very successful. The Swedes 
were first of all not impressed by the threats, simply because they did not 
believe them and secondly the Swedish demand for US weapons was so 
relatively small that the American threats were in fact doomed to fail. 
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But also the (non) coordination between the different policy-makers at the 
State Department, between the State Department and the Defence Department 
as well as between London and Washington played a role. It has been 
remarked before that the cooperation at State with regard to the Atlantic 
on Pact was not always optimal. I have already referred to Bevin and Marshall 
who both claimed to know nothing about the so-called pré-avis. 
The beginning of president Truman's second term in the White House, 
January 1949, caused some changes in the State Department. Marshall retired 
as Secretary of State and Dean Acheson took over. Charles Bohlen, Counsellor 
of State Department, became Acheson's closest adviser instead of John 
Hickerson. 
Bohlen shared Kennan's view of an Atlantic Pact as in the first place a 
political and not a military endeavour. Both men took a skeptical view at the 
Scandinavian membership of the Western Alliance and did not want, as 
Kennan expressed "to extend this alliance as far as possible - to jam it, so to 
speak, as close as possible to the Soviet borders.' 
Bohlen said to Lange that 
"arms would go to places where it was considered most advantageous 
for our security and that of the world, and that we do not as yet have 
commitments for sending arms to any of the Pact countries.' 
Bohlen's policy differed in that respect considerable from Hickerson's and 
Lovett's who had, according to the Norwegian historian Grethe аетф been 
under partial pressure from the military establishment and the National 
Security Counsel. 
Before Bohlen became more powerful as Acheson's adviser he had, together 
with his close friend George Kennan , formed the opposition within the State 
Department and represented a fundamental different view on the relations 
with the Soviet Union than Hickerson, Lovett and Marshall had done. The 
skeptical view of the former on the Scandinavian membership was quite 
logical in the light of their view that the danger to the Western world was 
not primarily a military one. 
"Military union should not be the starting point. It should flow from 
the political, economic and spiritual union - not vice versa.' 
Hickerson and the circle around him, as well as Marshall himself, the old 
general, had analyzed the situation in military terms. 
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In Paris Marshall had told Undén "in strong words" about the lack of 
"decency" that characterized the Soviet policy. "One could not negotiate with 
the Soviets and trust that they should adhere to a settlement or dealt fairly." 
Undén remarked that Marshall made the impression on him of a moralist and 
"a military in a rather high degree" because of the way he expressed 
himself. But is was Hickerson and Lovett, not Marshall, who actually 
Q7 determined the policy with regard to Scandinavia. Geir Lundestad has found 
evidence that 
"When Marshall held talks with other foreign ministers, he consistently 
asked the department in Washington for recommendations on what to 
say. More remarkable, almost without exception he followed the lead of 
his advisers. (..) Finally, even if Marshall had possessed the will to 
carry out a more personal policy, strong countervailing pressure existed 
to a policy favoring a Scandinavia with very limited ties with the West. 
There was the attitude of Lovett and Hickerson within the State 
Department itself, supported by the embassies in Oslo and Stockholm." 
In 1976 and 1977 Hickerson has told Grethe аетф in private conversation 
that his purpose had not been to get Sweden into the pact but that the 
Swedes should leave Norway and Denmark in peace. Matthews policy however 
pointed to the opposite direction." 
When Acheson became the new Secretary of State he knew little about the 
Atlantic discussions. When he took office in January 1949, Lovett, one of the 
driving forces behind a close relation of Scandinavia with the West, left and 
Bohlen, with his different view of the Pact, became his primary adviser. 
Acheson's policy in February 1949, during the meeting with the ambassadors 
of the Atìantic Pact, where also Lange was present, was in fact the policy of 
Bohlen.100 
Another result of the November elections of 1948 had been that Senator 
Vandenberg, an ardent supporter of the stepping stones theory and Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee was replaced by Tom Conally who cared 
much less about the stepping stones than Vandenberg had done. Vanderberg's 
influence on the US foreign policy had been considerable. It is also probable 
that Acheson was more realistic than his predecessor with regard to Sweden 
and has realized that Swedish policy was inflexible. With Acheson as 
Secretary of State the US policy vis à vis Sweden became less rigid. 
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The non-optimal coordination between London and Washington is clearly 
illustrated by the delivery of Vampire planes and radar equipment. Until 1948 
the USA contrary to Great Britain, had taken little interest in Scandinavia. 
On the other hand the polar strategy and bases policy had been much less 
important for London than it had been for Washington. υ The UK and the 
US had, in short, quite different political, military and economic, interests in 
the Scandinavian area, and that might have been the major reason for the 
failure of the US pressure on Sweden. 
The reason that England did not carry out its threats with regard to 
weapon deliveries was due to the fact that she could not afford to do so. On 
the other hand she also realized that it was to her own advantage to have a 
strong Sweden. 
6.4. Reactions on the SDU. 
Was there any opposition against the SDU within the social democratic 
Erlander government? There were indeed a few members who thought that 
military cooperation with the neighbouring countries went too far. The 
cabinet ministers (statsrâd) Quensel and Mossberg, like the ministers of 
agriculture, Sköld, and of finance, Wigforss, emphasized that neutrality should 
be the prerequisite for the SDU talks. Wigforss was the most influential of 
those men and remained doubtful about the desirability of a SDU all through 
the negotiations while Sköld seems to have changed his mind. 
Wigforss,"Wigge" in Undén's diaries, was a close friend to Undén. They often 
discussed the foreign policy and most of the time they agreed. The SDU 
seems to have been an exception. Wigforss wanted to stick to an isolated 
neutrality and did not want to extend the idea of Swedish neutrality to the 
rest of Scandinavia because the chance that Sweden would be drawn into a 
next war would only increase. 
A few social democrats in the Riksdag argued along the same line. Some 
feared that the SDU was the beginning of a definite "drifting away" to the 
West. Others had, according to Undén, not realised that he had been 
serious with regard to the establishment of a SDU. Only two social 
democratic members of the Riksdag, (1944 elections 46,6 - 1948: 46,1%) 
Nerman and Lundestad, pleaded for an adherence to the Western Pact. 
The main Social Democratic newspaper Morgón Tidningen (MT) acted as the 
governments mouth-piece. It did not only function as his master's voice, it 
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was sometimes his master's voice (in casu Undén) although only few people 
knew it. Herbert Tingsten, editor in chief, of the leading liberal newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter (DN) never knew it. In his MT editorials Undén called himself 
"Mr. Undén" or "foreign minister". Tingsten was most of the time referred to 
as "Mr. Tingsten". Sometimes he showed himself "surprised" about certain 
"exposures" of the foreign minister. The social democratic newspapers, the 
so called A press, were owned by the SPD and Landsorganisationen (the 
Swedish workers union) and appointments of new editors were first discussed 
within the party management. From Undén's diaries can be concluded that 
i n o 
he was sensitive to utterances in the press and that he could become 
irritated by a bad editorial in his own MT. On April 5 1949 he remarked that 
MT had a "rather unintelligent and bad analysis of the situation." He also 
noticed that the comments in the press on the Atlantic Pact were "ridiculous-
ly varying" from an almost "religious intonation" (DN and Göteborgs Handels-
och Sjöfartstidning, GHT, both liberal) to modest appreciation (Svenska 
Dadbladet, conservative). 
The position of DN and GHT (but also Expressen) was not a reflection of the 
atmosphere in the Liberal Party (Folkpartiet, 1944 elections 12.9%, 1948 22.8%) 
at the Riksdag. Three FP representatives were pro Western Alliance. u 
During the discussions about the party's tactics in the election campaign of 
1948, it was established by John Bergvall, member of the First Chamber of 
the Riksdag, that there were different opinions within the party as regards as 
the foreign policy. He wanted a formulation that covered the concept but it 
should be avoided that that formulation should give the SPD the occasion to 
call the members of Folkpartiet "warmongers". 
Ohlin said during that meeting that the FP did not want to tie itself with 
regard to the neutrality line, but things would change if Sweden was 
attacked. He stressed that he did of course not expect an attack from the 
West. Also earlier, probably in March or April, it had been established that 
Sweden should not enter a military alliance system but a few month later 
Ohlin appeared to have no objections against cooperation with the "Scan-
dinavian brother countries". A suggestion to enter an alliance accompanied 
with a declaration that Sweden belonged to the West was called unacceptable 
by the FP leader.111 
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Remarkable is that Ohlin tried to suggest that he had been the one who had 
proposed a SDU and there was at least one within the party who believed 
him: 
"Professor Hugo Osvald, Uppsala, expressed his pleasure and satisfaction 
about professor Ohlin's proposal for a certain defence cooperation with 
Norway."112 
What had happened? Both Erlander and Undén have commented the affair. 
Undén describes in his diary how Ohlin, after having been informed at a 
meeting of partyleaders that Undén should propose a SDU, had rushed out to 
recommend a Swedish - Norwegian military cooperation in a public speech. 
"Much attention is being paid to 'prof Ohlin's proposal'. Strange that 
he has gone straight out from the foreign committee where I had put 
the question of Swedish-Danish-Norwegian inquiry of the possibility for 
a common defence, to shout the idea from the roofs as his 
proposal."113 
Erlander put little confidence in the FP leader Ohlin: "who is going to accept 
any proposal that can be considered suitable for getting votes (..)." 
Folkpartiet supported the government, that was also confirmed by 
Erlander, but at the same time it stressed the point, contrary to the 
government, that the Scandinavian nations in a joint diplomatic action in the 
West should try to gain comprehension for a SDU concerning weapondelive-
ries. 5 At a meeting of the foreign committee on January 27, 1949 Ohlin and 
other members of Folkpartiet declared that American aid was a condition for 
their party's consent. The exact atmosphere among FP's Riksdagmembers is 
difficult to establish from the records. ' It seems that Ohlin to a certain 
degree blamed the government for the SDU failure. Looking back at the SDU 
negotiations on a meeting of the FP he recapitulated the matter and did not 
forget to mention that it had been he who had proposed that the SDU talks 
should start immediately. Unfortunately, according to Ohlin, the SDU 
committee was not established before October which 
"must have had an injurious effect on the course of events. Some dear 
months were lost and the Norwegian hesitation was gradually beginning 
to show." 
The Swedish position could have met much understanding in the US if it only 
was brought forward "in a suitable way" because it was, according to Ohlin 
"surprisingly easy to obtain understanding for the Swedish points of view in 
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the US." With reference to the Swedish foreign policy he remarked that it 
was not a strict and 
"in all directions directed policy of neutrality (..). Our policy is not 
1 1 0 
only alliance free but also West oriented.' 
In his memoirs Ohlin says that he had not used the expression "West 
orientation" after the spring of 1949 because it caused confusion (p.318). 
For Erlander the expression seems not have been confusing: "Ohlin and Elon 
Andersson indicated in several private conversations that their support of the 
government's policy was due to the fact that they saw in the defence pact an 
orientation towards the West! That is to say Dagens Nyheter!"liy 
Ohlin might, in his heart of hearts, have dreamt about an adherence to the 
Atlantic Pact but his party voted clearly against it. And yet most of the pro 
Atlantic Pact voters in Sweden could be found among the FP electorate: 40% 
The reason for that might have been that Dagens Nyheter was widespread 
among the Folkpartiet electorate. 
Prime Minister Erlander has admitted to be afraid that Tingsten's campaign 
would influence the public opinion. ^" This fear might also have been the 
reason for Undén's (anonymous) polemic in MT. Erlander feared Tingsten's 
campaign although he apparently did not have a high opinion of the editor in 
chief of Dagens Nyheter: 
"His style of writing is exactly adjusted to the half ignorant, half 
intellectual, half old housewife. He should be an excellent spokesman 
for unmarried woman teachers, who have not any prospects to get some 
children neither now nor in a future existence." 
The Canadian embassy in Moscow informed Ottawa that 
"The most uncritically pro-American (..) Professor Tingsten, editor of 
Dagens Nyheter, is not the most dependable; he has been successively a 
Conservative, a Communist, a Social Democrat and a Liberal (Myrdal 
once referred to him as 'the friend of all our parties') and there have 
12? been recently signs of another shift." ^ 
Tingsten became editor in chief of DN on the first of June 1946. The paper 
followed at that time a clear course of neutrality and Tingsten used argu-
ments which he later should combat vigorously. On October 6 1946 he 
maintained that the establishment of a Western bloc "despite assurances about 
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its peaceful intentions should intensify the antagonism between Russia and its 
former allies." 
The Bevin speech of January 22 1948 was for Tingsten the immediate cause 
for the Western Pact campaign. A paragraph in his contract compelled him to 
inform the paper's management about "specially important decisions". His first 
editorial of his Western Pact campaign was such a decision and that's why he 
informed Tor Bonnier, who, according to Tingsten's impression, in principle 
121 agreed with him. J But not everybody at DN was pleased with the new 
course. Already one day after Tingsten had started his campaign (It was the 
25th of January, Bevin made his speech at the 22nd) Johannes Wickman, one 
of DN's political commentators, visited Undén because he did not want to 
take any responsibility for Tingsten's policy. He said that Tingsten on the 8th 
of January had "pleaded against the bloc idea and now already had turned." 
Tingsten was according to Wickman good at writing books and also intelligent 
but he was no politician. But also the owners, the Bonniers, and the 
business manager, Helge Heilbron, 
"felt that Tingsten was trying to move too fast for the Swedish public 
and their circulation figures seemed at times to confirm their f e a r s . " 5 
Tingsten's first editorial in his campaign for adherence to the West was called 
"Isolation or cooperation" (25.01.1948) and about 50 similar articles were to 
follow in the year to come. "Isolation" became Tingsten's word for Undén's 
concept of neutrality. The essence of his articles was that a SDU would be 
too weak to resist a Russian attack. That's why he considered a direct or 
indirect adherence to a Western alliance necessary. Ideologically Sweden was 
not and neither could be neutral. Unden was often attacked personally. Undén 
reacted immediately on Tingsten's attack of January 25. In his diary he noted 
"An attack in DN. I wrote a thing for MT against Tingsten."126 That "thing" 
was an anonymous editorial with the title "The guardian of moral at 
Tegelbacken."127 
"When the temperature in the political atmosphere rises Mr. Tingsten 
becomes always hot in his head (..). He literally spins around of 
eagerness. After two days of pondering and even before he got the 
extensive English accounts (of the Bevin speech) in his hands he is 
ready with the Swedish foreign policy. It should be changed resolutely." 
In his editorials Undén did not go into the eventual advantages or disad-
vantages of an adherence to the West. What he put forward was that a 
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Scandinavian adherence did not promote peace and that Northern neutrality 
served all interests best. Sometimes Tingsten's attacks became very personal. 
12Ä The most remarkable one appeared in August 1948 and was called "Undén, 
a study in grey" in which Undén was pictured as "mediocrity decorated with 
blunders." 
Most of the time Undén reacted quietly on such attacks. Tingsten's 
campaign did not stop with the realization of Nato but should go on for 
about one more year. Other influential papers that followed a pro West course 
were, the already mentioned GHT and Expressen, although the latter uttered 
itself less sharp than the former. 7 Undén also wrote some editorials against 
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Hoger, (now: Moderatema) the conservative party in the Riksdag (1944:15.0%, 
1948: 12.3%) supported the official Swedish policy of neutrality. In an appeal 
to "the people of Sweden" the party pleaded for an "alliance free foreign 
policy" but emphasized also the imponance of close Scandinavian cooperation, 
also in the field of defence with Denmark and Norway. 3 1 Like the liberal 
Folkpartiet Höger considered American weapon aid necessary 3 2 and 
partyleader Domo put much weight to the understanding for the Swedish 
1 'W position from the side of the Americans.  J J The prominent member Gunnar 
Heckscher wrote in Svensk Tidskrifi that the representatives of Höger were 
"unanimous that an adherence to the Atlantic Pact ought to be out of the 
question" but he added: "anyway not at this time.' 
Ivar Anderson, Högermember and editor of Svenska Dagbladet claims that 
many conservatives were doubtful -yes or no to the Atlantic Pact- and that 
I O C 
he had been one of them. He pleaded with Undén to send Swedish 
observers to the Nato negotiations if Sweden would be asked to do so. 
Sweden's leading conservative paper, Svenska Dagbladet, (SvD) supported the 
alliance free policy although the paper took a critical view of Undén. 
"It was not easy for Otto Jarte (editor of SvD) and me, who supported 
the official policy -alliancefree- to digest Undén's neutrality preachings, 
dry and dogmatic, we were fed up with it. 'Ideological neutrality' was a 
concept that SvD refused to acknowledge." 
The motivation of SvD was that if Sweden should choose for the West Finland 
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would be at the mercy of Russia. 
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Bondeförbundet/Centerpaitiet (Agrarian Party 1944: 13.6%; 1948: 12.4%) 
supported the government wholeheartedly. A fortnight after the speech of 
Bevin, partyleader Bramstorp declared that his party declined any ideas 
13R 
concerning a Swedish adherence to a Western bloc. That attitude should 
not change and also in the minutes of the party management no dissonant 
13Q 
voice in this matter can be found. Contrary to Folkpartiet and Höger, 
which sympathized with the idea of western weapon aid, Bondeförbundet 
declined the idea because it was afraid, ,like the SDP, that the deliveries 
would be tied to certain conditions. u The position of Skânska Dagbladet did 
not differ from the standpoint of Bondeförbundet. 
Sverges Kommunistiska Parti (SKP, now VPK, 1944: 10.3%; 1948: 6.3%), the 
Swedish Communist Party, declined a SDU because it was a step back from 
neutrality. In 1945 the party wanted to get rid of neutrality and replace it 
with "democratic foreign policy". Sweden should unite with all nations and 
forces in the world that fought for "democracy, peace and freedom, against 
world capitalism, worldreaction and the imperialistic war mongers.' A SDU 
would come under direct US military command. Sven Linderot declared at a 
meeting of the party management that he should demand the government to 
stick to the alliance free line. He did not demand neutrality and the party 
had never asked for it because it was not, except in "certain concrete 
situations défendable and feasible." In the opinion of Linderot alliance free 
was not the same as neutrality. 
"For instance in the UN (..) one acts of course in favour of peace, 
supports the struggle for peace of the Soviet Union, supports the 
struggle against suppression of Greece's struggle for peace (..). That is 
what we mean with an alliance free policy.' 
The SDU was regarded as part of the Western Alliance and accordingly 
hostile to the Soviet Union and therefore unacceptable. It was nothing less 
than a "Scandinavian American military alliance.' The party paper "Ny 
Dag", owned by the SKP, expressed similar views. " 
Several Gallup polls show that a majority of the Swedish people was 
against an Atlantic Pact adherence although the Nato had more sympathizers 
among the people than among the Riksdag members. In April 1949 31% opted 
for Nato membership against 20% in June, 41% was against (June 47%) and 28% 
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had no opinion in April (June 33%). The reliability of the polls was 
questionable. 
Remarkable is that a third of the population at that time did not know the 
difference between democracy and dictatorship. 
One group in the Swedish society appeared to be a supporter of the Atlantic 
Pact: the military top. Matthews also has remarked that 
"There is just one element in the country which is not blind to 
Sweden's folly: the armed forces." 
Commander-in-chief Jung talked in front of Matthews about the "futility of 
neutrality" and about the probability of a western oriented SDU, once it was 
established. Air force chief Nordenskiöld said that he and other colleagues 
cooperated with Tingsten "furnishing him such ammunition as they possessed 
to aid his campaign." 
C. Ehrensvärd however, with Jung the most important Swedish officer, 
supported the official government line but he was part of a minority. 
Ny Militär Tidskrifi, mouth-piece for Jung, published articles in which the 
function of neutrality was openly subjected to doubts. A speech of Helge 
Jung in Lund (25.10.1949) that drew much attention became the target of an 
(anonymous) attack by Undén in the Social Democratic periodical "Tiden" 
where Undén criticized the commander-in-chief propagandizing a line 
deviating a from the official foreign policy. Months later, during a meeting of 
party leaders Undén said that the speech of Jung had "shaken the confidence 
1S9 
of the Soviets in Sweden's foreign policy.' J 
Krister Wahlbäck doubted in one of his articles 5 3 on the SDU if those 
utterances of the military top could be taken seriously and if they should not 
be seen as efforts to influence the US opinion about the SDU in a more 
positive direction but there seems to be little or no reason for his doubt. 
Also after the failure in Oslo (Jung's speech in Lund is a good example) the 
military continued their pro Nato policy. Several sources, also Swedish, 
confirm the disposition of the leading military circles. 
Ivar Anderson called general Nordenskiöld ("one of my best friends") an 
Atlantic Pact advocate, a fact that was confirmed by Tingsten. Undén warned 
Nordenskiöld from Paris that he should be more careful in his utterances. 
Among others Nordenskiöld, who was quoted in the Times of February 19 
1949, had stated that if Sweden was attacked its task should be 
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"to hold out until help comes, but this is possible only if her arma-
ments are technically completed through trusting cooperation with a 
Great Power. We must ensure that the door remains open for such 
cooperation with the West.' 
A couple of months later he advised the English Air Attaché that it was only 
"a matter of time before the Swedish government will realise that they 
have no other course than to become members of the Pact (..).' 
Commander-in-chief Jung stated that he, as a soldier, was convinced that 
"Sweden could not do otherwise than associate herself with the West" and in 
front of the Dutch ambassador he made fun of neutrality which he considered 
"untenable". Erlander was warned that the general pursued a pro West 
policy, ^ rom the very beginning Jung had been skeptical about a SDU 
because the advantages would be on the Danish and Norwegian side, while the 
risks for Sweden only would increase. Sweden was not able to supply it's 
neighbours with materials because the Swedish forces needed everything 
1 ^7 themselves. J ' 
The military top feared a shortage of materials and the resolution for that 
was an adherence to the West. Besides, they were convinced that they should 
not be able to resist an isolated Soviet attack on Sweden. The only thing 
they could do was to hold the enemy up until aid would come. Sweden was 
wholly dependent on supplies, both military and industrial, from the West, as 
1 CO 
general Swedlund explained in a speech. 
Because of the standpoints of the leading military the Americans and 
English might not have lost all hope regarding Swedish adherence to Nato. A 
hope that the official line could absolutely not provide. Farquhar also has 
made his contribution by reporting to Hankey that 
"the three commanders-in-Chief of the Swedish armed forces are all 
equally alarmed lest a policy of isolation might jeopardize the re-arming 
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and modernization of the Swedish forces.' 
Confidentially Hankey informed Prebensen, the Norwegian ambassador, about 
Farquhar's telegram and wondered if there was no way at all to tie Sweden 
up to the West. The Norwegian diplomat remarked, as he had done several 
times before, in his report to Lange that at the Foreign Office seemed 
"to prevail a strange optimism with regard to Sweden's position. I 
presume that reports, as the mentioned one, can be a contributing 
reason to this."160 
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Hankey's hope must only have grown stronger when he on the 19th of 
February 1949 received a copy from Farquhar of the document that the three 
Swedish Commanders-in-Chief on the 21st of January had sent to their 
government and in which they warned for an isolation of Sweden and pleaded 
for military cooperation with the West. 
A high Swedish officer had played the document into the hands of a 
British military attaché in Stockholm. The Foreign Office assumed that the 
leak was planned by the Swedish army top. Severe security measures were 
taken to protect this source to prevent Stockholm from knowing about the 
contact between the highest British and Swedish military circles. A result of 
this leak was, according to Eriksen and Skodvin, that the Hankey plan was 
taken up again. 
But unfortunately for London and Washington it was the Erlander 
government, and not the military establishment, which determined the ultimate 
course of the foreign policy. 
6.5 The Soviet Factor. 
Did the Soviet Union play a role in the Swedish decision making and, if so, 
how big was that role? Already in June 1945, Rickard Sandler, ex foreign 
minister in the SAP/Bondeförbudet coalition of 1936-1939, remarked at a 
meeting of the SAP executives that creating a good relationship with the 
Soviets without doing concessions that would infringe the Swedish right of 
self-determination was Sweden's most serious problem. 
Undén considered good relations to Moscow important and was glad to 
hear from Rolf Sohlman, Swedish Ambassador in Moscow, that his foreign 
policy had impressed the Kremlin. Especially the fact that he was considered 
to be under Anglo-American pressure but nevertheless stood firm was received 
well. Undén was for the Soviets the personification of Sweden's foreign policy 
and a few months later that view was once again confirmed by Sohlman: 
Undén was the guarantee for neutrality which was directly linked to him.164 
Undén was proud of this and told Lange that he did not want to 
jeopardize his policy of neutrality which apparently had "made a break-
through" in Moscow "through an inconsistent and ambiguous conduct.' " 5 
Undén was of course aware of the Soviet feelings about a Northern 
Defence Union. After the conclusion of peace between Finland and the Soviet 
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Union the Finnish government informed in Oslo and Stockholm how they felt 
about a defence pact. 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had immediately expressed his displeasure 
about the Finnish move face to face to the Swedish ambassador in Moscow 
and said that such pacts could not be neutral and that they were directed 
against the Soviet Union. Norway received a similar message. Radio 
Moscow branded in 1947 the idea of a military alliance in Scandinavia as "an 
idea borrowed from the fascist organizers of the new European order." and 
after the Bevin speech the Russian ambassador had visited Undén and asked 
him if there were any changes in the foreign policy to be expected which was 
answered negatively by Undén. Bevin himself had learned the same from 
Undén in Paris where the Swedish foreign minister declared that a country's 
foreign policy in a high degree was determined by its geographical position. 
If Sweden was a Pact member and if war broke out the Soviets should try 
immediately to occupy Sweden and "no other power could prevent the Soviets 
ι fn from coming first." Bevin made no comments. Nevertheless it appeared not 
to be so easy to know what Moscow really had in mind. Sohlman stated that 
it was difficult to analyze the Soviet policy. Most likely Moscow wanted an 
isolated neutrality for all three countries and seemed have accepted the 
Swedish foreign policy as a "working hypothesis." 
Norway was considered to be on the American side and Denmark some­
where in the middle. Sometimes it was doubted if Sweden could resist the 
Western pressure. A SDU was also experienced as a pact directed against 
Russia.168 
At a later state it was said that a neutral SDU was "unnecessary and 
undesirable" but that it could, if need be, be tolerated. A Norwegian 
adherence to the Atlantic Pact on the other hand was considered "a serious 
matter.' A additional factor for the Russian decline of a (neutral) SDU 
could have been the appeal a neutral Northern bloc could exercise on Finland 
because it could inspire new anti-sovietism. ' u 
It remains a strange phenomenon that the Soviets officially never discussed 
the matter. That was also the opinion of the Foreign Office in Stockholm: 
"The remarkable things is (..) that until today the Russians, with not 
one word have referred to the question of Scandinavia and the Atlantic 
Pact neither in Stockholm nor in Moscow." 
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Ambassador Tjemychev had since the late summer of 1948 not been in 
Stockholm longer than a few weeks. 
The Russian press however did not keep silent and denounced the SDU and 
other forms of bloc building.1'2 A possible reason for the Kremlin's low 
profile might have been the conviction that Undén would not change his 
course. His statements about the matter had always been clear and unambi-
guous. Undén feared both Western and Soviet influences because it was 
contrary to his strive for complete independence from both blocs. His "anti-
americanism" was quite exceptional for those years and more or less avant-
la-lettre. Engagement with the West would injure the peace time relations 
with Moscow seriously and the Russians would 
"not unreasonably regard the matter as a Swedish readiness to establish 
bases within its territory for the use of future enemies of Russia. 
Russia would have a strong interest in working against such a Swedish 
policy."173 
The question of the bases played an important role. That the Soviets did not 
want bases in Scandinavia is obvious. They would be too close to their 
borders. That was also realized in the West. Although the Americans pressed 
hard for bases in Greenland and Iceland they were much more reserved with 
regard to Denmark and Norway. They probably realized the Soviet sensitivity 
to this matter ' but on the other hand one had to prevent that Moscow 
obtained bases in Scandinavia. 
From the beginning of the SDU talks the Anglo-Americans appeared to 
have been withholding as regards bases. Already in June 1948 Lange declared 
that the English and Americans had not asked for bases in Scandinavia and 
that the only thing London and Washington were interested in was the denial 
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of bases to the Soviets. That declaration must have been a relief for 
Undén because in his view the Soviets would conceive bases as a threat and a 
provocation. Bases, in the vision of Undén, implied moreover the permanent 
presence of the West in Scandinavia so that the peninsula in fact would 
17R 
already be occupied before the war even had started. 
He remained skeptical about the assurances that the West was not 
interested in bases in Scandinavia because he foresaw that preparations would 
be made in peace time to enable the West to make use of Scandinavian 
territory as soon as a war broke out. There was to Undén little difference 
between "bases" and "positions". 
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"Bases are permanent stations while positions are points of support 
which can be used any time. The Soviet Union would be of the opinion 
that the USA had moved their positions close to its borders. That 
would have the effect of a provocation and bring about a Russian 
reaction."179 
Undén had foreseen the Soviet attitude pretty well. Already before the failure 
was an official fact the Soviets asked the Norwegian government in an note 
(29.01.1949) if she had considered the establishment of Western bases in 
Norway.180 
When Undén met Farquhar he pointed out that it was generally known how 
the Russians felt about "points of support" and that adherence to the Atlantic 
Pact should be interpreted as moving the American position further on to the 
Soviet borders. He had predicted a Russian reaction and he had been right. 
The Soviet reaction was the proof. Farquhar asked Undén what he thought 
about the Russian note to Oslo but Undén answered that he "had no special 
181 talent to interpret Russian notes."101 
When the Soviet ambassador Rodinov visited Undén the latter confirmed to 
share the view of his visitor that the USA now had bases to its disposal in 
Norway and accordingly had moved on to the borders of the Soviet Union. ° 
6.6. The Finnish Factor. 
The Finnish factor or "argument" has often been mentioned as one of the 
incentives for Sweden to stay neutral. The argument was hardly ever used by 
the members of the Swedish government and if they did it was merely for 
political reasons. It served as an alibi and could sometimes be useful in the 
"selling" of their foreign policy. Remarkable is that it were mainly non-
socialists who put forward this argument. One of them was ambassador 
Boheman. 
Boheman was suggested as the Foreign Minister to be in a liberal 
government if the social democrats should loose the elections of 1948. 
Privately he was pro Atlantic Pact but in function he always defended, as he 
was supposed to do, the policy of his government. In a conversation with 
Lovett and Benjamin Hulley, Chief Division of Northern European Affairs at 
the State Department, he said that 
"Sweden felt great reluctance to enter any sort of military alliance, 
because to do so would lead the Soviets to take counter-measures in 
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the belief that airfields in Sweden were being made available to the 
Western powers for attack on Russia. These counter-measures would 
include prompt Russian occupation of Finland. (..) As a result Russia 
would be right on the Swedish border necessitating continuous 
mobilization (..) and this would turn Sweden into a liability rather than 
a potential asset as it now is. Sweden believes that a major reason for 
the mild Soviet policy towards Finland is based on the theory that a 
harsh policy would frighten Scandinavia into close military cooperation 
with the West, and Sweden does not want to make any move which 
would lead to a harsh policy in Finland.' 
Boheman also tried to convince Hickerson and apparently with some success 
because the latter answered that the "argument about possible effects in 
Finland struck a very responsive cord with us.' Gunnar Hägglöf also (non 
socialist either) put the fate of the Finns forward as a motive for Sweden 
not to associate with the West and Bevin agreed with him that special 
consideration with regard to Finland was to be taken. OJ 
Undén himself used the argument during his meeting with Marshall in Paris 
and although Marshall despised neutrality he had no answer to this argu-
1 ftó 
ment which by Undén was used only as an alibi because it never was a 
real motive for his foreign policy. But the argument might have had some 
impact and might also have contributed to the fact that it was not unanimous 
considered desirable to have Sweden as a (full) member in the Atlantic Pact. 
The National Security Council advised that, although it was dissatisfied with 
the Swedish attitude 
"to refrain from forcing Sweden onto an attitude which would be 
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unnecessarily provocative toward the Soviet Union." ' 
And George Kennan doubted if it was good policy to press neighbouring 
countries to the Soviets into a pact when their neutrality in certain 
circumstances could be more desirable. As an example he mentioned Swe-
1 RR den. 0 The British however considered a Western allied Scandinavia more 
1RQ important as the independent position of Finland. Gumming was very 
skeptical about the argument and wondered if the Swedes believed the 
argument themselves. Also the military top of Sweden preferred adherence 
191 to the West above an independent position of Finland. 
Sweden did take Finland into consideration, however not for the sake of 
Finland but for its own sake. Quite concrete: a Soviet occupation of Finland 
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would have been regretted in the first place because of the fact that the 
Soviets would have considerably moved on to the Swedish borders and only in 
the second place because of the Finnish fate. 
Stockholm took also care to avoid utterances about Finland as much as 
1 Q2 
possible. The Finnish argument did simply not fit with the official Swedish 
foreign policy. After the failure Undén declared once more, and he had 
done so many times before, that the essence of his policy was to protect the 
own country against foreign aggression and to prevent it from being used as 
a basis for war operations. The conclusion as regards Finland can only be 
that Finland, being no part of the Swedish self-interest, was no motive for 
Undén's foreign policy. 
Immediately after Stalin's proposal for a Treaty of Friendship Undén had 
declared that Finland's situation would not influence his foreign policy. At 
another occasion he polemized with the Crown-Prince who considered the 
developments in Finland critical for the Swedish attitude towards the Western 
bloc.196 
In one of his most important documents on foreign policy in the post war 
area Undén does not even mention Finland. Boheman, who privately was of 
the opinion that a Soviet occupation of Finland could change the Swedish 
policy, was informed by Undén that he could make use of the Finnish 
argument but that it would not influence his policy in reality. Moreover 
Undén did not believe in a Russian occupation of Finland. In the eyes of 
Undén it was only a "hypothetical case." The Swedish Foreign Minister 
wondered if it had ever occurred to Boheman how the Soviets must feel if 
the "Baltic state of Sweden", which only by a small piece of water was 
separated from strategic vital Russian or Russian controlled territory, "would 
be integrated in the strategic system of the Western allies.' 7 0 
Illuminating for Undén's moderation in the sensitive Finnish matter is the 
following: 
"He (the South African ambassador) also wondered, if the pressure on 
Finland would not increase if Sweden would join a Western bloc. I 
(Undén) said that that was probable. The ambassador considered my 
points of view on the consequences for Finland very interesting" 
1QQ 
(though he himself had put forward them)."177 
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The Finnish historian and diplomat Max Jakobson has argued, quite rightly, 
that the neutrality of Finland was as important for Sweden as the Swedish 
neutrality was for Finland. He wondered if Sweden had stayed neutral "to 
save Finland from a greater dependence of Moscow" but his conclusion was 
negative. After all, he argued, the Swedes kept their neutrality even when the 
Soviets invaded Finland in 1939. Jacobson concludes that both countries took 
advantage of each other's neutrality. 
We still do not know why the Soviets acted so moderate as they did. Did 
Moscow fear a Swedish adherence to the West when they should occupy 
Finland? That does not seem very likely because if that would have been the 
case Moscow would probably have contacted Stockholm and warned Sweden to 
consider taking such a step. But the SDU, as well as the Atlantic Pact, have 
never been subject for Russian démarches, notes or pressure and accordingly 
the conclusion must be that Finland was never used as a means of pressure 
by the Soviets on Sweden. Does that also mean that Moscow never considered 
to draw Finland further into its sphere of influence? It seems quite unlikely 
that considerations towards Sweden stopped Stalin's eventual intentions to 
include Finland completely in the Soviet bloc. It is more reasonable to assume 
that an occupation of Finland did not serve Stalin's purposes. 
The Swedish embassies in Moscow and Helsinki reported that the Kremlin with 
the agreement first of all wanted to fill a gap in the Soviet defence system 
which was by then almost completed. Indeed. Why should the pragmatic 
Stalin, in order to fill the gap, have occupied Finland if he also could settle 
the problem in a cheaper and more peaceful way: by a Treaty of Friendship. 
For the definitive answer we will have to wait until glasnost also opens up 
the Soviet archives. ^ 
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CHAPTER 7. BETWEEN OSLO AND WASHINGTON. 
7.1 Lange pleads...SDU. 
On the fifth of February, a few days after the definite failure in Oslo, a 
Norwegian delegation, headed by Lange arrived in Washington. It had come 
to discuss the conditions for a Norwegian association with the Atlantic Pact. 
But in the first place it should, according to instructions of the Norwegian 
government, explore the possibilities of a SDU. 
The Norwegian delegation did what it was ordered to do and stressed 
orally through Lange the importance of a joint Scandinavian solution. But the 
reservation was made that a SDU could only be established with the complete 
agreement of the United States and the UK and provided that such a SDU 
"could obtain the necessary war materials for its armaments on lenient terms." 
The Norwegian delegation wholeheartedly asserted that it preferred a united 
Scandinavian bloc but Lange added at the same time that Norway was willing 
to accept a break of Scandinavian solidarity "if necessary". In fact this 
addendum "if necessary" made further negotiations superfluous: It was obvious 
to Washington that the Norwegians should choose the Atlantic Pact 
alternative if the US kept on rejecting furnishing weapon aid to a neutral 
SDU. There could be no misunderstanding about that. 
Through the weapon deliveries the US held the key to Norway's associa-
tion with Nato. Already a few days later, after hearings with the Pentagon 
and the future member countries of the Atlantic Pact, the State Department 
decided, as could be expected, to continue the old established policy. Dean 
Acheson informed president Truman on February 10 that: 
"We would assure them that an enthusiastic welcome awaited them 
either as participants in the drafting of....a pact or if they did not wish 
to do this in acceding to it later on." •' 
The Swedes had suspected Lange's intentions from the beginning and Boheman 
in Washington reported in complete bewilderment to Stockholm that: 
"For an old professional the Norwegian way of handling the entire 
Nordic question has been an awful experience. It has also created a 
situation where really nobody knows anything and where only the 
Russians can laugh, but that of course will really be 'und der Teufel 
lacht dazu'.First they let the Americans know through Morgenstieme 
(Norw. Ambassador) and official declarations that Norway is utterly 
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keen on joining an Adantic Treaty, that was not difficult to foresee 
what it would mean and also what it might give. Then they pass 
through the Nordic phase with different views in Karlstad and 
Copenhagen, reject an alliance-free treaty in Oslo, immediately get an 
hang-over, send Lange himself to Washington, on the surface in order 
to inform themselves about the meaning of the Atlantic Treaty, in 
reality to say that what was rejected in Oslo would probably be 
preferable. Then they ask a number of questions about the Atlantic 
Pact that could not possibly be answered, and then they return home in 
order to think."4 
Erlander also was perplexed that the Norwegians after the failure in Oslo 
started to plead in Washington exactly for what they had repudiated in their 
own capital a week before. The question is of course: what lay behind this 
stratagy? It is not likely that the Soviet notes of January 29 and February 5 
where Norway was warned, be it in moderate terms, against an association 
with the Atlantic Pact had influenced the Norwegian attitude. Moscow 
appeared to be particularly concerned about the possibility of Oslo putting 
bases at the disposal of the West. Norway, in its tum, had let known that it 
would not do so unless it was attacked or threatened with attack. Its 
probably more reasonable to assume that those notes only have strengthened 
the Norwegian belief that an adherence to the Atlantic Pact was the best 
solution for Norway's security. 
The Russian maneuver had made the Norwegian adherence a question of 
prestige, not only for Norway but also for those circles who considered a 
"no" of Norway and Denmark to the Pact as a success for the Soviets. Bevin 
called a neutral SDU "a major victory for Soviet Russia". 
Beck-Friis offers a reasonable explanation for the Norwegian way of acting: 
He believed that Lange had travelled to Washington because he was afraid 
that the three Scandinavian ambassadors would explain the SDU failure in 
Washington: 
"When at the Oslo meeting he first heard 'our friend' Morgenstieme's, 
generally speaking, as pompous as void speech and explanation and 
thereafter Boheman's extremely effectful and out of the ordinary 
convincing part of discussion, Lange, I believe, became afraid that 
Boheman would be able to win the game and get the USA over to the 
Swedish line. I would be inclined to guess that Lange departed in the 
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first place for Washington to try to prevent that the State Department 
would hold out the prospect of any concessions to a neutral Northern 
union." 
But the principal reason of Lange's plea for a SDU had according to Beck-
Friis entirely been dictated by: 
"regard to the opposition in his own party and by a wish to be able to 
assert before the party that he did everything to establish a Scandi-
navian union, but that, owing to the non-liability from the side of the 
USA to sell weapons, it had unfortunately proved to be impossible, and 
for that reason Norway had no other choice but joining the Atlantic 
Pact."10 
This matches what the Norwegian ambassador in London, Prebensen, told 
Bevin at the beginning of February. Within Lange's own party, Arbeiderpar-
tiet, there was a considerable group that had not made up its mind yet with 
regard to the Atlantic Pact. Lange had therefore, so Prebensen told to Bevin, 
in order to preserve the unity within the party.included an issue concerning 
the SDU.11 
Also Sivert Nielsen, secretary at the Norwegian embassy in Washington, 
sketched in the presence of CE. Rogers of the State Department the split 
within the Arbeiderpartiet and the impact that the SDU failure had made in 
Norway. John Hickerson however has maintained that Nielsen had come in the 
first place to inform if the Norway-in-the-Atlantic-Pact attitude of the State 
Department was still the same. 
Domestic politics have certainly played a role with regard to Lange's SDU 
appeal in Washington. Another question is as to how far the messenger and 
his plea can be taken seriously. Did Lange not play the devil's advocate? In a 
conversation with Hägglöf and the Danish ambassador in London, Reventlov, 
Lange asserted that he had been sincere in trying to win understanding for a 
ι λ SDU "with a view to obtaining a statement about weapon deliveries.' At his 
arrival in Washington he told Boheman something similar. Later, Boheman 
expressed as his opinion that Lange's hurry to travel to Washington was 
inspired by his fear that the US support for Norway's association with the 
Western Pact was going to give way. 
Lange's statements are categorical and that is not surprising. If he had a 
certain, private, strategy in mind he could hardly be expected to tell the 
Swedes what he was really up to. As long as no convincing indications can be 
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found for Lange's sudden conversion to the Swedish line, an allyfree SDU, 
there remains place for doubts about the sincerity of his statements. 
Lange did not, more or less, sabotage the instructions from his own govern-
ment (or was it part of the government's strategy?) by stating at the very 
beginning of the talks that if the establishment of a SDU appeared to be 
impossible Norway was prepared to join the Western Security Pact? It is quite 
possible that he wanted to return home with an unambiguous American 
answer: weapon aid for a neutral SDU was absolutely out of the question. 
Accordingly there was only one way left, also the opposition could hardly 
have drawn another conclusion: adherence to the Atlantic Pact as the only 
acceptable alternative. 
In 1963 Lange was asked if he had not considered it natural that the 
Americans had refused weapon aid to a neutral SDU, (like they had been 
doing from the beginning) as long as they were not put before such an union 
as a fait accompli. Lange answered that the definite rejection of the SDU had 
been impossible for Norway as long as it had not got the final, negative 
answer from the West with regard to material aid. The question had to be 
asked so that Oslo could definitively make up its mind and that's why the 
Norwegian government had chosen to follow that way in Washington. When 
the talks in Washington were finished there appeared to be no further 
17 prerequisites for a SDU whatsoever. It seems to back up the theory that 
Lange's trip was necessary in order to convince the antagonists that there 
was no solution for Norway's security but an Atlantic pact. 
In the above referred conversation of Lange with Hägglöf and Reventlov in 
London Lange stated that he saw few possibilities for the establishment of a 
SDU and that it was now up to the Storting to decide. He himself was of the 
IR 
opinion that Norway "ought to hasten slowly" into the Atlantic Pact. That 
harmonized perfectly with what Bevin had advised him: "do not rush matters 
but don't wait too long.' " 
Boheman in Washington explained Acheson the Swedish point of view but he 
did not plead for a re-opening of the SDU talks. He got explicit orders 
from Stockholm not to do that. Sweden was afraid that it could be misunder-
stood if it should propose to start new talks about the SDU and the weapon 
question. Undén saw no reason for that neither because the view of Stock-
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holm and Oslo with regard to the actual character of a defence union was 
still the same. New talks would resolve nothing and would consequently be 
senseless. 
The Danish ambassador, Kauffmann, however still fought for a neutral SDU 
and he succeeded in turning over the future Foreign minister, John Foster 
Dulles, at that time foreign expert for the Republican Party, to his point of 
view. But he could not convince the State Department although they 
expressed themselves much more carefully and moderately than they had done 
in the past. Kauffmann had been instructed by the Danish government to 
try to re-open the SDU negotiations but he had no results. Thereupon the 
Danes decided to take a last chance in Stockholm and proposed a kind of 
amputated SDU: a Swedish-Danish Defense Union. 
7.2 Swedish-Danish discussions on a Defence Union. 
Already in the autumn of 1948, when the SDU talks were still in full swing, 
the Danish Minister of Defence, Rasmus Hansen, had to Vougt expressed his 
hopes of a Swedish-Danish Defence Union in case the tripartite would fail. 
Denmark wanted a kind of de facto guarantee from Sweden. Two weeks 
after the failure in Oslo Hans Hedtoft asked Erlander about the prospects of 
a Swedish-Danish Defence Union (SDDU). Foreign minister Rasmussen also 
27 asked Undén on this matter during a meeting in Paris on February 16. 
It was the final Danish endeavour to escape the Atlantic Pact membership. 
Or was it a tactical maneuver in front of the Danish public and political 
opponents preceding the step which had become almost inevitable? Domestic 
political reasons played a certain role. Dardel reported to the Stockholm 
Foreign Office with reference to a meeting with Hedtoft that things was 
becoming delicate for his social democratic minority government. They did not 
want to cooperate with the communists, who were ami Nato, while among the 
opposition many pro Nato members could be found. If the opponents should 
form a pro Western Pact coalition in the Folketing there was a real danger 
that his social democratic party would become a minority. Hedtoft had also 
complained that the US absolutely refused to abandon their bases on 
Greenland, also when Denmark should decide not to choose Nato. ° In other 
words: Hedtoft foresaw a political defeat if he did not play the game smartly. 
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There was never a ghost of a chance that a Swedish Danish Defence Union 
would come into being. Also Copenhagen was aware of that although 
Hedtoft seemed, according to Erlander, quite optimistic about the outcome. υ 
Neither Norway nor Sweden had made a secret of their opinion about 
Denmark with regard to military matters. Denmark was extremely difficult to 
defend and was in fact nothing more than a burden for the other two 
-11 
countries. In fact both countries would have preferred even to leave 
Denmark out of a SDU but that was, for political and psychological reasons, 
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considered impossible. 
Already before the initial SDU talks, Undén had advised Rasmussen about 
his negative feelings concerning Swedish military cooperation with Denmark. J 
Erlander noted in his diary that a SDDU was "of course" out of the question 
although he in his heart of hearts did not believe that the risks would 
increase because of an engagement with Denmark. 4 
Yngve Möller, the biographer of Undén, however refers to Erlander having 
asserted that the Soviets could conceive a SDDU as a disguised association 
with the West and that America and England could consider it a desperate 
Swedish attempt to prevent the association of Denmark with the Atlantic 
Pact.35 
Undén assured the Danish Ambassador, Svenningsen, that he privately, "not 
as foreign minister", could imagine a more "extensive union: economy, politics, 
not only defence.'00 
Sverker Aström, concluded in a memorandum that the political and military 
risks for Sweden in case of a SDDU, compared with a SDU, would be the 
same but without any of the advantages that a SDU could have had, neither 
in time of war nor peace. Positive was, in times of peace, that Sweden could 
avoid the inescapable political isolation be it only to a very limited extent. 
But what pleaded most against a SDDU was that Sweden, through 
Denmark, could be drawn into a war, which otherwise, "at least for a time", 
could have been avoided. Sweden would "unnecessarily" be involved in 
hostilities. As an advantage might be considered that an isolated Soviet attack 
on the SDDU countries could provoke a world wide conflict which in its turn 
meant a diminishing of the chances of such an attack. 
The thought behind that consideration was that the West would not accept 
Soviet naval bases on the Danish Atlantic coast. Also Helge Jung had 
warned, before the SDU talks even had finished, against cooperation with 
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Denmark because it would mean increasing risks for Sweden without cor­
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responding advantages. Denmark was impossible to defend. From the 
Swedish military point of view it was deemed most desirable that Denmark, 
like Norway, should adhere to the Atlantic pact. That would have been, in 
the eyes of the military establishment, the second best solution. 
Also the Foreign committee and the meeting of party leaders voted against 
a SDDU. Undén informed Svenningsen on March 1 1949 about the negative 
decision. But Hedtoft was, through Erlander, already aware of the Swedish 
г • 43 point of view. -^  
The SDDU had never been a serious alternative with regard to Swedish 
security because it did in no way serve the interests of the country. That 
fact, rather than considerations with feelings in Moscow, London and 
Washington, was the ultimate reason for the rejection of the SDDU proposal. 
Folkpartiet leader Ohlin had voted against a SDDU but propagated at the 
same the desirability of military cooperation with Denmark and Norway. 
Erlander wondered if that had something to do with signs of early senility 
which also would explain a part of his "enormous tediousness". 
Neither the military did abandon the thought of cooperation with the 
Scandinavian members of the Nato and general Svedlund spoke in May 1949 
in front of Erlander still about "limited military cooperation with Norway". 
The Prime Minister committed to his diary that he hoped that Defence 
Minister Vougt now finally could "collect the rests of his courage" to tell the 
generals that there could be no question of military collaboration with 
Norway. Also American weapon aid to Sweden, by way of deliveries 
deliveries to Norway, were rejected. 
On March 3 1949 the Norwegian Storting voted in favour of Norway's 
participation in the Atlantic Pact. Denmark had now the choice between 
isolation and association to NATO. On March 4 it was decided that Rasmussen 
should travel to Washington to make preparations for Denmark's adherence to 
the Atlantic pact. He returned on the 17th of March and on the 24th and 
25th of March the First and Second Chamber of the Danish Folketing voted 
49 for signing of the NATO pact. 
Iceland followed, as was expected, the example of the Danish homeland. On 
April 1949 Norway, Denmark and Iceland became, along with the Benelux, 
Canada, Italy, France, England, Portugal and the USA, the original members 
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of NATO. Both Denmark and Norway refused to have Allied bases, and 
accordingly no nuclear weapons, on their home territory in peace time. 
7.3 English and American reactions on the failure. 
"Relief' might be the most appropriate word to describe the reaction in 
London when it was certain that Norway would join the Western Pact. The 
danger of a neutral SDU, a "major disaster" according to Gladwynn Jebb , 
Head of the Economic and Reconstruction Department of the foreign Office, 
had passed. The reaction of Hankey was amazingly hypocritic: he called the 
failure in front of Hägglöf a "real tragedy". 
The Swedish ambassador expressed his surprise. Had England not got what it 
first and foremost wanted: The Atlantic Pact membership of Norway and 
Denmark. Hankey's answer to Hägglöf's remark was not very sincere either 
because he knew that it was unreal: he had preferred a SDU where Norway 
and Denmark at the same time were member of the NATO. 
Personally he had never been eager about the membership of the Swedes. 
It should have situated the Nato too close to the Russian borders. 
Hankey's "hypocrisy" may have been inspired by his, as "privately" expressed, 
desire that Sweden should give military support to its neighbours and enter 
some kind of military cooperation for the defence of Northern Europe, also 
after Norway and Denmark had joined the Atlantic Pact. 
That wish might also explain Hankey's remark of late February when he, 
during a visit to Hägglöf, declared that the Swedish-British relations were 
"very satisfactory". The Swedish ambassador answered that he was glad to 
hear that but that the Swedish point of view had not changed a bit. But 
Hankey appeared not to be eager to start a discussion about the subject all 
53 over again because it did serve no purpose anymore. The situation repeated 
itself once more, when the Foreign Office, through Robin Hankey, now 
considered the situation to be "very satisfactory". And this time Hankey was 
in the mood to give an answer to Hägglöf's "why". In the autumn and winter 
the British authorities had been 
"seriously worried in front of with the possibility that Sweden would 
bring Norway and Denmark respectively to a kind of neutral or alliance 
free group. When it had become evident that Denmark and Norway had 
gone their own way and adhered themselves to the Atlantic group, the 
situation in relation to Sweden had also cleared up." 
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Many "deeply rooted misunderstandings" had disappeared. Also Orme Sargent 
and Gladwynn Jebb stated after the failure frankly that England had been 
afraid that Sweden could have drawn Norway and Denmark into a neutral SDU 
which would have meant a "real adversity for British protracted diplomacy". 
They admitted the importance of the Norwegian and Danish waters for the 
protection for Great Britain's own security. There had also been an emotion-
ally tinged component with regard to neutrality which should not be 
underestimated. For many British it was objectionable that a Western nation 
placed itself outside "the group of fighting democracies" or the "general union 
of democracies". 
Also Bevin asserted that he had preferred a Western linked SDU -that was 
nothing new of course, he had said that many times before- but added now 
that Sweden, at least for the time being, especially with regard to Finland 
had certain grounds to stay outside the Atlantic Pact. 
Great Britain had won the tug-of-war with Sweden about Norway and 
appeared not to be rancorous, which she neither could have afford. Sweden, 
with its strong defence and sound economy and moreover her willingness to 
defend her territory, was indispensable for the defence of the Northern area. 
Besides it was the cheapest solution for the West. Sweden did not claim 
weapon aid, at a time when there was a great shortage of supplies, and paid 
with hard currency for the advanced defence material she ordered. The 
prophecy of Erlander and Undén that the West should be interested in a 
strong Sweden for their own sake ' had come true. 
The reaction of the Americans on the shattering of the SDU was less 
outspoken. The opinion of the US about the SDU had been negative and it 
still was soat the beginning of February although a slight turning of the tide 
seemed to be under way. The rejections of the State Department seemed less 
outspoken than before and appeared to be more cautious and restrained. The 
CO 
shift of policymakers at State, was one of the reasons, another might have 
been that the State Department was confronted with a storm of critíque in 
the American press for their obstinate endeavors to draw Scandinavia, 
especially Norway and Denmark, into a Western Alliance without, when it 
59 
came to it, giving them any solid guarantees. 
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In a letter (12.2.1949) to Undén ambassador Boheman expressed as his 
opinion that he believed that the US preferred a Northern Alliance which was 
factually free but which could be shown to the world as associated, in one 
way or another, to the West. Then the Russians could not claim it as a 
victory for their politics. Boheman reported that the Americans were 
confused about the behaviour of Lange and his delegation and Hickerson had 
told him that he could not get the hang of it. Hickerson admitted in front of 
Boheman also that the US were interested in a military strong Sweden that 
was able to defend itself. 
Yet Boheman considered his talks with Hickerson not so "fruitful" because 
he "permanently recurs to his moral ideological motives". At the end of 
February Boheman was convinced that a neutral SDU as for the Americans 
had been realizable. In a relatively short time he had been able to secure 
understanding for the Swedish SDU idea. Boheman was convinced that within 
the State Department the beginning of a reversal could be noticed and that if 
Lange really had wanted the SDU, he had been pleading for in Washington, it 
could have been realized. 
Also Geir Lundestad has pointed out to the changing attitudes at the State 
Department.·3 Had a SDU, in retrospect, belonged to the possibilities? We will 
never know but what we do know is that the Swedes and the Danes blamed 
the Norwegians, Lange and Hauge, for the failure while Norway on its turn 
depicted Sweden as the malefactor. 
7.4. The failure. The view of Sweden, Denmark and Norway. 
Norway was in the eyes of Sweden, and also of Denmark, responsible for the 
ultimate failure of the SDU. 
Norway, through Lange, in its tum blamed Sweden. The central issue 
between Norway and Sweden was whether assistance from abroad, "an opening 
to the West", in case of war should be arranged in advance or not. In Norway 
there has been a debate whether Lange wanted a Western linked SDU or 
preferred the pure Atlantic Pact membership. By now, or at least for the 
time being, it has been clearly established that Lange would have favoured a 
SDU with an opening to the West. 5 
So in fact both countries wanted a SDU. But both wanted a SDU which was 
cut according to their own specific needs, which in practice appeared to be 
incompatible. 
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Has Sweden at any time been prepared to abandon its strict policy of 
neutrality during the negotiatìons? In the Swedish sources that I consulted I 
have found no indications that Undén Erlander, or the government in 
Stockholm in general, ever have played with the thought to reconsider their 
foreign policy, just as little as Lange has been willing to abandon their, in 
advance arranged, opening to the West. The (mis)understanding in Stockholm 
of the Norwegian point of view is quite astonishing, especially if we see it in 
the light of what is put forward in the "Lange debate". " 
The perceptions of Stockholm seem for a great part to have been 
generated by her own foreign service but at the same time it must be noticed 
that Undén and Erlander shared those ideas. Johann Beck-Friis considered 
Prime Minister Gerhardsen an irresolute man and in a letter to Undén he 
wrote that Gerhardsen was not the strong leader that the country in this 
troublesome times needed. He always went along with his Swedish and Danish 
colleagues, as long as he was with them, but once back in Oslo he adopted, 
influenced by Lange, another point of view. 
Also Erlander put more confidence in Gerhardsen's ideas than in his deeds 
and confirms the idea of Beck-Friis about Gerhardsen as a irresolute man. 
Undén in his tum considered Gerhardsen to be on the Swedish line but he 
too pictured him as a man who could not make decisions. The Norwegian 
ambassador Bergersen has indicated to Undén that there were controversaries 
between Gerhardsen and Lange concerning the SDU. 
With regard to Lange Beck-Friis was of the opinion that never before such an 
important decision had been forced through by only one man. He was 
convinced that Lange had aimed at the Atlantic Pact membership from the 
beginning. If he sometimes pleaded for a SDU, he did so only to demonstrate 
to the opposition in his own social democratic party that he tried very hard 
to reach a Scandinavian solution, but that it was impossible. Beck-Friis was 
almost convinced that Lange had exploited the rumours about an impending 
Russian move in the spring of 1948, for his own ends: to associate Norway to 
the West.' The tone and words in Beck-Friis' letter are far from objective 
but there is no doubt that he was convinced that Lange was the man who 
aligned Norway purposefully to the NATO. 
In his letter to Undén he remarked that Lange was not eager about a Danish 
connection to NATO because he wanted the honour of being one of the 7 
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original NATO members for himself and did not want to share it with any 
other Scandinavian country. 
"His personal ambition is great and the publicity he got in the world 
press in the past months as 'the courageous leader' for the 'brave 
Norway' etc. has probably given him very much satisfaction, though he 
certainly would have preferred being celebrated as the leader of 
Scandinavia as well: Lange has intervened quietly and purposefully, 
without getting carried away and without hesitation , as soon as there 
were risks for closer Scandinavian cooperation. (...) He has played his 
cards extremely well and has been eager to avoid making appearances 
of leading the public opinion, which in fact he has done. In his public 
speeches he has always gone step by step with his ear against the 
ground, listening if the public opinion followed.' ^ 
Beck-Friis considered Lange an excellent speaker: 
"During his last speech in the Storting in favour of connection to the 
Atlantic Pact he appeared equally convincing as one year ago (20.1.-
1948) when he energetically defended the entirely contrary policy 
(...)."73 
Already in the beginning of September 1948 Beck-Friis had warned Undén 
that he distrusted Lange's intention: He took part in the SDU talks because 
he was convinced that they would lead nowhere, but he was forced to par-
ticipate because of the heavy criticism he would otherwise have been subject 
to from the neutral SDU minded parliamentary members of his own party. 
According to Beck-Friis Oslo continued the SDU negotiations for the sake of 
appearances only, hoping thereby that the outside would get the impression 
7S that the Swedish unflexibility was responsible for the failure. 
Also Undén himself was convinced that Lange had worked for pure Nato 
membership from the beginning'" and during the Karlstad Meeting he 
committed to his diary: 
"How do the Norwegians consider the results? Have they any thoughts 
about giving up association with the Atlantic Pact? I hardly think so. 
From the beginning they have thought about the possibility of drawing 
Sweden in the wake. When they noticed that they not succeeded they 
were finished with the Scandinavian union. Yet they wanted to know 
just how far Sweden would go. They probably never thought that we 
would be willing to go along with a defence union. If this is the case, 
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at least as far as the government is concerned they think it necessary 
to follow the line a bit further. Probably they expect that everything 
will break down on USA's stance to the war material question." 
In a conversation with the Danish Ambassador in Stockholm Undén could do 
nothing but agree when the former remarked that Lange consciously had 
worked for Atlantic Pact membership. ' ° 
Erlander was also of that opinion and alleged that Lange had never taken 
the Swedish proposal seriously and when in Copenhagen the chances for a 
79 SDU definitively were gone he called it "Lange's day of triumph". 
That Sweden nevertheless attended the last SDU meeting in Oslo (29-30 
January)had not been for political and psychological reasons only but also "to 
give the SDU a decent funeral".80 Erlander has called the failure his "first 
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big political defeat". In the opinion of Erlander Lange had won and 
Erlander wondered if Lange therefore could be called a "distinguished politici-
an". The Prime Minister answered his own question affirmatively but added 
bitterly that 
"may be it is not so difficult to deceive unsuspecting friends who do 
not even dream to play the game with marked cards and that one of 
the partners does not follow the rules of the game."0 
Neither Erik Boheman had any confidence in the Norwegian intentions: 
Norway had already made its decision and Boheman advised Stockholm "to 
grin and bear it". After the definite failure in Oslo, Boheman's distrust had 
turned into complete bewilderment when Lange went to Washington to plead 
for a SDU. In Stockholm the picture of Lange as the evil genius behind the 
failure was finally confirmed by Gunnar Hägglöf in London who had felt that 
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Norway had wanted to join Nato all the time. 
The pro West role of Hauge and accordingly his part in the failure was also 
taken up discussion. Beck-Friis described him principally as an ardent 
supporter of Lange. Hauge is not pictured in that way in the diaries of Undén 
although also Undén was convinced that Jens Hauge was an outspoken pro 
West. Different again is the approach of Erlander who puts much more 
weight on Hauge who, according to Erlander had dominated the Norwegian 
87 
delegation at the important Karlstad conference. But he held both respon-
sible: 
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"The responsibility that Lange and Hauge take upon themselves ought to 
00 
be feeling horrible but seems not to trouble them.' 
The Swedish government considered the Norwegians responsible for the failure 
of the SDU because of their unwillingness to join a non aligned defence 
union. From the Swedish point of view it did not matter at all if Lange 
wanted a SDU with "an opening to the West" or pure NATO membership. Both 
options were incompatible with the Swedish policy of non-alignment. The 
Swedes explained the failure partly by referring to the deep mistrust that the 
Norwegians felt with regard to Sweden and which had arisen during the 
period of the former Personal Union, when the Norwegians were under the 
Swedish crown. The king told Undén about the different Norwegian mentali-
ty: 
"You can understand that it was difficult in former days when one 
came to Norway as Crown-Prince. They thought different from us. It 
was like changing skin. But one was of course forced to do that in that 
QO 
capacity.' 
The deep distrust that had arisen during the years of the former Personal 
Union must not be overstressed but neither must it be overlooked. Erlander 
probably referred to that period when he wrote that 
"much of the Norwegian point of view is emotionally determined by the 
repugnance of the Norwegians to accept advice and even less instruc-
tions from Sweden."y 
London and Washington might also have made use of this Norwegian sensitive-
ness. Boheman, looking back at the negotiations, expressed as his view that: 
"The main reason for the failure is to be found in Norwegian politics. 
From the Norwegian side they have quite simply never wanted a 
Northern cooperation that infringed in the least Norway's possibilities 
to be a member in a bigger security organization. (..) The perspective 
of a Northern military alliance, where Sweden because of his military 
superiority would be going to play the dominating role, has appeared 
particularly frightening.' J 
Where Norwegian research has established that Oslo preferred a Western 
associated SDU, the opinion of the Swedish policymakers was that Norway 
consciously and purposefully had worked for a Norwegian adherence to Nato. 
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The Swedish experience was that their SDU concept had failed because 
Norway doomed their proposals to fail. 
Also the "April syndrome" has played a role but it seems that the influence 
of the Second World War (one cannot speak of a syndrome with regard to 
Sweden) on the Swedes has been at least as big as it was on Norway. The 
April syndrome refers to the shattering of the Danish an Norwegian neutrality 
by the Germans on the 9th of April 1940. The event caused considerable 
doubts about the desirability of a recontinuation of the old policy and a 
repetition of April 1940 was feared, be it this time with the Soviet Union as 
aggressor. Krister Wahlbäck has paid much attention to what he calls the 9th 
од 
of April syndrome. 
In what might be his most important declaration on post war foreign policy 
Undén puts forward that: 
"the experience of the two past world wars cannot simply be denied as 
being meaningless. On the contrary, this experience is of great 
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weight.' 
Both wars had strengthened the Swedish credo that involvement in war could 
be avoided. At least for a time. In the light of the last World War, it is not 
surprising that Norway, with her experience, threw herself into the arms of 
the West on which tacit support she had relied ever since the Crimean War in 
the nineteenth century. 
Denmark however, although having been occupied by the Nazi's, preferred the 
Swedish option. The reasons for that were of a domestic political, 
psychological, historical and sentimental nature. " According to Erlander, the 
view that Denmark, or at least Hedtoft, should have preferred a non-aligned 
SDU is not correct. Erlander believed that the Danish Prime Minister was one 
of the actors in the SDU game who was most pro West although he hid that 
by acting as the intermediary between East and West. ' Hedtoft should also 
have said that he was 
"with the Swedes against the Norwegians, when I am with the Swedes, 
and with the Norwegians against the Swedes, when I am with the 
Norwegians." 
Erlander was upset and noticed in his diary: "Hell!" Hedtoft played "double". 
Hedtoft's role is not confirmed by what is said here above about his activities 
during the SDU negotiations and neither by Undén in his diaries and 
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memoranda; rather the opposite. There are however other sources which 
confirm that Hedtoft assured the English and American administration that he 
should try to get the Swedes over to a "Western" SDU. 
But it is far from sure that Hedtoft meant what he said. It might as well 
have been a part of his tactics to keep London and Washington calm so that 
the negotiations could proceed undisturbed. 
It has been established by Nikolaj Petersen that Denmark preferred the 
Swedish option. The second choice was a Western oriented SDU while the 
Atlantic Pact membership was the least attractive solution. Also Petersen 
has pointed out that the central role of Hans Hedtoft is still not totally 
clear. υ Hedtoft himself advised ambassador Dardel that he held Norway 
responsible for the failure: 
"The Norwegian position was forced through by Lange who for the 
greater part of his life has lived abroad, and by minister of defence 
Hauge, who was still influenced by the sufferings he had been exposed 
to during his stay in concentration camps. J 
Dardel, or rather Hedtoft, was wrong about the facts both concerning Lange 
and Hauge but it illustrates how incorrect information can contribute to a 
false picture of the actual situation. 
And finally: Who was to blame according to Norway? Oslo got its "opening to 
the West" be it not in the way it had preferred: via an aligned SDU. So 
actually the leading policymakers in Oslo had not much reason for blaming 
the others for the failure. Erlander has maintained that Lange "internally has 
pushed the argument" that the Swedes the whole time had realized that 
weapon deliveries to a non-aligned SDU were not to be expected and that 
accordingly the "Swedish offer therefore was not seriously meant". ^ 
Lange might have made his utterance for internal use in order to defend his 
own choice for the Atlantic Pact. But he cannot be blamed for not having 
warned the Swedes that if they should stick to their unconditional neutrality 
there could not be any question of a SDU. The Swedish SDU proposal was 
absolutely seriously meant. The non-aid question was not, in any case not the 
weight it was to get, to be foreseen at the time of proposal. 
But the final conclusion must be that the SDU negotiations were bound to 
fail from the beginning because of the opposite points of view (alignment in 
some form versus absolute non-alignment) in respectively Oslo and Stockholm. 
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Copenhagen played no role of any significance. Neither Oslo nor Stockholm 
should abandon their initial views and for that reason the viability of the 
SDU proposal was next to zero. 
The story of the SDU negotiations and the ultimate failure was also the story 
of distorted views, distrust, personal resentment, affections and miscalcula-
tions. Together with historical dominants, national self interest, strategic 
considerations, British and American pressure, threats of non-aid and Cold 
War outlooks they provide the ingredients for the story why Sweden stayed 
neutral whereas Norway and Denmark sought their security in the West. 
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CHAPTER 8. THE AMERICAN EMBARGO POLICY AND SWEDISH 
NEUTRALITY. 
8.1 History and motives of the embargo policy. 
The first legal steps on the road to the Embargo policy were taken in 
Washington at the tum of the year 1947-1948. The Marshall Aid, which was 
announced in June 1947, may be considered as the first phase in this 
Economic warfare against the Soviet Union that gradually should become 
known as Embargo Policy. From the end of 1947 onwards licenses from the 
US Department of Commerce became necessary for all US exports to Eastern 
Europe. Commodities which were considered to have strategic value could no 
longer be shipped (or re-exported by third countries) to the Soviet Union or 
its satellites. 
What are "strategic" goods? A simple definition does not exist. With regard to 
products as tanks, armoured cars, bombers, tanks, ammunition and explosives 
there is little confusion but what about steel, rubber or simply food? Steel 
can be used for peaceful purposes but also for the manufacture of for 
instance air craft carriers, rubber is used for tires of military vehicles and 
plane but it can also be utilized for wheel chairs. Even food can be of 
strategic value. Soldiers keep themselves in good fighting condition by using 
proper food. So it is obvious that almost any commodity can be labelled as 
"strategic". 
Two World Wars have also taught us the lesson that almost any commodity 
can be important or at least of some use for the war potential of the adver-
sary. The American export licensing regulations of December 31, 1947 and 
January 15, 1948 became effective on the first of March 1948. The directives 
had been scheduled indeed for that date although they later often have been 
explained as a reaction on the communist takeover in Prague. The principle 
motive behind the embargo policy was to influence the East - West trade 
which on its tum must be seen in the light of the ever growing Cold War 
sentiments. Communism had to be contained and the embargo policy func-
tioned as a rational means of upholding the American power supremacy vis à 
vis Russia. From the beginning it has been evident that a unilateral US 
embargo would be ineffective and that the help and support of the Western 
Europeans was required. But Western Europe displayed little enthusiasm for 
the new US policy. The reason for that was simple: Their trade with Eastern 
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Europe was too important. Too, the Western Europeans had, much more than 
the US, large vested interests in Eastern Europe which they might risk to 
loose in case of an embargo. It was obvious that Europe had to be forced 
into cooperation but that did not happen to offer un surmountable difficulties 
for the US. 
The Marshall Aid, which the Europeans deemed indispensable for their 
economic recovery, was linked directly to the embargo policy. Cooperate or 
perish. Cooperate in the embargo policy or otherwise the Marshall Aid will be 
stopped (section 117 (d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948). Export 
control became a condition for economic aid. 
The European unwillingness to participate did not mean that they were less 
interested in the containment of communism than the US. The fear in Western 
Europe for the extension of communism was great, because they would be the 
first victims of an eventual Soviet expansion, but it was seriously doubted if 
an embargo policy was the proper solution. Western Europe argued that the 
policy could not be implemented in a realistic way and that it neither would 
hurt the East so much that it would be willing to change its policy. Besides: 
it would hurt Western Europe as much as Eastern Europe and probably even 
more. And finally: the foreign trade of Moscow was of such relative 
importance that it could not be expected to influence Stalin's decisionmaking. 
The countries in the Soviet sphere were indeed much more depended on their 
foreign trade than Moscow but it was also realized that their influence in the 
Kremlin was practically nihil. 
8.2. The OEEC and CoCom. 
The nations that profited from the Marshall Aid were organized in the 
Organization for European Economic Organization (OEEC) in which also 
Switzerland and Sweden were represented although the Swiss did not accept 
any economic assistance att all. The aid that Sweden received was more 
symbolic than substantial. 
In the summer of 1948 the US started negotiations with the OEEC 
countries which finally should result in the decision to establish an organiza-
tion which should become known as the CG-CoCom (Consultative Group-
Coordinating Committee), shortly referred to as CoCom. The CoCom, installed 
in Paris on November 22, 1949 coordinated the embargo policy which the 
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Europeans after hard bargaining with the US had agreed upon. Embargo lists 
were made which became effective on January 1, 1950. There were three 
different types of lists: 
a.) commodities which under no circumstances were allowed to be exported to 
communist countries 
b.) commodities which were allowed to be exported in limited quantities and 
c.) commodities which should be kept under surveillance. 
The CoCom operated in complete secrecy, even the name of the organization 
was until 1953 classified, and it had neither a legal charter nor enforcement 
powers. Sweden, represented by Dag Hammarskjöld, and also Switzerland, had 
participated in the talks which finally had led to CoCom but they did not join 
the organization because both countries could not compromise their neutral 
status by taking part in economic warfare. It was of course important for the 
US that both Sweden and Switzerland were in some way or another connected 
to the CoCom. The danger that the other Europeans, which had been forced 
to cooperate, should use those two industrialized states as a transit station, 
was by no means inconceivable. 
That the CoCom operated in complete secrecy had also the advantage, as 
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson has observed, that domestic debates in the member 
countries were avoided and that parliamentary approval was not needed. Too 
it offered neutrals like Sweden the opportunity to conclude a gentlemen's 
agreement with the US, in exchange for certain favours. The US had some 
effective means of pressure to its disposal in order to compel the reluctant 
neutrals into cooperation: Sanctions on the national economies, sanctions on 
private undertakings and direct negotiations with the pertinent governments 
and business interests. Denial of essential raw materials, machinery and export 
licenses had as a matter of fact become an approved weapon since the 
realization of the Ryssavtalet. 
Also the non-aid question during the SDU negotiations must be seen in the 
light of that policy of denial. With regard to Sweden the implementation of 
the policy of denial and pressure on business circles had began long before 
7 
anybody had ever heard of the embargo policy. 
We will first try to answer the question in how far the administration in 
Stockholm was willing to participate in the embargo policy and then turn to 
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the problem in how far the private Swedish enterprises were used by 
Washington in order to reach the best possible result for their policy. 
8.3 Embargo policy and neutrality in practice. 
Discretion was the catchword of the Swedish government with regard to the 
embargo policy. Stockholm received the US embargo lists as "information 
material"(from January 1949 onwards) but despite all discretion and secrecy 
the Soviet Union appeared soon to be aware of the American efforts to 
involve Sweden in their embargo policy. The matter was reported by the 
Soviet news agency Tass, as early as March 1949. 
After the formation of CoCom a decree (May 1950) on general exports 
control was issued in Sweden which gave the government discretionary 
licensing powers. The Americans appeared to have been particularly concerned 
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with deliveries of special steel, iron ore and roller and ball bearings. But 
already since November 1949 a decree had been in effect which determined 
that a list of munitions and certain other warmaterials could be exported only 
under special licenses. Also machinery and tools, necessary for the production 
of all the other items on the embargolists were covered by this degree. 
The negotiations of the US with Sweden had been difficult because of the 
importance of its trade with Eastern Europe, the limited Marshall Aid and last 
but not least because of the Swedish policy of neutrality. ü The pressure on 
private companies had already begun with the implementation of the Ryssav-
talet, a fact that initially was denied by the US authorities , but that 
nevertheless had become more and more open with the elapse of time. 
Significant in that respect is the visit that Gumming and the EGA representa-
tive in Sweden, Haskell, had paid to Hans Beck-Friis at the Utrikesdepar-
tementet in October 1948. Haskell appeared to be rather unhappy in his role 
of messenger of the embargo restrictions which he considered had little to do 
with his function of EGA representative. Haskell told Hans Beck-Friis that 
the US had started confidential discussions with the OEEC countries about 
the export of warmaterials to the Soviet Union "and other countries behind 
the iron curtain". He reminded of the section 117 {d} of the Foreign 
Assistance Act. In that connection he refused to use the word "sanctions" but 
preferred instead to talk about "voluntary cooperation" in the interest of all. 
The Marshall Aid would be taken up in Congress, next spring, and it was 
therefore deemed necessary "to show people" how things so far had go on. 
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Time after time Haskell emphasized that the US in principle had nothing 
against trade with the East, on the contrary, they even wanted it to be 
"fostered" but that for reasons of security certain commodities could not 
allowed to be shipped. Such was especially the case with goods which from a 
military point of view were "essentially dangerous". 
Haskell admitted that it was complicated to establish which commodities 
fell under that definition but gave as an example roller and ball bearings 
which might for about 5% be characterized as dangerous from a military point 
of view. To make things easier and also for the sake of avoiding mistakes the 
EGA representative handed over the official American warmaterial list in five 
numbered copies (3-7). The list did not look unfamiliar to Hans Beck-Friis 
because it "resembled our own". The still embarrassed Haskell stressed in an 
almost apologizing way that the list was not to be seen as a kind of an 
"economic warfare list" but merely as a basis for further American-Swedish 
discussions. 
Absolute secrecy with regard to conversations between the US and Sweden 
could be guaranteed. Even the pertinent Congress committee was not to be 
informed. It should be restricted to the party leaders. The close cooperation 
in foreign affairs between president Truman and senator Vandenberg was the 
guarantee that things would not be made public. 
The EGA representative in Switzerland used apparently other methods in order 
to secure the cooperation of Bem. The Swiss ambassador informed Undén that 
his country was asked to accept the war materials list as the basis for their 
trade with the East. Of course in all discretion. The Swiss were also told that 
Sweden had decided to accept the American request. But the Swiss govern-
ment had not believed a word of that allegation and that's why ambassador 
Vallotton had come to see Undén who could assure him that Sweden had not 
yet answered the American request but that it was likely going to be 
negative. According to Undén the US had tried the same hoax with him by 
saying that Oslo was willing to accept the war material list which Undén 
considered to be hardly credible. 
During an informal discussion in Brussels where France, Great Britain, Italy, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden were present the US lists were 
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taken up for discussion. It appeared that Washington had exercised pressure 
on France and the United Kingdom to accept the lists. 
The other countries had until that moment not been subject to pressure. 
All agreed that the lists should be treated as a political question which in 
fact had nothing to do with the Marshall Aid to which they were connected. 
It was agreed that the lists would be handled as "information" and that 
Washington would be told that the lists would be taken into consideration as 
much as possible. An individual approach of the problem was preferred above 
a general European strategy. "Especially" Hammarskjöld, who represented 
Sweden, held that view. 
Haskell did not confine his visits to his call of October 13 1948 when he, 
somewhat embarrassed, visited the Utrikesdcpartementet in the company of 
Cumming. He returned on December 13, this time alone, and on January 7 
1949 he was back again with Matthews. At that occasion he left a secret list 
with commodities of which the export to "the other side of the iron curtain" 
was undesirable. Finland was called "a special case" and the same was true 
for Yugoslavia. On January 28 1949 Matthews was, with reference to Section 
117 {d}, orally informed that goods, which import in Sweden was financed 
through the Marshall Aid, were bound to stay in Sweden and were not 
allowed to be re-exported. Matthews was also promised that special control 
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would be exercised. 
The (oral) American accounts had also, "and principally", a further purpose: 
to have the Swedish government accept the new lists which exceeded the old 
warmaterial conception. The Americans doubted now if they should link these 
lists directly to the Marshall Aid: the first demarches had been made jointly 
by ECA representative Haskell and members of the US embassy while the 
third demarche was made Matthews alone. The wording had not been very 
harsh either: what Washington wanted was voluntary cooperation for the sake 
of both the US and Sweden and it was not their intention to disrupt the 
trade with the East. But from the security point of view special attention had 
to be paid to goods which could serve for the building up of the Eastern war 
potential. 
The difficult point was that nowadays almost any commodity can be used 
in modem warfare. What the US wanted in the first place was a basis for 
1 я 
"friendly discussions" with Sweden. 0 Originally the US had provided the 
Swedes with two lists with commodities: the first one being public and 
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containing war materials which were prohibited to export and which was 
tantamount to the Swedish list, the second list being secret and not meant 
for the public. 
The secret list had been replaced with the 1 A list, pure strategic material 
which was qualified as especially dangerous, and the 1 В list which contained 
material that could be useful in a potential military sense. On January 28 1949 
Matthews received the oral statement that the Swedish government had taken 
the information about the commodity lists ad notant and that her control 
experts and authorities would study it. It was also pointed out that Sweden, 
with regard to war materials, already had promulgated restrictions and export 
prohibitions and that most commodities were already subject to a licensing 
system. For the protection however of Sweden's own security interests it 
might appear to be requisite to extend the realm of commodities which were 
subject to export restrictions. The new American lists could in that respect 
19 be a guide for Swedish resolutions. 7 
On March 20 1949, Gumming and Haskell, informed Stockholm that the 
question of the end-use of some commodities which Sweden imported from the 
USA in due time would be taken up again for discussion. 
In February 1949 the UK and France had decided to follow a common line 
with regard to the embargo policy and had produced a list of their own which 
was a modified version of the American one. Also Sweden was now provided 
with this list and requested in how far they were willing to prevent the re­
export of the commodities on the Anglo-French list for which an export 
licence to Sweden was required. Sweden let orally know that they were quite 
willing to cooperate. In October 1949 the Swedish government agreed to 
21 
control both the export of 1 A and 1 В items to the Soviet areas. 
In December both State Department and EGA representatives returned to 
the Swedish position with regard to the East-West trade. It appeared that the 
US officials had a clear picture of the official Swedish attitude but Dag 
Hammarskjöld felt that they wanted more: control of the by Sweden supplied 
information by means of a direct interview. Hammarskjöld repeated what he 
had said before: there could be no talk of an export policy that was 
established on discriminating principles but Sweden was quite willing, also for 
the sake of her own security, to keep the export of war material under 
control. 
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In principle that was already done "by freezing traditional export pat-
terns", among others in the fields which were covered by the actual lists. 
That implied that strategic and potential strategic material was exported only 
to countries which had been "traditional customers" of Swedish war material. 
The trade could be controlled through the system of export licensing. A 
special officer at the Trade Commission controlled the increase in exports of 
sensitive commodities which "involved a departure from traditional patterns". 
In case of suspicion the matter was raised to "cabinet levels for considera-
tion". 
What Hammarskjöld in fact said was that there existed no official, legal 
export policy with regard to sensitive commodities but that the government at 
any moment, and at the highest level, could intervene if she deemed it 
desirable. Hammarskjöld's answer was considered "very positive" and Ham-
marskjöld's impression was that Washington relied on the good intentions of 
the Swedes as well as on the Swedish governmental capacities and that 
Sweden anyway had "the benefit of the doubt". Hammarskjöld was also told 
that the attitude of Sweden was felt to be much more satisfying than that of 
many other countries who claimed to follow the US political line. However 
one important thing was missing: a statistical elucidation of the factual 
situation although it was admitted that Sweden was on the proper way with 
the material that the Utrikesdepartementet transferred to Washington. It only 
could have been some more. But the bare fact that it occurred was at least 
an indication that both countries would be able to reach a mutual satisfying 
settlement in the embargo policy. Because of the here painted situation 
Hammarskjöld did not expect US much criticism on the Swedish decision not 
to join the CoCom in Paris. But he warned that Sweden must avoid to expose 
herself to suspicion of "bad faith" because: 
"The opinion that great caution in the field in question is the price for 
a maintenance of the complete independence, that we until now have 
managed to maintain, seems (..) confirmed". 
The English Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir William Strang, was 
informed about the definite Swedish standpoint: Stockholm was not going to 
join the CoCom and the US had shown complete understanding for the way 
how Sweden, in practice, handled its "part in question of the security 
problem". Strang's answer was short: "Congratulations".24 
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Ample nine months later, on September 25 1950, the Brirish chargé d'affaires, 
Lambert, informed himself about whether Sweden was willing to follow the 
"Lists of Paris", i.e. the CoCom. Lambert himself foresaw that that was not 
possible and begged that's why to be informed if Sweden in one way or 
another could cooperate in order "to bring the matter a step further". 
Hammarskjöld answered that the Swedish policy made it impossible indeed to 
follow officially the "Lists of Paris" but that Stockholm was much interested 
in receiving information "concerning what other countries considered to be 
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material that was important for warfare". J 
With regard to the East-West trade Sweden maintained close contact with 
Switzerland. Dag Hammarskjöld learned from his Swiss colleague Zehnder that 
Bern also received "information material". In other words: Also the Swiss got 
the common American, English and French lists. With regard to the common 
lists the Swiss had declined all measures but they had followed the Swedish 
example and used them as a basis for a correction of their own lists with 
commodities which were subject to blocking measures. 
The USA had exercised grave pressure on the Swiss government because of 
the very extensive transit trade via the free port of Basle. It had been es-
tablished that great quantities of strategic material, originating from the 
NATO pact nations, via Switzerland reached the communist countries. All 
these goods had a re-exportdestination which at first sight looked innocent 
but which after closer examination appeared to be false. Zehnder presumed 
that there were big organizations behind these affairs. " Similar affairs were 
known in Sweden. The US had also tried to force Switzerland to give 
accurate information about their trade with the East but the Swiss had, as 
contrary to the Swedes, rejected the US demands. Zehnder considered that 
the US control on Swiss activities had gone much too far and therefore been 
subject for Swiss protests in Washington. The Americans, Zehnder complained, 
had gone so far that they had confiscated goods which had been destined for 
Austria. The confiscation was of course regarded as "inadmissible" by the 
Swiss government. 
It had also come to the fore that large quantities of American raw 
materials for Switzerland did not longer reach their destination. Several 
shipments had been blocked which, so believed the Swiss, was due to their 
refusal to accept the CoCom lists as well as rules for their extensive transit 
173 
trade. Bern did not believe that their denial to give information about their 
export trade with the East played a dominant role in the whole affair. Ham-
marskjöld thought that the denial of raw material, at least partly, could be 
explained as a consequence of a US priority system: Switzerland, being no 
NATO member, would be at the bottom of the American priority list but 
Zehnder considered that to be a minor possibility. 
The Swiss diplomat, Petitpieire, held the same opinion: Fieldmarshall 
Montgomery had informed him that NATO headquarters considered a strong 
and well-armed neutral Switzerland the best solution from the NATO point of 
29 view. 
Also with regard to Sweden the question of the East-West trade was still 
subject to American interest. But the State Department could not really make 
up its mind about what to do. One of the reasons was that State was aware 
of the importance for Sweden of imports from Eastern Europe. But pressure 
from Washington might also have political consequences and result in worse 
on 
relations with Sweden. " In that way the US might have hazarded the far 
going Swedish voluntary cooperation as regards the embargo lists. 
But despite that collaboration not all the departments in Washington were 
satisfied. The Pentagon insisted that Sweden should include all the com-
modities on the US embargo lists on penalty of an export stop of almost all 
American goods to Sweden. The Trade department was less radical, although it 
also desired an essential change in the Swedish trade policy. The department 
happened to be under heavy pressure of US business circles which were 
worried about their own export position and that's why demanded that the 
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entire Western world should follow the American directives. But all the 
Swedish concessions appeared in the end not to be enough for the American. 
In the fall of 1950 they demanded also information from Sweden about her 
transit trade with Eastern Europe. 
Nor did the CoCom give way. On October 26 1950 a Sub Committee discussed 
the question of which procedure was to be followed in order to obtain the 
Swedish and Swiss cooperation. The US delegate informed the committee 
members that any considerable extension of Sweden's export controls, in view 
of it's foreign policy, might prove to be embarrassing for Stockholm. In 
addition Sweden had in effect since November 1949 a decree whereby 
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commodities of war and machinery and tools for the manufacture of all the 
other items could be exported only under special licenses. The US appeared 
also to be satisfied about the 
"effective control of transit trade through Sweden by means of a 
comparison by Customs Authorities of incoming and outgoing shipping 
documents. When the destination had been changed on the outgoing 
documents, the goods are not permitted to move". 
The American delegate declared also that Washington had obtained an 
undertaking from Stockholm that war materials imported from the US would 
not be reexported to the Russian sphere. But the US control on Sweden was 
by no means conclusive because there was no 
"control over the reexport of any commodities except for exchange 
control measures which prevent reexport of goods for which Swedish 
payments were made in scarce currencies."-'4 
If Sweden really wanted, so was the opinion in Washington, she could stop all 
exports because she had the administrative apparatus for such an inspection. 
Also the UK appeared to have informal contacts with Stockholm, especially 
with regard to the reexport of certain security goods. London was quite 
satisfied with the measure of cooperation she received from the Swedish 
authorities in those particular cases. Moreover the Swedes had assured that 
they were willing to cooperate in the future. 
Switzerland offered the US the same problems as Sweden: lack of total 
cooperation, while the leakage of strategic commodities was considerably more 
serious than it was the case in Sweden. The Sub-Committee decided, after 
having evaluated the previous approaches which had been made to the 
governments of both neutrals "that the recent offers of informal cooperation 
by both countries should be followed up as expeditiously as possible." The 
ultimate purpose however remained "to secure from Sweden and Switzerland 
the same controls as are operated by the participating countries." As a 
practical compromise for the time being it was suggested to try to have the 
Swedes and Swiss accepted: 
"a. a parallel control over a selected list of items where Swedish (or 
Swiss) production is an important gap in the agreed international 
controls 
b. control over transit trade and free ports 
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с. guarantee against the reexport of strategic goods originating in 
participating countries". 
On the meeting of October 27 the Coordinating Committee approved of the 
conclusions of the Sub-Committee's report. ^ 
But the Swedes stubbornly held to their policy of voluntary cooperation and 
kept on receiving embargo lists as "information". A common demarche of 
England, France and the US was not able to change that attitude. But 
England showed, contrary to the US, considerable understanding for the 
position of Sweden. Hammarskjöld was assured that the Foreign Office had 
comprehension for the Swedish attitude but at the same time he was warned 
that the British probably officially would continue to exercise pressure on 
Sweden. But that was nothing to worry about because it was only a reflection 
of the pressure which London was exposed to herself from the US. 
Makin, the official of the Foreign Office, who informed Hammarskjöld 
about this situation, assured him also that the Americans would continue to 
exercise pressure on Sweden, no matter what their counter arguments would 
be.36 
The official answer to the joint US, French and English demarche was left on 
January 28 1951. It read: 
"The autonomous policy which Sweden has pursued already for a 
considerable period of time as regards exports of commodities of 
international security interest, is characterized mainly by the following 
two principles. Firstly, the Swedish authorities permit exports of war 
materials only to such countries or group of countries which have been 
traditionally been purchasers of war materials manufactured in Sweden. 
Secondly, exports of commodities which, according to available technical 
information, are of strategic importance, although not classified as war 
materials in the technical sense of the word, are allowed to expand 
only to those same countries or groups of countries. In view of the 
relatively low level of exports of such commodities to other markets 
than the ones referred to, this commercial policy, based on the concept 
of 'normal trade', has been considered satisfactory from the point of 
view of general security interests. As to a possible departure, on 
grounds of security, from the principles outlined above in the way of a 
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discriminatory reduction of exports in relation to one particular trading 
area below the traditional level of those exports, it may be pointed out, 
judging the cases from a purely practical standpoint, that such a policy 
would involve evident risks for Sweden's own possibilities to secure an 
adequate supply of goods essential to the economic and military 
strength of Sweden. It is not possible to anticipate that the trading 
partner in question would limit itself to countermeasures corresponding 
only to the reduction of exports; far reaching reprisals in such fields, 
whereby Sweden supposedly is particularly vulnerable, must also be 
expected.' 
In other words: If Sweden went too far in her export restrictions she might 
jeopardize her own, essential imports from the communistic bloc. Especially 
coal from Poland was in that respect very important. Not only because of the 
importance for the Swedish industry but also because of the fact that it could 
be used by the Soviet Union as an instrument of pressure. Coal was vital for 
Sweden's economy, especially since the imports from Great Britain had 
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stopped. " 
Butterworth, the US ambassador who had succeeded Freeman Matthews, 
argued in a conversation with Boheman and Hammarskjöld, that coal meant 
less for Sweden than iron ore for Poland. Butterworth's tone during the 
meeting was described as "bullying". The ideas of the new American 
ambassador were contested by Hammarskjöld who maintained that Sweden only 
thanks to her possession of iron ore had been able to obtain coal from 
Poland: iron ore had been played off against coal. Hammarskjöld also asserted 
that it was impossible to discuss those two raw materials as isolated 
phenomena but that they instead should be looked at as part of the total 
trade.40 
Boheman reported from Washington that the Americans experienced the 
Swedish answer to the joint demarche as a confirmation of the status quo. 
The US would have welcomed very much a statement wherein Stockholm 
expressed her willingness to cut off the strategic exports to, for example, 
Poland, with that measure risking a Polish embargo on the shipment of coal 
to Sweden. The US would in such a case only be too glad to compensate for 
the coal. It was also remarked that the Swedish exports could easily be sold 
on the Western markets. Both State Department and the Department of 
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Commerce showed themselves most worried about the continuing export of 
roller and ball bearings. Boheman had also learned that the Swiss were under 
constant pressure from the US whereby electric generators played the same 
role as roller and ball bearings did in Sweden. 
Also Denmark and Norway appeared to be under American pressure regarding 
their trade with the East. Under the Marshall Aid conditions and as members 
of the CoCom both countries had accepted not to ship goods from the 
embargo lists. The US also urged Denmark, being a NATO member, not to 
ship goods which export might imply a reduction of the Danish defense 
potential, even when those commodities were not included in the official lists. 
As an example electric motors were mentioned. 
The Americans also controlled the transit trade wherever and whenever 
they could. Like the Swedes had the Danes pointed out to their dependence 
on Polish coal for their economy. But promises for compensation coal, like the 
US had done in the case of Sweden, were not made. Instead the Danes were 
told to regard it as a natural part of the "common sacrifice" which all the 
Adantic Pact members had to take upon themselves. 
In the summer of 1951 the Stockholm approach of the embargo policy was 
that she followed her own course but that, concerning export licenses, 
consideration was taken with regard to commodities which could be used for 
(potential) warfare. Existent trade agreements were honoured but the embargo 
lists should, with regard to new trade agreements, be taken into considera-
tion. The US, France and Great Britain were promised to be kept informed of 
the development of the Swedish with regard to the East. 
It is evident that the Swedish government went along with the embargo policy 
as far as she could within the frame of its policy of neutrality and that she 
even exceeded the line of what can be regarded as acceptable within the 
framework of her foreign policy. Such departures were defended with an 
appeal to the own national security: selling war materials to the East would 
undermine Sweden's own safety. On the other hand the Swedish dependence 
on raw materials as coal provided the Eastern bloc a certain grip on the 
government in Stockholm. It is equally evident that the government in 
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Washington considered the Swedish measures insufficient and sought ways to 
improve that situation. 
Washington turned , and not quite unsuccessfully, her attention to private 
Swedish companies from which she, because of some incidents that had 
occurred during the Second World War, could extract certain favours. 
8.3 Embargo policy and Ryssavtalet. 
The historian of the Embargo policy, Adler-Karlsson, has wondered if certain 
Swedish companies have been forced by the US to participate in their 
policy. His theory was that several Swedish firms that had secretly 
cooperated with the Nazi's during the Second World War had been put under 
American pressure to thwart the implementation of the Ryssavtalet and 
accordingly make their tribute to the embargo policy. 
The well known Wallenberg bankers were mentioned as victims of this 
American black mail policy. The funds of the Wallenbergs and their Stock-
holms Enskilda Bank had been blocked in the USA because of their part in 
the so called Bosch Affair. 5 In exchange for the release of their funds the 
Americans demanded the participation of the Wallenbergs in their embargo 
policy^ In the light of the enormous influence of the Wallenbergs on all 
spheres of Swedish industrial life it would have been a real master stroke of 
Washington: participation of the Wallenbergs meant an excellent completion of 
the far going voluntary cooperation of Stockholm. 
It is a theory that cannot be proved with material sources, but it is a 
theory with a high degree of credibility and probability on ground of 
circumstantial evidence. 
It has been established that Swiss firms were under continuous pressure to 
take part in the embargo policy and there is also evidence that the US 
authorities have proposed such a deal - participation in the embargo policy in 
exchange for the release of blocked funds - to another tycoon of the Swedish 
industry who was in a similar position as the Wallenberg brothers: Axel 
Wenner-Gren.48 
Known are also the early US threats (from the fall of 1946 onwards) of 
denial of raw materials if Sweden did not stop her exports to the Soviet 
Union. " Managing director Ericson of ASEA visited Undén on the 12th of 
September 1946 and informed him that he had learned that private US firms 
would boycott the sale of their products to Sweden if their goods, in one 
179 
form or another, would find their way to Russia. He also said he was afraid 
that the American government was going to boycott the Ryssavtalet. The 
management of ASEA had "clear evidence' about American plans to hamper 
the implementation of the Trade and Credit Agreement which was to last from 
1947 to 1952. For that reason the firm sought contact with the Swedish 
government on the highest level. 
Undén was warned that if the American deliveries of raw materials and 
semi-products to Sweden would be stopped or on purpose would be retarded, 
the whole Swedish industry would get into a "very critical situation" and 
deliveries to all other customers would be endangered. 
ASEA proposed to take up an extra article in the agreement with Russia in 
which it was formulated that because of lack of raw materials "(America 
ought in that respect preferably not be mentioned)" the provisions of the 
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Ryssavtalet might not be fulfilled. Ericson's concern that Washington would 
boycott the firms that made deliveries to the Soviet Union elicited from 
Undén the statement that if 
"the American should introduce special provisions for prohibition of 
deliveries to Russia or through Sweden to Russia, that would be 
tantamount to a break of relations between the USA and the Soviet 
Union and almost imply a state of war, and in that case would imply a 
considerable danger for Sweden that then had associated herself too 
much to the one party through failing to make deliveries to Russia.' 
Undén was during that occasion also informed that most of the important 
contractors which were involved in the Ryssavtalet shared the view that was 
brought to the fore by Torsten Ericson. ASEA's played a central role in the 
Ryssavtalet as already has been described. The company was Wallenberg 
controlled. 
SKF took a similar stand as ASEA concerning the Ryssavtalet. The roller 
and ballbearing company was also Wallenberg dominated. Moreover its US 
subsidiary in Philadelphia was under the threat of a law suit for breaching 
anti-trust laws. It is obvious that the authorities in Washington possessed 
some tools that could induce SKF into participation. That SKF smuggled her 
products to the Soviet sphere was due to the circumstance that she was also 
under Soviet influence: Important properties of SKF in East Europe were 
situated in the Soviet zone. 
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It seems plausible that this situation is no theory but reflects reality. But for 
the question of Swedish neutrality it is in fact of minor importance whether 
this theory about forcing private companies into collaboration holds or not. 
From the neutrality point of view it is most interesting to observe that in 
such a circumstance the official foreign policy of a democratically elected 
government effectively can be obstructed by a few influential businessmen. It 
offers a peculiar situation: a state alleges (or believes) to follow a neutral 
course while she in reality is involved in a policy of alignment. 
In the here above outlined peculiar situation a Government may, according to 
International Law, not be accused of departure from neutrality because she 
may not be held responsible for the actions of her citizens, as long as those 
citizens don't trespass national laws. 
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CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS & EPILOGUE. 
It is obvious that the question of neutrality will always bring forth a 
discrepancy between theory and practice. In the case of Sweden the Second 
World War provides us with some excellent examples, even if Undén has 
maintained that not Sweden's neutrality but departures of its neutrality were 
criticized. Formally, Undén's was right but he overlooked the fact that for 
the foreign observers the difference between neutrality and departures from 
neutrality had faded and become almost tantamount conceptions. The 
departures occurred so frequently that the credibility of Sweden's neutral 
course reduced to next to nothing, especially in Nazi occupied Denmark and 
Norway. It was for exactly that reason that those countries during the SDU 
negotiations declared the word "neutrality" taboo. 
To establish that Denmark and Norway abandoned their policy of neutrality is 
easy and leaves no room for doubts. Both joined NATO, a military alliance. 
The answer with regard to Sweden is far more complicated. The precepts of 
International Law are here of little relevance because its rules of neutrality 
only apply to times of war and there was no war in the period which was 
object for my research. But that answer can neither satisfy the historian nor 
the political scientist and it is probably neither satisfactorily for the lawyer. 
What can be concluded from this study in Swedish foreign policy at the 
outset of the Cold War that should split the world in two antagonistic parts? 
In the Swedish archives that I consulted there was nothing that leads me to 
think that Stockholm was ever prepared to reconsider its foreign policy. But 
in various chapters it has also been established that the Swedish concept of 
neutrality in the researched period was not always quite convincing: it was 
certainly not unambiguous and fundamentally dominated by Sweden's own 
national interests. In the words of Undén: "no country regards it as its duty 
to interfere in the course of events sacrifying its own safety." But national 
interest is not an unequivocal concept either because its interpretation 
depends largely on the definition of politicians who are responsible for the 
execution of the foreign policy. And of course those statesmen are, in tum, 
influenced by the spirit of the time, the actual circumstances and last but not 
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least by their personal backgrounds. Those factors carried much more weight 
in Sweden than for instance in Switzerland where neutrality was laid down in 
the constitution. 
What would have happened if the Social Democrats had lost the 1948 elections 
and had been replaced by a liberal-conservative coalition under the leadership 
of Bertil Ohlin and with Erik Boheman as Foreign Minister? The ideas of the 
liberal and conservative parties were considerably more pro-West oriented and 
inspired than those of the social democratic party. Ohlin's neutrality attitude 
has not always been convincing and it is not unlikely that Erik Boheman, of 
whom the British had hoped that he, in case of a social democratic election 
defeat, should replace Undén, would have defined the national interests more 
in accordance with the British view of what that Swedish national interest in 
fact ought to be. That such a government at a given point might have 
changed the foreign policy is not quite unthinkable and cannot, I believe, be 
discounted as unfounded speculations. An alteration of the constitution would 
not have been necessary and neither is neutrality otherwise proclaimed as a 
unalterable state doctrine. The campaign of Tingsten might in the case of this 
hypothetical non-socialist coalition with pro-Westem sympathies have bom 
more fruit and accomplished a change in the public opinion. Neither that is 
pure fiction because it is an undisputable fact that the political consciousness 
and interest of the public at that time left much to be desired: For many 
citizens the meaning of the word democracy seems to have been a mystery. 
Yet the above pictured scenario of 1948 is not very likely because this 
imaginative liberal-conservative coalition would almost certainly have needed 
the support of the agrarian party which pro-neutral attitude was beyond all 
argument. 
The concept of neutrality was during the researched period indisputably 
rooted in a comfortable majority. And for that majority the idea of neutrality 
was certainly more than a phrase: It was a belief rooted in the experiences 
from two world wars and as it were a manifest truth. 
Erlander and Unden were in the examined period (and in many years to 
come, respectively to 1969 and 1962) the guardians of the Swedish foreign 
policy and the guarantee for the continuity of that policy. But sometimes they 
exceeded, in their zeal to defend the neutrality, the limits of what generally 
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is understood by the concept of neutrality, reducing it to a rather empty 
phrase that perhaps adequately can be described as nominal neutrality: 
neutrality in words rather than in deeds. Here is not referred to ideological 
neutrality. In that respect neither Undén nor Erlander wanted to be neutral. 
Undén explicitly claimed the right of an own opinion and the liberty to 
criticise matters which he considered to be unjust; moreover ideological 
neutrality has no legal grounds. 
The Swedish adaptation to the American embargo policy provides us with a 
fine example of nominal neutrality because the foreign policy of the Erlander 
administration differed little from what the authorities in Washington wanted 
her to do. Stockholm saved her face by declaring this policy of adaptation as 
genuine Swedish foreign policy. In fact Sweden had little choice but following 
the course she did. But that is exactly the nucleus of the problem that small 
states, which are to a high degree depended on foreign trade, face by the 
execution of their foreign policy. What would be the verdict of a court on 
Sweden if that court should apply the wartime neutrality laws on the Swedish 
attitude in the embargo policy, supposing that it regarded the embargo policy 
as a wartime blockade and considering that the rules of neutrality prohibit 
the use of a neutral's territory as a base for war operations? Undén might 
have answered that 
"The obligation to take measures against infringements of neutrality are 
limited to the use of means that are at disposal". 
But the implication of this imaginative answer is also an ad hoc neutrality: a 
flexible neutrality, dominated by circumstances. 
The case of the SDU provides us with another example of nominal 
neutrality because it was a neutrality disguised in words. Sweden wanted to 
stay neutral but considered that purpose to be in danger in case that her two 
neighbouring countries would associate themselves with a Western military 
pact. All of a sudden Swedish neutrality become an export product and was to 
embrace the whole of Scandinavia. Sweden would have formed a military 
alliance with her neighbours in order to defend her neutrality if she could 
have convinced her partners of the advantages of the Swedish SDU concept. 
Is a military alliance of neutral states not a contradictio in terminis? It is 
true that Sweden in the SDU case, in comparison with the embargo policy, 
did not submit to American threats of no deliveries (non-aid) but that cannot 
be explained by an outspoken Swedish persistency to hold to neutrality. The 
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real answer has nothing to do with higher principles relating to neutrality: 
The Erlander government simply did not believe the threats because it was 
convinced that the West in case of factual non-aid would have harmed the 
latter's own position in the first place. 
The Swedish belief in neutrality is to a very high degree historically 
determined and certainly the Second World War has made an impressive and 
convincing contribution to the idea that neutrality is the policy that serves 
the nation's interest best. The Cold War did not have a notable influence on 
the post war foreign policy of Sweden. That fact is essentially due to Osten 
Undén who deserves, more than anyone else, to be called the architect of 
post war Swedish foreign policy. He was, as already has been remarked in 
this study before, the embodiment of the Swedish neutrality. Undén held a 
remarkable position in the Cold War because he was one of the few statesmen 
who was not or hardly infected by the Cold War virus. The Swedish Foreign 
Minister had a natural suspicion vis à vis the Great Powers and was 
convinced that their interests in most of the times did not, and neither could 
not, correspond with those of Sweden. Moscow trusted him, a fact of which 
Undén as we have experienced was fully aware, and relied on the Swedish 
Foreign Minister's ambition to stay outside any Western defence community. 
Accordingly Moscow did not put pressure on Sweden. The Soviet approach to 
Swedish politics was in the pertinent period more realistic than the US 
strategy which at times made a rather chaotic or even outspokenly unprofes-
sional impression. The last phenomenon was largely due to the duo Cumming-
Matthews at the US embassy in Stockholm. 
London in its turn showed more sense of reality and understanding towards 
Undén's foreign policy but had always to reckon with the USA. 
It has also been established above that Finland was of little or no influence 
on the attitude of Sweden, although sometimes, with an eye to the public 
opinion, another impression was evoked. In what I consider Undén's most 
important document on foreign policy from this period, the memorandum of 
April 2 1948 Finland is not even mentioned. The memorandum also confirms 
that Sweden's non-participation in the two World Wars of this century 
provided the basis for and its belief in its post war foreign policy. 
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With regard to the future foreign policy of Sweden the question remains in 
how far she, because of her virtual dependence on foreign trade and technical 
developments, and with only a very limited hold on private undertakings, can 
cany out a credible policy of neutrality. The problem will not be manifest as 
long as there is peace but will emerge in times of crises and definitively in 
case of war. The outcome will be determined by two major factors which will 
be the ultimate test: the amount of pressure from the side of the West and 
above all the extent of her stores of strategic goods. It might be expected 
that the problem of securing necessary supplies in the event of war will only 
increase with the lapse of time which is due to the constantly growing 
economic dependence on the rest of the world. That factor of dependence 
might finally result in the departure from even her nominal neutrality. 
In that situation only a total nuclear war could prevent Sweden from 
making that ultimate choice. 
Epilogue. 
But there is another, non-violent, phenomenon that in due time might cause 
Sweden to abandon her neutrality: the European Economic Community (EEC). 
The idea of membership was rejected in March 1971 because it would have 
caused the loss of her complete freedom in foreign politics and would have 
drawn her in the common policy of the member states. Another reason was 
that existing plans for a monetary and economic union would have deprived 
Stockholm of an essential part of her national sovereignty as far as her right 
to decide about her budgets and her economy was concerned. 
Also the internal political situation made the adherence to the EEC quite 
controversial. Instead of the membership a free trade agreement with the 
accompanying tariff benefits was negotiated. With the European integration 
wave of 1992 in sight the membership is anew taken up for discussion. Prime 
Minister Ingvar Carlsson has declared that he wants an extensive cooperation 
with the Community except in the field of foreign and security policy. But a 
membership was for the social democrats out of the question. Conservatives 
and liberals however do not want to exclude an EEC membership in the 
future, i. e after 1992. Since late 1987 a flood of articles, dealing with the 
question of an eventual Swedish membership in EEC, has appeared in the 
Swedish media, The group that wants association seems to be growing. There 
is however still much debate about the kind of association. Much of the 
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discussion is determined by the Swedish background of neutrality and 
consequently the questions are mainly focused on matters of security policy as 
well as on the question in how far the freedom to follow one's own foreign 
policy is restricted. Those discussions are not likely to stop in the near 
future. 
On the contrary: they seem only to intensify. Also the contacts on 
governmental level with the EEC are increasing. The European integration of 
1992 might bring about something that neither two World Wars nor the Cold 
War could accomplish: Serious cracks in the Swedish bulwark of neutrality. 
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6.PRO. FO 188/1566. N 6731/78/42 Foreign relations Great Britain -Sweden. 
Hankey to Jerram, June 1st 1946. 
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PRO. FO 371/77394. Scandinavian Defence and the Atlantic Pact. January 17 
1949 by Hankey. 
About two weeks later, on February 4 1949 Hankey told Hägglöf that he 
personally did not like the idea of Sweden joining Nato (it was after the SDU 
failure) because the Pact would in that case move too closely to the Soviet 
borders. ASFO. HP Vol. 987 Memorandum by Hägglöf of a conversation with 
Hankey. 
7.PRO. FO 115/4435. Ministry of Defence to Joint Services Mission, February 
10 1949. Top Secret. Replies prepared by the British Chiefs of Staff. 
The whole text of this important document reads as follows: 
"Question 1: What strategic role is anticipated for Scandinavia in the event of 
war? 
Answer (a) To deny its territory to the enemy 
(b) To grant to the allies the use of Greenland and the right of entry 
to the Faroes should this be necessary 
Question 2: Would our strategic objects be accomplished by Scandinavian non 
belligerence or neutrality? 
Answer: The major strategic role of Scandinavia is to deny its territory to 
the enemy. This role would be fulfilled if Scandinavia could achieve non-
belligerence or neutrality. On the other hand, our requirements for the use of 
bases in Greenland and the right of entry into the Faroes will not be met 
unless Scandinavian non-belligerence or neutrality excludes its overseas 
territories. 
Furthermore, if Scandinavia is attacked it would not be able to maintain its 
territorial integrity unless 
(a) the enemy are being held in Western Europe, and 
(b) the three Scandinavian countries have coordinated their defence plans in 
peace and have received assistance in equipment and training from the 
Western powers. 
Apart from this however it, it is difficult to imagine that the neutrality is 
likely to be respected by either party 
Question 3: In the light of the above answers, what are the relative 
advantages to the North Atlantic Powers of: 
(a) Norwegian and Danish membership in the North Atlantic Pact with a 
neutral Sweden, unwilling to contribute in any way to the defence of Norway 
or Denmark unless it is itself attacked? 
(b)Scandinavian Defence Pact committing Norway, Sweden and Denmark to go 
to war in the event of an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any 
of them, but precluding any association either by Treaty or through military 
conversations with the parties to the North Atlantic Pact? 
Answer: On balance the Scandinavian Defence Pact appears, from the military 
point of view, to have certain advantages over Norway and Denmark joining 
the Atlantic Pact to the exclusion of Sweden. We realize that the political 
considerations might outweigh the military considerations, which are not very 
strong either way, but we must emphasise that the provision of direct military 
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or air assistance by the Western Union Powers in war is military 
unjustifiable. 
(a) Norwegian and Danish membership in North Atlantic Pact. 
Advantages 
The advantages of this course are: 
(a) It would meet our strategic requirements in Greenland and the Faroes 
(b) The likelihood of Iceland joining the Atlantic Pact would be increased 
(c) In war the Norwegian and Danish Merchant Navy would be at the service 
of the Allies 
(d) There is some chance that Sweden, feeling her isolation would make 
independent arrangements with Norway and Denmark. 
Disadvantages: 
Disadvantages of this course are: 
(a) We should be under great pressure to give Norway and Denmark appreci-
able military equipment which could only be at the expense of Western Union. 
Furthermore, the provision of assistance would not help us in war, as without 
Sweden, the resistance of these two countries is bound to be ineffective, 
however much equipment they have been given. 
(b) In the event of war, there is a serious danger that we should be morally 
obliged to give direct assistance to Norway. We can ill afford such assistance 
and we can certainly not give it in sufficient strength to prevent that 
country from being overrun. 
(b) Scandinavian Defence Pact 
Advantages 
Advantages of this course are: 
(a) The combination of the three Scandinavian countries would increase their 
deterrent power against possible Russian aggression. By coordinating their 
defence plans the Scandinavian countries would be better able to prolong 
their defence if attacked. 
(b) The net result might be that the Scandinavian countries would be left out 
of the initial stages of any future war and if they could maintain their 
neutrality they would achieve our principal object which is to deny Scan-
dinavia to the enemy. 
Disadvantages: 
Disadvantages of this course are: 
(a) As already stated there may be difficulties in our occupying Greenland and 
the Faroes 
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(b) Iceland may well follow Norway, Denmark and Sweden in such a policy. 
Should she join the Scandinavian Union, the American occupation of bases in 
Iceland on the outbreak of war would be a clear casus belli for the Scan-
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S A M E N V A T T I N G . 
DE ZWEEDSE NEUTRALITEIT IN DE KOUDE OORLOG, 1945-1949. 
Introductie. 
De vraag waarom Zweden geen partij heeft gekozen in de opkomende Koude 
Oorlog is tot dusverre nooit bevredigend beantwoord. Studies over het 
onderwerp zijn zeer schaars en maken bovendien slechts in uiterst geringe 
mate gebruik van Zweedse bronnen. De voornaamste reden daarvoor was dat 
de Zweedse overheidsarchieven niet voor onderzoek toegangelijk waren. 
Voor dit proefschrift kon echter wél gebruik worden gemaakt van die 
bronnen. Als eerste onderzoeker verkreeg ik toegang tot de archieven van het 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken te Stockholm. Ook kreeg ik toestemming 
om de privé archieven en dagboeken van zowel de toenmalige Minister 
President Tage Erlander als zijn Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Östen 
Undén, de architect van de naoorlogse Zweedse buitenlandse politiek, te 
benutten. Tevens ben ik in de gelegenheid geweest om diverse prominente 
politici uit de bewuste periode, waaronder Erlander, te interviewen. Ook 
werden ten behoeve van mijn onderzoek de archieven van de Zweedse 
politieke partijen ontsloten. Tenslotte heb ik een groot aantal kranten en 
periodieken over de periode 1945-1949 systematisch doorgenomen en verwerkt. 
In de introductie wordt een schets gegeven van de achtergronden en 
geschiedenis van de Zweedse neutraliteit die tijdends de Tweede Wereldoorlog 
meer pragmatisch dan neutraal bleek. De ervaringen uit die periode oefenden 
grote invloed uit op de naoorlogse buitenlandse politiek. Hoe weinig de 
neutraliteitsinvulling van 1940-1945 door o.a. de Scandinavische buurlanden, 
Denemarken en Noorwegen, werd gewaardeerd bleek uit hun verzoek aan 
Zweden om het woord neutraliteit niet meer te gebruiken. 
In de introductie wordt ook nader ingegaan op het begrip Koude Oorlog, 
waarom de periode 1945-1949 gekozen is en de methode van benadering en 
onderzoek. 
Het proefschrift tracht een antwoord te geven op de centrale vraag of de 
neutraliteit in de turbulente naoorlogse jaren ooit ter discussie heeft gestaan, 
zowel binnen de regering als binnen de politieke partijen. 
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1. Het VN lidmaatschap. 
De discussie over de compatibiliteit van neutraliteit met een lidmaatschap van 
een internationale volkerenorganisatie werd in feite al in 1920 gevoerd toen 
de Volkerenbond werd opgericht. Van grote weerstand zoals die in 1920 tegen 
het lidmaatschap bestond was er in 1946, toen toetreding tot de VN ter 
discussie stond, geen sprake. De Zweden zagen in het functioneren van de 
Veiligheidsraad een garantie voor hun neutraliteit. De Raad besliste over 
sancties tegen landen maar kon dat alleen doen als zeven van de elf tellende 
Veiligheidsraad leden daartoe besloten. Bovendien moesten de Supermachten, 
die permanent zitting in de Veiligheidsraad hebben, zich unaniem voor sanctie 
uitspreken. Op die wijze zou Zweden nooit onverwacht of ongewild aan de 
zijde van het Oost- of het Westblok kunnen geraken. 
2. Tussen Oost en West. De Krediet- en handelsovereenkomst met de Sovjet 
Unie. 
Het krediet aan de Sovjets ter waarde van 1 miljard Zweedse kronen zorgde 
voor grote onrust in de binnenlandse politiek en in de media. Toch durfde 
geen der politieke panijen tegen deze overeenkomst van 1946 te stemmen die 
al tijdens de oorlog was voorbereid: in de Tweede Wereldoorlog werd Zweden 
geregeerd door een coalitie waarin alle partijen, behalve de communistische, 
vertegenwoordigd waren. 
De eerste tekenen van de Koude Oorlog hadden inmiddels ook Zweden 
bereikt. De VS protesteerden middels een nota tegen de Zweeds-Russische 
overeenkomst. 
Het krediet werd een mislukking in die zin dat de Sovjets slechts de helft 
opnamen. In hoofdstuk acht wordt nader op die mislukking ingegaan en in 
verband gebracht met de Amerikaanse embargopolitiek tegen het Oostblok. 
3. De Marshallhulp. 
De Marshallhulp stond ter discussie omdat de VS via die hulp invloed zouden 
kunnen uitoefenen op de politiek van Stockholm. Dat Zweden toch mee deed 
had een aantal redenen: Zweden was gebaat bij de wederopbouw van de 
Europese economie, het importeerde belangrijke grondstoffen uit de VS en 
bovendien kon het de groeiende invloed van Washington in Europa niet 
negeren. Acceptatie was een kwestie van goodwill. 
De Amerikaanse sympathie voor Zweden was al tijdens de wereldoorlog 
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drastisch verminderd vanwege de Zweedse opstelling. De kredietovereenkomst 
met de Sovjet Unie had de relatie nog verder vertroebeld. 
De hulp die Zweden in de vorm van een bescheiden lening accepteerde 
moet dan ook voornamelijk als een verzoenend, symbolisch gebaar worden 
gezien 
4. Toenemende spanningen in 1948. 
De communistische machtsovername in Tsjechoslowakije en het Sovjet voorstel 
aan Finland om een vriendschapsverdrag te sluiten brachten de gemoederen in 
Europa hevig in beweging. Zweden hield het hoofd, zeker vergeleken met 
Noorwegen en Denemarken, opmerkelijk koel. Wel groeide de verontrusting 
over de houding van Noorwegen dat steeds meer naar het Westen leek over te 
hellen. Ook de oproep van de Engelse Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Ernest 
Bevin, aan Europa om zich te verenigen werd niet zo krachtig door Oslo van 
de hand gewezen als Stockholm wel gewenst had. 
5,6 en 7. De Scandinavische Defensie Unie. 
In deze hoofdstukken wordt uitgebreid ingegaan op het voorstel van Undén (3 
Mei 1948) aan Denemarken en Noorwegen om een Scandinavische Defensie 
Unie (SDU) op te richten. Bij de Zweedse regering bestond de vrees dat 
Noorwegen zich op termijn bij het Westen zou aansluiten. Die eventuele 
Noorse stap werd als een directe bedreiging voor de Zweedse neutraliteit 
gezien want als Noorwegen aan de kant van het Westen in een oorlog zou 
worden meegesleurd, zou de kans van Zweden om buiten dat conflict te 
blijven gering zijn. 
De oprichting van een ongebonden SDU leek de enige mogelijkheid om 
Noorwegen van de gevreesde stap af te houden. Via de SDU wilde Stockholm 
a.h.w. haar eigen neutraliteitsopvatting aan geheel Scandinavië opleggen. Van 
Mei 1948 tot Januari 1949 werden diverse onderhandelingen gevoerd maar in 
feite waren ze vanaf het begin tot mislukken gedoemd. Noorwegen achtte, met 
het oog op nationale veiligheid een zekere mate van associatie met het 
Westen noodzakelijk terwijl Zweden dat juist als het grootste gevaar 
beschouwde. 
Van de kant van het Westen werd er druk op Scandinavië uitgeoefend om 
toe te treden tot een Atlantisch Pact, de toekomstige Navo. Groot Brittannië 
was traditioneel hoofdzakelijk in Noorwegen geïnteresseerd. De aanwezigheid 
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van de Sovjet Unie op de Noorse kusten zou immers een direkte bedreiging 
voor de UK vormen. 
De Amerikaanse belangstelling ging vooral uit naar Denemarken. Dat land 
zelf was nauwelijks van enige betekenis voor de VS maar het bezat wel 
Groenland waar de Amerikanen sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog vliegbases 
bezaten die voor Washington van enorm strategisch belang waren. Denemarken 
voelde het meest voor de Zweedse optie, een neutrale SDU, desnoods zonder 
Noorwegen. Zweden weigerde echter om samen met Denemarken een militair 
verbond te vormen. In Noorwegen bestond er binnen parlement en regering 
een groep die nog twijfelde over de wenselijkheid van een samengaan met het 
Westen. Hun uiteindelijke beslissing zou doorslaggevend zijn voor zowel de 
Noorse als de Deense koers. Als Oslo voor het Westen zou kiezen had 
Kopenhagen geen andere keuze dan het Noorse voorbeeld te volgen. Geï-
soleerde neutraliteit werd niet verantwoord geacht en Zweden was absoluut 
niet geïnteresseerd in een Deens-Zweedse militair verbond. 
Zowel van de zijde van Stockholm als van Washington en Londen begon 
het touwtrekken om de Noorse gunst. Stockholm hoopte dus een onafhanke-
lijke SDU van de grond te krijgen, de Anglo-Amerikanen op de associatie van 
Noorwegen en Denemarken met het Atlantisch Pact. 
De druk op de Scandinavische landen was aanzienlijk. Het grote verschil 
tussen Oslo en Stockholm was dat de Noren, in tegenstelling tot de Zweden, 
de Brits-Amerikaanse pressie serieus namen. De houding van Denemarken 
speelde in dit verloop nauwelijks een rol. Door Moskou werd nauwelijks druk 
op Stockholm uitgeoefend. Undén werd als een garantie voor de neutraliteit, 
die het Kremlin het liefst gehandhaafd wilde zien, beschouwd. 
De positie van Finland speelde in de Zweedse overwegingen nauwelijks een 
rol hoewel naar de publieke opinie toe het tegendeel werd gesuggereerd. 
De Zweedse militaire top voelde het meest voor aansluiting bij het Westen. 
Het gros van de media (behalve de belangrijkste liberale krant Dagens 
Nyheter) steunde de regeringspolitiek en hetzelfde kan gezegd worden van de 
politieke partijen. Alleen de communistische partij (en de door haar gecontro-
leerde media) prefereerde handhaving van de oude neutraliteitskoers. 
Uiteindelijk zouden Noorwegen, en dus ook Denemarken, zich bij de Navo 
aansluiten. 
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8. De Amerikaanse embargopolitiek en de Zweedse neutraliteit. 
De Amerikaanse pogingen om Stockholm officieel te laten deelnemen in hun 
embargopolitiek tegen het Oostblok mislukten hoewel de Zweden in de 
practische uitvoering van hun politiek wel heel ver met het embargo 
meegingen. Zweedse bedrijven werden door de VS onder druk gezet om mee te 
doen op straffe van stopzetting van leveranties van grondstoffen en tech-
nologie. 
Het is aannemelijk dat diverse industrieën, op grond van hun activiteiten in 
de Tweede Wereldoorlog ten gunste van Nazi-Duitsland, door de VS onder 
druk werden gezet. In eerste instantie bood de reeds genoemde kredietover-
eenkomst met de Sovjet Unie daartoe een goed handvat omdat quota, 
leveringsdata etc. precies bekend waren en daarom gecontroleerd konden 
worden. 
Conclusies en Epiloog. 
In de onderzochte periode heeft binnen parlement en regering de neutraliteit 
nooit ter discussie gestaan. Toch was die neutraliteit niet geheel ondubbelzin-
nig. Pragmatisme, ingegeven door nationale belangen, speelde een grote rol in 
de uitvoering van hun buitenlandse politiek. Ook is het duidelijk dat het 
Zweedse vertrouwen in neutraliteit in hoge mate historisch werd bepaald (met 
name door de Tweede Wereldoorlog) maar ook de persoonlijke opstelling van 
Undén en Erlander vormden een factor van betekenis. De Koude Oorlogs 
mentaliteit had verrassend weinig invloed op dit regeringsduo. Beiden 
wantrouwden zowel Oost als West. 
De vraag is nu hoe lang Zweden de verlokkingen van de EEG van 1992 kan 
weerstaan. Toetreding zou het begin van een definitief afscheid van haar 
neutraliteit betekenen. 
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T H E S E S 
1. It may be considered undesirable that Sweden will ever be forced to prove 
the ultimate reliability of its neutrality because this would demand a new 
total war. A nuclear war, on the other hand, would make the test superfluous. 
2. As long as citizens of neutral states are not hampered by international and 
national laws to deal with warfaring parties and accordingly are able to 
benefit at least one of the belligerents, the concept of neutrality is more 
fiction than reality. 
3. The Swedish (voluntary) participation in the US embargo policy may not be 
considered a departure from neutrality, as long as it has not clearly been 
proved that it was more than a coincidental synchronization of the Swedish 
policy with the demands of the USA. 
4. As long as the nationality of the submarines violating Swedish territorial 
waters cannot be established with more accuracy it would be preferable to 
refer to those phantom ships, in analogy with UFO, as USMO: Unidentified 
Sub Marine Objects. 
5. The thesis that the Nato preserved peace in Europe is as untenable as the 
theory that the Warsaw Pact threatened it (or the other way round, depend-
ing on one's domicile in Europe). The only possible conclusion is that peace 
was preserved. The question if this was due to or despite the existence of 
the pacts remains for ever unsolved. 
6. Presupposed effects on ideological adversaries, mutual prejudices and 
distrust are the main ingredients of the Cold War. 
7. Good personal relations between the leaders of the Super Powers produce 
more positive effects on disarmament conferences in a single day than the 
usual reduction talks in a decade. 
8. Neutral states in wartime are indispensable: they provide the various intel-
ligence services of the belligerents with a safe haven from where activities 
can be conducted and where informal contacts between the enemies can be 
maintained. 
9. The acceptance of Marshall Aid provided the US with so much influence 
over the economy of Sweden that the phrase "non-alignment" is an inadequate 
description of the factual situation. 
10. Proposal for a Swedish national motto: East, West, Neutrality Best. 
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